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E. Sokolova: "Russian psychologists embraced the view that the activity theory was extremely impractical because, unlike psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology, existential psychology, etc., which have truck with the real, 'concrete' man, it only considered 'man as such,' the 'abstract' man ... it is the activity theory that contains an immense practical potential, if 'practice' is understood as something other than hurriedly organized training or the use of some unthinkingly acquired 'competences' ... practice is the *practice of life* ...rather than the use of ready-made tools developed by someone else."

S. Lurye: "It took for nations to implement the ideologem of internationalism, not to speak of the fact that from the point of view of Soviet ideologists a developed society invariably consists of nations the models of relations among which had to be developed and an image of 'the Soviet man' committed to internationalism had to be created. Thus the project sought to implement two opposite goals. On the one hand, a deliberate attempt was made to awaken national consciousness... On the other hand, as soon as national self-consciousness became more or less discernible it was subject to repression as 'petty bourgeois nationalism'... The intricacy of such a dual policy and ideology generated excessive attention to interethnic relations and a cult of the 'friendship of the peoples.'"

Prolegomena to the Next Modernization of Russia

Georgy SATAROV

What Is at Issue

The term "modernization," if understood literally, means bringing something in line with the modern state of affairs. The latter, of course, refers to that modern state of affairs—of which there is always a multitude—, which is interpreted as the most advanced and effective. The current fashion for the term "modernization" is a conscious, but also sometimes subconscious, reaction to the acute sense of dissatisfaction (to put it mildly) with the situation in Russia. The popular term can be applied to literally anything because in the same way the sense of dissatisfaction can be referred to "literally anything."

This situation puts power and society in unequal positions. Their sense of dissatisfaction stems from different sets of causes and as a consequence they have different systems of priorities (different hierarchies of modernization goals). But the authorities have vastly more resources for imposing their agenda, their ideas of priorities and methods of going about solving tasks. That prompts new causes for dissatisfaction: the authorities feel distressed that society does not understand their sincere and noble intentions while society accuses power of all the deadly sins: from being blind and deaf (as a minimum) to selfish and occasionally criminal intentions (at the other end of the spectrum). The two sides lose the habit of listening to each other, and are often unwilling to do it, and the institutions of mutual and voluntary cross-pollination have either been destroyed or have an artificial character not conducive to real or effective dialogue.

Meanwhile, as regards "modernization," we find ourselves again in a situation typical of Russia which is marked both by discontent and by attempts to improve certain things that cause it. Equally characteristic are mutual deafness, radicalism of people's expectations, half-hearted actions of the authorities, mutual disenchantment, rollback followed by a historical pause until another drive of modernization.

All this raises two important questions. First: can the country not only develop but simply exist long enough in such an erratic mode? The second (twin)

G. Satarov, President of the Russian *INDEM* (Informatics for Democracy) Fund. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 5, 2011.

question is: are there countries that develop, but are not subject to regular and desperate modernization drives? And what distinguishes these countries from us and countries similar to ours?

I am not sure that a universal answer to the first question exists. I suspect that there are at least two typical scenarios. The first is a moderate one. The countries following that scenario live through modernization cycles, but each new attempt is weaker than the previous one, involving less discontent and less effort. The country gradually settles in a dead-end historical niche and ceases to be actively involved in social evolution (in a broad sense). The second scenario, I think, has a direct bearing on Russia. Under that scenario, with each new attempt at modernization problems multiply and the authorities' ability to cope with them diminishes. In parallel, the scale of external challenges grows while the country's ability to meet them diminishes. The result is a kind of generator with a positive feedback that blows up or (with luck) dissolves the country from within. That was how empires perished and fell apart. And Russia in some ways is still an empire. True, that is not its only problem at the moment.

The answer to the second of the questions asked above merges with my attempt to answer the first question. The answer is not comforting. Does it mean that our country is doomed? If not, what can break the destructive vicious cycle? I believe that an answer can be found if Russia is compared with the countries not subject to modernization cycles (in the sense indicated at the beginning of this article). The article below will try to provide such an answer.

Power and Civil Society

Why, as I have claimed above, do some countries develop without experiencing a sporadic urge for modernization? The answer follows directly from a sort of definition that was given at the beginning of this article. A country does not need modernization drives if it is located in the zone of modernity and develops within that zone. In other words, there is no need for extraordinary spurs to catch up with others if you are among the front runners.

This leads to the next question: why have they found themselves in the zone of modernity and why do they remain in it? I would permit myself to formulate the following thesis, actually quite banal: those countries can stay in the zone of modernity that are the first to cross the border between modernity and the future. Obviously that border is somewhat blurred and often invisible; there are no border posts marking it, it is everywhere and it can be crossed in various ways. Let us imagine that countries are pedestrians walking into the future, rather bulky creatures that move fairly slowly. I maintain that the countries marching at the head of that column are pedestrians on their two legs: one leg is an effective state (power) and the other is a developed civil society. I maintain also that crossing the border between the present and the future occurs at a time when the second leg—the civil society—is at the head of the column (it is worth remembering that two-legged creatures normally move by putting first one foot and then the other

foot forward). My contention assumes a certain division of functions between modern power and modern civil society.

Any complex self-organizing adaptive system faces two cardinal tasks: the first is to maintain the integrity and stability of the system and the second is to adapt to external challenges as well as internal problems that inevitably arise. These two conflicting tasks are solved more or less effectively if they are morphologically attached to different "organs" of the system. In our case power is responsible for integrity and stability and all the state institutions are geared to this task. Meanwhile civil society ensures adaptation.

The latter proposition is very important and merits a closer look. Any person, any communities, including countries, encounter as they move into the future, a common problem: the problem is that the future is unpredictable in principle. The chaotic diversity of the civil society generates innovations—technical, social, cultural—which in general become a reservoir from which solutions are drawn for the impending future or which generate current decisions for which the future becomes a filter that selects them. To use the idiom of the games theory: no determined rational strategy (which are the characteristics of power)[1] can win against a player with a random strategy (the future); only an alternative random strategy (provided by civil society) has a chance against it.[2] Thus we are dealing with evolutionary inevitability without which society's chances to survive are dubious. Douglass Cecil North put it in the following way: "Over time, the richer the cultural context in terms of providing multiple experimentation and creative competition, the more likely is the successful survival of society."[3]

"The richness of the cultural context" North is referring to is created by the civil society. It embodies the evolutionary imperative of "multiple experimentation and creative competition." This is something the state-power is incapable of, not because of its ill will, but because it has a different nature, a different organization and a different mission.

