Аннотация:The article deals with the questions of material incentives and anti-corruption behavior of public officials. In the research process of the theoretical foundation it was concluded that tasks set for the professionalization of the public service and improvement of its efficiency require an appropriate result-oriented system of remuneration. By studying the problems of managing material incentives for labor to ensure anti-corruption behavior of civil servants, specific proposals have been formulated to take into account such aspects of public office that characterize its corruption risks within the framework of the factor-point assessment of the positions. Since a civil servant, whose labor activity is associated with the possibility of “unhindered” obtaining illegal benefits and advantages, in the context of a system of material incentives that is insufficient to meet his primary needs, strictly speaking, is deliberately directed to commit corruption crimes. The results of the study on the transition to the factor-point assessment of positions as a measure of the validity of wages are presented in this article. However, the considered factors, which are traditionally used in assessing positions for their importance and “weight”, are not able to reflect the particular features of civil service.