Место издания:Экономический факультет МГУ имени М. В. Ломоносова, Москва
Первая страница:155
Последняя страница:164
Аннотация:The paper studies reputation and morality as the determinants of tax avoidance and evasion by firms, household and individuals. There are several directions of research in the literature of tax avoidance and evasion drivers: agency problems, corporate governance, tax rates, the probability of detection and punishment, penalties, risk-aversion and intrinsic motivations of economic agents. The latter approach investigates moral and reputational factors in decisions of agents. The aim of the author is to offer guidelines for policy-makers and tax authorities for improving tax collection systems as well as strategic directions for firms by unification of moral and reputational costs approaches in the context of tax evasion and avoidance. Based on extensive historical review and theoretical modelling approach, the author fills in a recent gap in the literature on tax collection and develops a general model of tax avoidance and evasion moral trade-offs by economic agents. The model is then used to check the behavior of economic agents to administrative policy-measures, implemented by tax and financial authorities. Overall results will be of interest to scholars of institutional and behavioral economics and taxation, and tax and financial administrations.