The civil society complements power in yet another important sphere: by constantly controlling the latter it flags the accumulating problems, diagnoses them, looks for new solutions, brings pressure to bear on power inducing it to use the necessary institutional, technological and cultural innovations while being actively involved in these actions. Thereby the civil society constantly shakes up the rigid lattice of the social order that power seeks to create in performing its main function of ensuring stability. If the crystal lattice of social order does not become ossified, it retains the capacity to change without self-destructing, which is a feature inherent in effective democracies. In this way the leading countries move into the future. To put it in a more simple way: civil society diagnoses problems at an early stage and proposes solutions as well as determines innovations. These proposals are selected and absorbed by the authorities and when necessary are consolidated by constant modification of the existing institutions. This is a continuous process that does not call for "modernization" in the shape of campaigns prompted by a sense of overall backwardness.[4]

Undoubtedly, the process described above is no guarantee against crises that may break out in the economic sphere and in other spheres such as foreign and

domestic policy, etc. Economic crises have become part of our lives, occurring with a depressing and inexorable regularity. They are not like the crisis of the Second World War triggered in many ways by the "Munich collusion" of European democracies, because that crisis was seen as a victory by political leaders and had almost unanimous public support. Today Europe faces the crisis of multiculturalism. However, established democracies have the potential to adapt themselves to overcome such crises sacrificing, when necessary, a great deal to preserve the main quality, i.e., adaptivity referred to above. Examples in point are Great Britain or France shedding their imperial shells after the Second World War.

Institutional Transformation

As mentioned above, adaptive movement into the future (I shy away from the term "sustainable" because it is unrealistic) is shored up by constant modification of institutions. Let us have a closer look at the issue.

Let us proceed from the modern interpretation of the concept of institution according to North.[5] Paraphrasing slightly, it can be put in the following way: an institution is a combination of formal norms, informal prescriptions and the terms of their functioning. North does not analyze the last element of the triad, yet it is very important. An analysis of the transformation of the judiciary in Russia and other countries, which is the subject of a major study carried out by the *INDEM* Fund,[6] gives grounds for the following generalization. The conditions mentioned include: related institutions (for example, for the law courts the Prosecutor's Office is the key related institution); the history of the institutional drift; the external environment (for example, the terms of the country's economic competitiveness); the structure of the prevailing social relations (of which more below); traditions; popular perceptions and convictions (in my opinion, North overestimates their importance).

Another important point: institutions are effective when the three components—formal norms, informal prescriptions and the conditions for their functioning—do not contradict each other, but on the contrary are complementary to each other. It is the contradictions among the three components of an institution that create tensions[7] that make them less effective and prompt a transformation and improvement of institutions. If the authorities for some reason fail to respond to the rising tensions and do not consent to improve institutions (sometimes sweeping and profound improvements are needed) then the growing tensions are resolved in a revolutionary way. The dangerous rigidity of power often stems from its belief that it is irreplaceable or from a fear of being replaced because of the crimes it perpetrates. Both can delay revolutionary upheavals, but when they do happen they tend to be even more dramatic. That brings us back to the theme of interaction between the authorities and the civil society. A strong civil society is inconvenient and burdensome for any authorities, but it diminishes the chances of power turning into a rigid suicidal monster.

There is another problem connected with the theme of civil society. People who believe that there is a reasonable cause for everything ask the legitimate

question: "What are institutions for? Modern theory answers (and I must fall back on North's definition): "The institutions diminish uncertainty in the interaction among people." However, things are not that simple. We must distinguish the process of interaction and its result. One can cite institutions of which it is said that the main thing about them is "strict adherence to rules while the result is uncertain." The key example is elections. If the result of elections (somebody's victory) is a foregone conclusion because of compliance with certain procedures, then elections cease to perform their main function, i.e., a play with a random strategy and unpredictable outcome. Elections are an example of an institution that shares its basic generic nature with civil society. The results of the actions of these institutions are chaotic, random and unpredictable. These are not institutions of order, but institutions of chaos, which are just as necessary as the former.

Thus, along with institutions of order there exist institutions of chaos, moreover, institutions of order sometimes rise in defense of the institutions of chaos (and chaos, chance and unpredictability as such). And to show that the thesis is not too "way out" I will illustrate my proposition with a real-life example.

The late 20th century ushered in the Internet era. The state tried to harness that powerful and independent spontaneous element. In the USA the President signed a Communications Decency Act (CDA) on February 8, 1996. The adoption of the act was prompted by the need to curb the harmful impact on children of pornography purveyed via the Internet (and by other equally understandable motives). However, that first attempt ended with a history-making verdict of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.[8] The concluding part of the 70-page document signed on June 11, 1996 reads: "Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects.

For these reasons I without hesitation hold that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face."

This example bears out the above said: the court is an institution called upon to preserve the immutable social order and yet it protects another institution, the Internet, on the grounds that its main virtue is chaos. Let me note that we are actually talking about two institutions of chaos: freedom of speech and the Internet.[9]

Evolution of Institutions and Project Transformations

One can identify two ways in which institutions with new characteristics appear: through evolution and through projects. A great deal has been written about institutional evolution (or spontaneous appearance of institutions) by scholars ranging from Friedrich Hayek to North,[10] not to mention their forerunners who studied the processes of unintentional emergence of institutions, such as Edmund Burke or Adam Smith. The idea, however, challenges our common sense and experience. Throughout our conscious life we observe and occasionally take part in deliberate efforts to change institutions by suggesting certain corrections that are subsequently embodied in laws we draft for that purpose. In

other words: we witness or participate in a project change (or even creation) of institutions. Does not our personal experience bring constant proof that institutions are created as a result of conscious project efforts?

I have a hunch that here we are confronted with a certain defect of our psyche: we tend to record and remember our grand efforts aimed at improving something, but we tend to easily forget the failures of our efforts. Part of the reason, I believe, is that while we legitimately claim some credit for our great and noble efforts, we attribute failures to somebody's intrigues or to our bad luck. How else can we account for the results of our conscious project efforts if their failure is not the worst of what can happen? And what could be done if the result is a catastrophe, as described by James Scott? In a more general way we have no right to forget what Anthony Giddens called "unintended consequences." Personal experience constantly provides us not only with examples of our intentions, but with examples of unintended consequences. A classic example is *perestroika* undertaken by Gorbachev. It was aimed at strengthening the USSR and ended up destroying it.

Less ambitious projects aimed at improving concrete institutions through concrete normative improvements are of the same nature except that their consequences are less important. Behind all of them is the common misconception, often called legalism, though "normative fetishism" might be a better description. Basically, it is the conviction that social order can be effectively improved by adopting new formal norms. This misconception is reinforced by the fact that some improvements of the social order may indeed occur after the adoption of new laws. However, "after" does not mean "as a consequence of." Success occurs if the laws identify and ensure ongoing social changes, if new formal norms (a modified formal institution) correspond to the already existing informal norms and practices and the conditions of the functioning of the institution.

