Asset Ownership, Climate Variability and Policy Design: Game Theoretic Insights on Tuna Management Outcomesтезисы доклада

Дата последнего поиска статьи во внешних источниках: 28 мая 2015 г.

Работа с тезисами доклада

[1] Robert M., Peter G., Kathleen M. Asset ownership, climate variability and policy design: Game theoretic insights on tuna management outcomes // IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings. — Le Corum Montpellier, France, 2010. — P. 209–209. Tuna fisheries around the world are governed by Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs), whose membership includes both harvesting nations and nations in whose waters the targeted fish populations reside. The outcomes of the policies established by an RFMO will depend on subsequent interactions among the fleets, the fishing sites and the RFMO itself – an interplay that can be formally modeled as a multi-party harvesting and management game. This paper uses such a model to explore the consequences of alternative policies that might be pursued by the Western and Central Pacific Fishery Commission in its efforts to manage fisheries for tropical tuna in that region. The analysis indicates that while the RFMO can achieve any given biological objectiveby in a variety of ways, different types of policies will have very different implications for who benefits from the policy as well as for the overall level of the economic returns that can be obtained under the policy. Furthermore, policy outcomes will vary considerably depending on whether or not coalitions form among the various fishing nations and coastal nations in whose waters harvesting occurs. In addition, climate-related shifts in the distribution of the stocks between EEZ’s and the high seas can affect the biological and economic consequences of the RFMO policy choices. Recent policy developments in the region are evaluated in light of insights from model simulations.

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