However, the practice of the state's project activity since the state of Russia appeared in the 17th—18th centuries prompts the need to consider an alternative method of institution-building, i.e., project transformations of institutions. That trend has been particularly apparent since the second half of the 20th century. The first wave was triggered by changes in the countries that emerged after the dissolution of the colonial system, and the second by the collapse of the Soviet empire. Both waves were marked by normative fetishism. It is to a large extent the numerous setbacks of the primitive approach to transforming institutions that forced economists to rethink their concepts and prompted a new and broader interpretation of institutions of which a variant was spelled out at the beginning of this article. There are safe grounds for considering this to be an independent method of institutional transformation because of its scale and importance today. Formerly major institutional transformations were rare and came as a result of revolutionary upheavals. But it needs to be understood that the proposed distinction between different types of institutional transformations is to be taken with reservations, for it is obvious that the evolution of institutions means a series of discrete institutional changes. Each of them is a separate and comparatively small project which has its own goals, actors and involves concrete steps thought to be rational by these actors.

The evolutionary process of institution-building consists in a long sequence of individual steps that harmonize formal norms, informal prescriptions and conditions (terms) of their functioning. Such gradual harmonization ensures that the new institutions emerging in an evolutionary way are effective. The project method of institution-building concentrates on changing the formal norms. The result is a break of the connection between components of the institution in its modern broad sense, which is why projects of institutional transformations are ineffective. The rupture of the links referred to above is arguably the main but so far little studied problem with the project approach to institutional change. Below I will share some views on one aspect of the problem revealed by the *INDEM* Fund study referred to above.[11] I mentioned in the beginning of this article that the formal norms must correspond to the structure of the basic social relations that may be described in different ways. Let us dwell on one such description.

In democratic societies horizontal relations (cooperation, competition, horizontal trust) prevail over vertical relations. This is a fairly well-known proposition that has been expressed in various equivalent forms. It is often a tacit understanding, but sometimes is articulated and occasionally even becomes the basis of entire theories. Interestingly, from whatever angle various social thinkers tackled the task of building theories of modern society, the common denominator of their efforts was the same (whether it is articulated or not): the predominance of horizontal relations. Let us consider three examples.

Talcott Parsons identified four subsystems in modern society.[12] The first two are absorbed almost entirely by civil society and are based exclusively on horizontal relations. They are the economic subsystem and the societal community (ensuring coordination of various elements of society). The third subsystem is politics in which the dominant role is played by political competition, which is inherently horizontal, just like economic competition. The fourth subsystem, called "fiduciary system" by Parsons, is intended to be a vehicle of cultural models and ensures their assimilation. Obviously, it includes not only education. Yet even to that extent the state in modern democratic countries does not quite fully cope with that task. And if one remembers that it also includes culture and the arts, the share of horizontal relations in that subsystem increases sharply.

Niklas Luhmann, in building his grandiose theory of society[13] uses the category of communication, namely, horizontal communication, as its basis. According to Luhmann, social communication is maintained by the equality of participants among whom knowledge and lack of knowledge as well as the sources of new knowledge are distributed differently over various issues and occasions. Communication has no borders. In undemocratic societies, it has to be noted, communication goes from top to bottom: the sources of knowledge are at the top and ignorance is at the bottom. New knowledge comes from top to bottom. Communication in the opposite direction is limited and regulated from above; the limits of information flows are also established from above.

Ernest Gellner introduced the concept of "modular man," referring to a multiplicity of roles an individual can assume in a developed civil society, i.e., the ability to form groups over various issues. One and the same person may be a

member of different groups (relations) and identify oneself with them. "The modular man can combine into effective associations and institutions, *without* these being total, many-stranded, underwritten by ritual, and made stable through being linked to a whole inside set of relationships, all of these being tied in with each other and so immobilized. He can combine into specific purpose, *ad hoc*, limited association without binding himself by some blood ritual. He can leave an association when he comes to disagree with its policy, without being open to an accusation of treason. A market society operates not only with changing prices, but also with changing alignments and opinions."[14] Obviously, he is referring to the multitude of horizontal relations that form the civil society. The latter—and this is a commonplace—is the foundation of democratic societies.

Institutions, above all legal and economic institutions, in developed democracies are effective because the power institutions and the political system cater first and foremost to this kind of horizontal relations and are geared to them. Below, using Russia as an example, we will consider how the discrepancy between prevailing social relations and formal norms manifests itself.

Towards the New Modernization

As mentioned above, Russia is living through another period of obsession with modernization. It is accompanied by the degradation of the governance system due to unprecedented corruption; the weakening of the civil society which has become the final target of the authorities committed to liquidating any institutional autonomy; and demoralization of the population affected by indifference and cynicism. The signs of disintegration consist not only in the fact that the current regime in many ways reproduces the trajectory of the disintegration of the USSR. The most tragic thing is the prevailing sense of loss of the future. That syndrome is most dramatically manifested in the flight of capital and people from the country. One can argue that the traditional Russia's cycle—partial modernization followed by a rollback—may be the last not on the way to a historical impasse, but on the way to disintegration. This prompts the conclusion that Russia can only be saved by the last modernization that will lend the country new qualities of institutional adaptivity and innovative capacity for moving into the future. This can happen under favorable political conditions, if modernization sets other goals and is carried out by other methods. To support these conclusions let us consider some of the previous modernizations.

The reign of Peter I completed the building of an absolute centralized monarchy. His reforms followed three directions. First, the creation of a "regular" state, which he saw as a machine effectively designed to implement the will of the autocrat. The operation of that machine was to be regulated by written norms that rigidly regulated the activities of officials. Peter's principles of the state were fairly faithful copies of the European innovations of the time in the sphere of building state bureaucracies. He had accomplished a great deal, many of his efforts were crowned with success in his lifetime. However, the only dri-

ver of that new machine was the indefatigable energy of the monarch himself. When it disappeared with the death of the monarch, the machine began misfiring and then began to fall apart. The second area was the technical revolution aimed at creating a modern army and weaponry. The industrial revolution, strictly regulated by the state, was geared to that task. The third area can be described as cultural. Travelling in Europe Peter, who was sensitive and perceptive, realized that Russia was epochs behind Europe. Russia had missed the era of the Renaissance and the Modern Times. Upon returning to Russia the tsar proceeded to ruthlessly impose not only the modern European way of life, but cultural ideals, for example, the adoration of the aesthetics of Ancient Greece and Rome. He devoted even more energy to the technical training of groups of the nobility, and not only the nobility, in order to meet the challenges of Modern Times. Numerous new educational institutions provided the children of the nobility with a grounding in natural sciences and instructed them in how to use European technical and military achievements.

Peter gave Russia such a powerful push that its imperial military might endured for more than a hundred years, until the Crimean War. Russia became a member of the club of great European powers. In addition, Russia entered the European cultural space even if that process was skin-deep. However, this is one of those situations where not only the result but the means of achieving it were important. The tsars who succeeded Peter on the throne took the soft option, following the path trodden by Europe: they expanded the privileges of the aristocracy at the expense of the rights of all the other social strata. The state machine built up by Peter was degrading. But the most dreadful legacy left by Peter was that he chose to borrow the results of European development and not the methods by which they had been achieved (I am borrowing the diagnosis formulated by Akhiyezer, Klyamkin and Yakovenko[15]).

Therefore after Peter's death the reforms lost their driving force. I would dare to assert that Russia's backwardness was programmed by the success of Peter's forcible reforms because they deprived Russia of the main institutions that launched the processes of the country's self-development.

Modernization under Alexander II turned out to be the first serious institutional transformation in Russia's history involving as it did not only the emancipation of the serfs, but also education, the judiciary, local government, freedom of speech, the public budget, etc. However, only the reform of education was implemented with active participation of society, met social expectations and therefore turned out to be the most successful. On the whole, the reforms of the Tsar the Emancipator were inconsistent, widening, though paradoxical that would seem, the gulf between absolute power striving to preserve absolutism, and the emerging civil society, which made the tsar a victim of his own reforms and predetermined a rollback from these reforms. It is important, with a view to my intended conclusions, to note that Alexander II's multifaceted reforms did not touch the foundations of autocracy. They generated many expectations in society that power failed to meet. Alexander II only decided to meet these expectations when he had already been sentenced to death by the terrorists. The constitutional attempt made

by Nicholas II was belated: the country seemed to have entered an active and fruitful transitional phase, but the First World War proved to be too much of a trial for a Russia enfeebled by the transitional process. As a result the young constitutional monarchy proved unable to withstand external and internal pressures.

The Bolsheviks, led by Stalin, repeated Peter's feat. By conducting a forced industrialization they restored the country's military might, but at the same time predetermined the country's future lag. The political system they created was even more rigid and more dangerous for its citizens than the monarchy it had succeeded. The totalitarian regime deferred the next crisis of the empire by a whole 70 years.

The modernization launched by Mikhail Gorbachev and continued by Boris Yeltsin was the most massive of all. The gap between the totalitarian state and the model they strove to implement was appalling. That predetermined the difficulty of the transition processes. The chosen modernization strategy based on normative fetishism made the new institutions ineffective. Russia experienced a veritable revolution in the sphere of formal institutions. These have been borrowed from developed democracies and for that reason were aimed at regulating horizontal social relations (above all in the sphere of law and economics). However, the informal norms and practices, people's consciousness have a great inertia and cannot change as fast as the formal norms; therefore informal norms remained primarily vertical. The result was a gap between vertical social relations, vertical consciousness and the new laws aimed at regulating horizontal relations. That gap was filled by corruption which made the new institutions still less effective.

The attempt made in the first decade of the 21st century to rectify the situation by returning to the old vertical system of governance has failed. The reasons are obvious. First: the dubious legitimacy of the regime that owes its power more to bureaucracy than to the citizens. Second: the stake on bureaucracy as the subject of modernization did not work because of the absence of a docile, honest and effective bureaucracy. Third: suppression of all autonomous institutions by the executive branch gave free rein to bureaucracy and as a consequence to the rapid growth of corruption and increasing inefficiency of power. The new attempt at technological modernization contemplated by President Medvedev is doomed to failure because it repeats the main mistake made by Peter I: it seeks to borrow the results of development and not the conditions that have ensured it. Furthermore, modernization targets the sphere that is not connected to the country's main problems. The failure of that attempt will mean the collapse of the regime which may coincide with the collapse of the country.

Russia needs a different, and radical last modernization. Its main aim should be to create adaptive mechanisms of development and its main driving force should be the civil society. I hope that the chance has not been missed.

Outlines of the Next Modernization

What is to be done to use that chance? I do not pretend to know the ultimate truth. I can merely share some preliminary thoughts, prolegomena, so to speak.

I draw some inspiration from an event that occurred while I was writing this article: during an annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the then IMF President and Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn declared a formal renunciation of the Washington consensus thus putting an end to one of the most destructive projects in the spirit of high modernism, a project that spanned the whole world and damaged not only the countries in the process of modernization but the very ideas of democracy and liberalism and triggered the movement of antiglobalism.

The numerous modernization projects within the Washington consensus ideology were marked by the old legalistic approach to the institutions as sets of formal norms. The substance of these projects was simple borrowing of laws from the countries where these laws had appeared in an evolutionary way. This primitive borrowing led to failures because of the contradiction between the new norms, on the one hand, and the old informal prescriptions and the conditions of the functioning of the formal norms and informal prescriptions which were simply ignored, on the other hand. One particular but very important contradiction arose between the new norms that correlated horizontal relations (the Civil Code and the plethora of laws regulating the market) and the old "vertical" thinking, informal vertical relations (as between patron and client), the "vertical" practice of power, the vertical organization and practice of law courts, the prosecutor's office, the police, etc. That contradiction, or gulf, if you like, was the reason for the inefficiency of regulation and hence for corruption which brought more inefficiency.

Informal prescriptions and conditions of the functioning of these prescriptions and formal norms possess great inertia. By changing formal norms overnight and ignoring all the rest we unwittingly create the abovementioned gulf. What happens within it? At this point it is worth recalling an important principle of the "second cybernetics" formulated by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela: external actions on a complicated adaptive self-organizing system are *not instructive,* in the sense that they do not contain an instruction as to how the system should react to these actions. The system reacts in accordance with its internal organization. Here is but one example. It is believed, with some reason, that high salaries of judges is one way to make them independent. When the salaries of judges were raised significantly in Russia in the early 2000s, the effect was to make them still more dependent. The reason was obvious: by that time the judiciary had been so structured that any norm that spelled some benefits for judges was used as an instrument of control.

One-time sweeping change of norms promotes the formation of new informal prescriptions in the social environment existing at the time of change. That happens due to the interaction of several processes, including the emergence of new informal norms and practices and constant selection of old and new informal norms and practices in the context of new formal norms. Various circumstances influence the processes of selection, which is similar to evolution. Let me name just two. First: the impact of external factors. For example, high oil prices are known to influence the countries that have large oil reserves. Second: the models of behavior set by the elites (let us recall what Norbert Elias noted) are

percolating from the elites down the social ladder.[16] Let me cite two examples. In 1994 President Yeltsin ordered his Defense Minister Grachyov to attend a court hearing initiated by the Minister himself who had sued the newspaper *Moskovsky komsomolets* for defamation of character. That gesture set a new standard of the attitude to an independent judiciary. Obviously, such a situation would have been unthinkable within the framework of the Soviet court system. After the court verdict on the first trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, followed by the decimation of the Yukos company, a new pattern of relations between power and business was created to be soon copied all over the country at various levels of government. Both examples are instructive because they involve a contradiction between horizontal norms, on the one hand, and vertical traditions and informal relations, on the other. Under the new Constitution the judiciary branch is an equal branch of power alongside the other branches. However, the old tradition of the courts playing a subordinate role in the system of old vertical relations between power institutions turned out to be stronger as it was not supported by new examples of the attitude to law courts, especially on the part of the supreme political power. Similarly, the Soviet tradition implies vertical relations between political power and economic actors. The market does not envisage that kind of relations, a fact reflected in the new laws. However, the old tradition has prevailed because external circumstances (oil prices) made the old vertical pattern of relations preferable for power over the new horizontal relations.

The trend of launching modernization projects is constantly promoted by the intellectual products brought out both by the opposition (political and intellectual) and the brain trusts that are in the service of power. Both share one fundamental flaw (and here I am referring to the best specimens): a displaced or belated diagnosis (in the lucky instances when such a diagnosis exists at all). For example, both the former and the latter say rightly that Russia needs to have its political and legal institutions restored. However, while the idea was taking root, another problem overshadowed it.

The degradation of institutions as a result of actions by government has been very much in evidence during the past decade, it stares you in the face. There is no doubt that efforts in this sphere must be made, but their effect takes time to kick in. In the meantime Russia is experiencing a less obvious but a more dangerous catastrophe. Here are its main signs: the shortening of life expectancy; a shrinking population, deteriorating public health, especially children's health; a dramatic rise of the share of handicapped children; a spike-like sharp increase in the rate of dangerous diseases (especially AIDS and tuberculosis); declining quality of education at all levels; de-intellectualization of the nation; mercantilization of higher education; an exodus from the country of the more active and educated part of the population; low public morale; loss and devaluation of moral standards; and criminalization of daily life. In my opinion, when and if any reforms yield fruit, there will be nobody in Russia to enjoy them, especially if one considers that the people who leave the country are precisely those who should be shaping demand for such reforms, a demand for a radical modernization.

The depopulation of Russia aggravates yet another unique factor: never in the history of our country was its ruling class, in its overhelming majority, so well educated and at the same time so unmotivated to conduct modernization. Unprecedented corruption has swept the country. Fear of losing power or changing its antisocial nature is proportionate to corruption and grows alongside corruption. Finally, for more than ten years many people have been putting into question the legitimacy of political power in Russia. If one recalls what has been said earlier about society the obvious problem stands out: the lack of the subject of modernization. So, the object of modernization is dissolved and the subject has disappeared. Unless this is borne in mind in launching the radical modernization it will be bereft of any meaning.

The last problem has to do with the defect that marks democratic and liberal modernization projects regularly proposed by official think tanks. They are all based on the "assumption of governability": it means that minor managerial actions lead to adequate and expected ("positive") reactions of the political system that is being acted upon. With respect to Russia that hypothesis is absolutely wrong. I would like to cite two examples of different scales. First: the adoption of the amendment initiated by President Medvedev that bans the confinement in prison of people, charged with economic crimes, at the stage of pretrial investigation. The result has been nil. People are still kept in jail as before. The second example is on a larger scale: the anticorruption campaign launched in 2008. Many little steps have been taken, but the absence of any results has been admitted by the President himself.

In this article I merely suggest that the decisions connected with the last modernization project of Russia should be looked for in a different place than they are being looked for today. Summing up the above, one can formulate several theses identifying the zones of the future search.

1. The last modernization project must be institutional.[17]
2. The modernization of any institutions should be preceded by a thorough diagnosis of the sphere of the regulation of these institutions.[18]
3. Modernization of institutions should not be confined to changing formal norms. That effort should be complemented by acting on informal prescriptions with due account of the conditions in which formal norms and informal prescriptions function.
4. In designing ways to influence informal prescriptions it should be borne in mind that the main gap between formal norms and informal prescriptions during the course of the reform of institutions, burdened by the totalitarian heritage, appears between the new formal norms that regulate horizontal relations and the informal prescriptions and the conditions traditionally adapted to vertical relations.
5. Informal prescriptions can be influenced by acting upon various mechanisms of selecting informal norms and practices in the process of their adaptation to new formal norms.

6. In designing the set of measures aimed at transforming institutions and their succession one should reject the governability hypothesis. That means that instead of a strategy of step-by-step change a strategy of massive and multi-pronged influence on the regulatory sphere should be used.
7. The next modernization should target, above all, people, their health, education, culture, environment and safety. Failing that, it is not worth even starting modernization. As a second priority a large-scale institutional modernization should be carried out, with institutions interpreted in a modern and expanded way.
8. The main target of modernization among the state institutions should be the judiciary.[19]
9. The main task of the future modernization should be the leveling of the relations between power and the civil society to give them a horizontal character. For that purpose the civil society must from the outset become an equal partner in implementing such modernization.

NOTES

1 This is brilliantly described in James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed,* Yale University Press*,* 1998. The author introduces the concept of "high modernism" to describe projects carried out by the state to make people happier by rationalizing and bringing uniformity to the activities of these people, thus dooming such projects to failure.

2 For more detail see: G. Satarov, "How Can Social Change Become Possible: the Discussion of a Hypothesis," *Obshchestvenniye nauki i sovremennost (ONS),* 2006, No. 3, pp.23-39; G. Satarov, "The Institutions of Chaos: the Problem of Recognition," *Politia,* 2008, No. 3, pp. 45-66. See also David Stark "Heterarchy: Ambiguity of Assets and the Organization of Diversity in Postsocialist Countries," *Economic Sociology: New Approaches to Institutional and Network Analysis,* Moscow, 2002, pp. 47-95 (in Russian).

3 D. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change,* Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 36.

4 The process described is characteristic of Western civilization. The alternatives offered by Eastern civilizations are beyond the scope of this article. The main reason is that the author is convinced that Russia belongs to the Western civilization. Lack of space is an additional reason.

5 D. North, op. cit.

6 A. Gorbuz et al., *Transformation of the Russian Judiciary. An Attempt at a Comprehensive Analysis,* St. Petersburg, 2010 (in Russian).

7 The term "tensions" is used in the sense Kurt Zadek Lewin attributed to it.

8 www.ciec.org/decision_PA/decision_text.html.

9 Speaking about institutions I proceed from the interpretation of this concept that has been adopted by sociologists: a totality of stable interconnected social practices ensured by the existence of universally accepted norms, formal and (or) informal.

10 See for example: F. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom,* London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944, (published in Russian in 1992); F. Hayek, *The Counterrevolution of Science.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952, (A Russian translation published in Moscow in 2003); J. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,* Cambridge University Press, 1990; D. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change.*

11 A. Gorbuz et al., op. cit.

12 T. Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies,* New York, 1973.

13 Luhmann builds a theory of modern democratic society. He does not always say so explicitly but it shows systematically in his discourse. See, for example: N. Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. (I.1 Gesellschaft als soziales System,* (S. 11-189)), Frankfurt am Main 1997.

14 E. Gelner, *Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and Its Rivals,* Hamilton, London, 1994.

15 A. Ahiyezer et al., *A History of Russia: the End or a New Beginning?* Moscow, 2008 (in Russian).

16 N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (the History of Manners),* vol. 1, Oxford, 1969.

17 This is a truism. Everybody writes about it. But I am citing this thesis because so far political power has been more oriented towards technological borrowing.

18 That is another truism, but it is not in evidence in the implementation of the reforms initiated from the top or in the reports of most think tanks about modernization.

19 This does not directly follow from the text of the article, but to bolster that thesis would have doubled the size of the article. The validation can be found in: A. Gorbuz et al., *Transformation of the Russian Judiciary. An Attempt at a Comprehensive Analysis,* op. cit.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

"The Great Game." Russia and Great Britain in Central and Eastern Asia (the latter half of the 19th century— early 20th century)

Evgeny SERGEEV

The phenomenon of "the Great Game" in the interaction between the British and Russian empires in the East throughout the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries is in need of reinterpretation because new data have come to hand concerning the substance of that process, its chronological framework, its localization features and the main stages.

Traditionally, the concept of "the Great Game" applies solely to the rivalry between England and Russia in Central Asia in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The Tsarist government's aggressive policy in the region confronted the British Cabinet of Ministers with a three-fold task:

- first, to preserve the balance of forces in Europe,
- second, to ensure the security of India which was the main source of the wealth of the mother country and
- third, to protect the strategic trade routes.

However, the latest studies show that this perception of "the Great Game" is not complete and does not correspond to the modern view of the problem. The genesis, content and features of "the Great Game" and its impact on international relations are still an insufficiently studied area. In the literature, both inside and outside Russia, the history of "the Great Game" is still fragmentary. And the concept of "the Great Game" is today used rather as a literary cliché to denote the geopolitical rivalry of various states, ranging from the USA to China, which robs it of its concrete historical meaning.[1]

Experts usually study "the Great Game" between Great Britain and Russia either within the boundaries of such state entities as Persia, Afghanistan, the Central Asian khanates, etc., or else as a process determined exclusively by the

E. Sergeev, D. Sc. (History), professor, leading research fellow, the head of the 20th-Century Sociopolitical and Economic Problems Center at the RAS Institute of World History. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya,* No. 3, 2011.

military-political considerations of the main protagonists. That leaves out the economic and sociocultural motives of "the Great Game" which, among other things, included the need to modernize the traditional Oriental societies, a process that the European powers managed to impose on them.

One of the most controversial issues in the study of "the Great Game" remains its origin and causes. It has to be stressed that the expansion of the British and Russian empires towards each other in Central and Eastern Asia stemmed first and foremost from the geostrategic ambitions of their ruling circles which sought to move to the natural limits of territorial expansion. The prestige and power of a state was traditionally associated with the expanse of its possessions and the natural wealth under its control. The British and Russian empires were no exceptions in that respect. The Liberal and Conservative governments in the United Kingdom succeeding one another did all they could to compensate for the loss of the North American colonies ("the first empire") by acquiring possessions in Asia and Africa ("the second empire"); the Russian autocrats beginning from Peter I, who undertook an expedition to the shores of the Caspian, considered reaching the eastern and southern seas to be a key foreign policy goal.[2] Commenting on Russia's unrestrainable push to the South and East across the vast steppes, the deserts and mountain ridges to gain access to the most significant sea routes, the *New York Times* wrote on January 29, 1873: "As the great highways of Western commerce are the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean and as she (Russia) possesses very inadequate means of reaching any of them, the great problem of Russian statesmanship must continue to be, as it has been for the last 200 years, how to obtain for her a southern seaboard."[3]

The interests of the Russian empire determined the importance of the key coastal strongholds such as Murmansk and Archangelsk in the North, Constantinople in the Turkish Straits, Libava and Riga on the Baltic, Vladivostok and Port Arthur on the Pacific.[4]

Thus the geostrategic potential of the continental empire was strengthened by the acquisition of naval power that guaranteed the protection of the coast and the land borders. Characteristically, the American student of geopolitics Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the founders of the concept of "sea power" (The Influence of Sea Power upon History) compared Russia's advance towards the Persian Gulf to Britain's similar actions in Egypt: "Russia is in a disadvantageous position for the accumulation of wealth; which is but another way of saying that she is deficient in means for advancing the welfare of her people, of which wealth is at once the instrument and the exponent. This being so, it is natural and proper that she should be dissatisfied, and the dissatisfaction readily takes the form of aggression—the word most in favor with those of us who dislike all forward movement in nations."[5]

At the same time Russia's goals in Central and Eastern Asia called for major government spending, for example, to develop military settlements and border strongholds that formed protective lines and to colonize the vast sparsely populated territories. It was important to determine the natural boundaries that were often formed by areas inhabited by autochthonous ethnic entities that differed in

terms of language, religion and cultural traditions. This activity initiated contacts with the population engaged in farming, contributed to the appeasement of the bellicose nomadic tribes and protected the caravan routes that crisscrossed the Eurasian continent.[6] Great Britain, for its part, was faced with the task of completing the industrial revolution and consolidating its leadership in the world trade markets. In contrast to the doctrine of mercantilism that provided the justification for the British movement beyond Europe in the early Modern Times, the "second empire" was created on the basis of competitive economy as reflected in the classical works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. While in the 17th—18th centuries the "first empire" attracted mainly plantation owners and commodity traders who were shuttling between London and New York to acquire wealth in remote corners of the British possessions, the "second wave" entrepreneurs sought to invest their money in creating new markets for the output of British factories while at the same time providing them with the necessary sources of raw materials.[7]

Members of aristocratic families, with rare exceptions, still occupied key government posts both in the Russian and in the British empires throughout the 19th century, their foreign policy decisions often running counter to the economic interests of the industrialists and the social needs of hired workers. "The British elite, drawn in part from the aristocracy for a long period of time, and mostly with an Oxbridge education overwhelmingly classical (or more recently historical) in its emphasis, was frequently disdainful of business interests."[8]

However, towards the end of the Modern Times pragmatism and hard-nosed calculation of the statesmen and businessmen who led the British political and economic expansion in the Asian countries gradually began to prevail over the yen of the offsprings of noble families to set out to remote exotic countries to face dangers.

A typical feature of both Russian and British colonial administrations throughout the 19th century was the comparatively broad autonomy of local military and civilian officials appointed by the governments of the mother countries. While they had their career ambitions, they combined their commitment to diligent fulfillment of their official duties "in the borderlands of the empires" with an unshakable conviction that their mission was to promote national interests on a truly cosmic scale. The energy of these people's activities was reflected not only in the reports of journalists, but was vividly described in adventure novels and glorified in poetry.[9]

However, in spite of the outward similarity of their civilizing missions in the East, Russia and Britain differed in at least three important ways. Russia by the middle of the 19th century, the time when "the Great Game" began, remained a continental preindustrial country whose government, as the British historian Alfred Rieber rightly pointed out, continued to struggle to contain the outflow of the population which either evaded fulfilling government duties or sought to gain additional economic opportunities and raise its well-being.[10] Great Britain by that time had turned into a major maritime power, "a workshop to the world" having restored its might after a temporary weakening caused by the American

revolution and the Napoleonic wars and had gone through industrial modernization in the period between 1780 and 1840.

The impact of Great Britain on the international relations during the reign of Queen Victoria has come in for detailed description by historians.[11] The Second Empire can be described as Protestant, commercial and maritime" power whose possessions were interlinked by free trade and whose motto was summed up by three "C"s: "Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation."[12]

Unlike Tsarist Russia, the British political elite by the mid-19th century was acutely aware of the need to harmonize the liberal principles of parliamentary democracy in the mother country with the largely authoritarian style in which London governed the colonial periphery, with the exception of the so-called "white dominions" where the institutions of representative power were successfully grafted.

In contrast to Russia, Great Britain preferred to assert its dominance over dependent territories through behind-the-scenes deals, compromises and subsidies to the local rulers, although the British Cabinet was not above using military force when local chieftains refused to go along with that "harmony" of bilateral relations. Considering its obvious leadership in maritime trade, the majority of British people believed that first commercial and then entrepreneurial incomes were more important for increasing the wealth of the empire than the dubious benefits derived through iron-fisted military-political control of the overseas territories.

That is why, in addition to the geostrategic motives of "the Great Game" it also had a series of underlying economic reasons. In spite of the fact that the two empires exhibited an equal need to expand the raw materials base for industrial development, many experts have drawn attention to the differing character of British and Russian commerce. Statistics show that England derived significant revenues from trade with Asia, especially such countries as China and India. Thanks to its foreign trade surplus it managed to cover the deficit that arose in the export-import operations with the US and European companies, including those of Russia which was Britain's second biggest trade partner after France throughout the 1860s—1880s. Specialists stress that the surplus in trade with India was one of the reasons why London sought to preserve low mutual tariffs in commercial transactions with the USA and European states. No wonder that imperial expansion appeared to the advocates of an aggressive foreign policy to be "an inevitable givenness and a solemn obligation" of maintaining Britain's world leadership.[13]

Unlike the English industrialists, the Russian entrepreneurs were not prepared to openly challenge their rivals in the European consumer markets. However, the required level of overall demand for domestically produced goods both within the empire and in the neighboring Asian countries could also be ensured by political methods. As T. Michell, an attaché of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, wrote in his memorandum on trade between England and Russia in 1865, that it was, precisely, "the object for which so much revenue (as customs duties.—*E.S.)* is annually sacrificed, so much fraud and demoralization tolerated, for which international, commercial relations are permitted to suffer neglect, and to which it

should be remembered, the most important interests of Russia have been made subject, is the protection of native industry from ruinous foreign competition."[14]

It needs to be stressed that the Russian merchants usually tried to break into those local markets where Tsarist diplomats and the military ensured their monopoly. In other words, most of the merchants, mainly of Asian origin, who delivered goods from the Russian empire to Central and Eastern Asia would have gone bankrupt if the principles of free trade had been spread to these regions. Only a very limited range of Russian exports could hold their own in terms of price and quality against the goods from British India or the China's Qing Dynasty. Such Russian products as calicoes,[15] metal tableware, hardware, leather, sugar, kerosene, flour accounted for 80% of the empire's exports to the Eastern countries.[16] It is not by accident that the Russian merchants traditionally accused the British traders of unfair competition while urging the Tsarist government to strengthen its protectionist policy in Asia. In the 1850s—1860s military and civilian officials in the periphery reported to their superiors and proposed various options for protecting Russian goods against foreign competition to prevent the penetration of British, or rather, Anglo-Indian goods into the markets, for example, of Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva. One military analyst criticized Britain on the grounds that its exports were pushing Russian goods out of Central Asia: "England has every chance to win the emir (of Bokhara.—*E.S.)* over to its side and turn him into a most loyal ally. In other words, England easily acquires what forms the essence of the Central Asian question for whose solution all that is needed is to allow the British merchant to appear in Bokhara. After that sky will be the limit for England."[17]

Peter the Great was the first ruler who introduced a single customs tariff on Russian territory in 1717. From that time onward the Russian government pursued a policy of mercantilism over many decades. By 1850 the new customs tariff was introduced allowing the authorities to keep up high tariffs on imports until the 1890s.[18]

Let it be noted in this connection that the main direction of Russian exports to Asian states repeatedly changed throughout the first half of the 19th century in accordance with the fluctuations of the economic and political situation. While in the 1820s Russia's main trading partner in the East was Persia, in the following decade commerce with Afghanistan and the Central Asian khanates was developing more actively. A contemporary British historian attests that the Persians had reported vigorous Russian commercial activity when huge caravans consisting of 4000-5000 camels annually made a four-month-long journey between Bokhara and the Tsar's possessions.[19]

Then followed the era of Russian-Chinese rapprochement which saw intensified bilateral trade during the 1840s—1850s. At the same time, trade between Russia and the Bokhara and Khiva khanates decreased. By 1856 Russian imports from Asia accounted for about 14% of the total foreign trade, while export to the Eastern countries accounted for more than 60% of total exports. The share of Asian states in Russia's annual import was respectively 58.2% for the Qing Empire, 20% for territories occupied by the Kazakh tribal groups (*juzes*), 14.8%

for Afghanistan and Persia and only 7% for the Central Asian emirates.[20] In this context new Russian commercial enterprises were thriving. For example, Vasily Kokorev, a major trader, aided by the Caucasus governor Prince Aleksandr Baryatinsky, founded the Tran Caspian Trade Company. The company sought to bring Russian goods to the consumer markets of Persia, Afghanistan and the Turkmen tribes while buying commodities (raw materials), gold and precious stones there.[21]

The protectionist policy of the Tsarist government resulted in adopting temporary rules of import trade in 1881. Under these rules all the caravans bound from the vassal Bokhara and Khiva khanates to the Turkistan General Governorship, had to submit to customs inspection at special posts to prevent uncontrolled entry of European, chiefly Anglo-Indian, goods. Although the rules were billed as "temporary" they indicated that the Tsarist colonial administration was still committed to a prohibitive customs system in Central Asia. It took its final shape by the mid-1890s when customs officials were appointed to all the border crossing points of the Russian empire in the East.[22]

Events in other parts of the planet also influenced trade links. For example, after the start of the Civil War in the United States in 1861 the purchases of raw cotton by Russian companies plummeted. In this connection the textile enterprises had to reorient themselves towards importing that strategic commodity from Central Asia in spite of the lower quality and lack of equipment for processing the short-fiber Uzbek cotton, which differed from the long-fiber cotton coming from North America or Egypt. To control the sources of cotton the Russian authorities tried to monopolize overland trade with Persia, Bokhara, Khiva and China.

It was not the economic but logistical (to use modern terminology) support of military cargo carriage that was the main motive that caused the Russian government to start the construction of railways leading from the European part of Russia and South Siberia to Turkistan. Insufficient development of the merchant marine capable of carrying commodities and finished products by sea was also a factor behind the decision. As a result, according to statistics, the total length of railways in Central Asia built between 1872 and 1915 exceeded 5000 km, not to count branches to the Volga and Urals areas.[23]

At the same time revenues from trade with the Indian subcontinent ensured for Britain an overall surplus of the balance of payments almost throughout the 19th century. India played the key role as a staging post in carrying commodities and goods between the Atlantic and the Pacific basins. Statistics dating to the 1860s show that the share of British goods in Chinese imports was 90%, with goods from the mother country and India accounting respectively for 33.4% and 35.6% (the remainder came to the Celestial Empire from Hong-Kong and other British overseas possessions). Although India's share in Chinese exports did not exceed 0.4%, compared with 13% from Hong-Kong, 61.8% of Chinese goods exported to Britain passed through India's ports.[24] "We are obliged to protect India as the cornerstone of British prosperity," this was the immutable principle of British policy throughout the Victorian epoch. The *New York Times* com-

mented in 1869: "Not only on the Black Sea and in the direction of Turkey and the Mediterranean have the Russian movements been jealously watched, but her advances along the eastern shore of the Caspian and into Turkistan and Bokhara have been looked at with much uneasiness by Great Britain, as being dangerous military approaches toward the northwestern boundary of her Indian Empire, and the line of the Hindu Kush, the great bulwark of that boundary, has been sedulously guarded." [25]

That accounts for the protracted local wars the British waged in the 1830s—1840s against the warlike "free" tribes inhabiting the northwestern sector of the Indian subcontinent. From that point of view the threat of a Russian invasion of India was seen by London as a major obstacle to the assertion there of the British crown. The end of the Crimean war and the Caucasian wars fueled London's fears on that score.

It would however be wrong to believe that by the mid-19th century the Anglo-Indian merchants had gained control over the consumer markets in Asia.[26] Although Britain was Russia's number one trade partner, the balance of Russian British trade was in favor of Russia. Besides, China under the Qing Dynasty and not Great Britain, at least in the first half of the 19th century, continued to be Russia's main rival in the markets of the Central Asian khanates, Eastern Turkistan and in the small mountain princedoms of the Pamirs and Hindu Kush.[27]

After a look at the political and economic prerequisites for the start of "the Great Game" we can now turn to the analysis of its sociocultural and civilization-related motives. Karl Marx, who was a part-time correspondent of the American *New York Daily Tribune* during the 1850s was among the first to draw attention to these factors. Assessing the possible future results of British rule he wrote on August 8, 1853: "England is destined to fulfill a two-fold mission in India—devastating, which means annihilation of old Asiatic society, and creative, which intends the organization of social structure in Asia according to Western pattern."[28] A similar opinion was expressed three decades later by the Russian experts commenting on the progressive role of the Tsarist empire in Turkistan: "The Russians have done a great deal for the local civilization, terminating that predatory regime (the rule of the Khan—*E.S.*) and giving the first push to the assimilation of elements of the population that differed in terms of their economic type. Thanks to us the traditional trade routes were secured."[29]

According to contemporaries, the people of almost all the social strata in Europe, including the power elites, were inclined to see both the British and the Russian expansion to the Eastern countries as a necessary instrument for liquidating local tyrannies with their inhumane laws, universal disfranchisement, poverty and disease. The principles of the policy and norms of behavior of enlightened European monarchies were to be spread to the East. It is notable that even the natural conditions of Asian countries, in the eyes of travelers from the Old World, corresponded to the ossified medieval forms of political structure of the khanates and emirates. One can quote the following extract from a report by captain Chokan Valikhanov, who came from a noble Kazakh family, and joined the Russian military service. Valikhanov thus described the situation in the

khanates in the mid-19th century: "Central Asia in its present stage of social organization presents a truly mournful spectacle; her present stage of development being, so to speak, a sort of pathological crisis. The whole country, without exaggeration, is nothing but one vast waste, intersected here and there by abandoned aqueducts, canals and wells. The desolate sandy plains, dotted occasionally with ruins and overgrown with ugly prickly shrubs and tamarisks, is wandered over by herds of wild asses, and hardly less shy and timid saigaks. In the midst of this Sahara, along the banks of the rivers occur small oases, shaded by the poplar, elm, and mulberry; while nothing intervenes to break the monotony of the scene, save here and there cultivated rice fields and plantations of cotton, diversified by occasional vineyards and orchards, abandoned by the lazy and improvident population to the care of Allah. In the center of these oases, and constructed above the numerous remains of ancient cities, long since moldering beneath the soil, stand the miserable mud hovels of a wild and barbarous race, demoralized by Islamism, and reduced almost to idiocy by the political and religious despotism of their native rulers."[30]

In spite of the differences of geostrategic ambitions of the great powers they all recognized the role of Christian Europe in civilizing the East. Moreover, the monarchs and political leaders of Great Britain and Russia shared the view that the Christian civilization, whether Catholic, Protestant (Anglican) or Orthodox, was incomparably more progressive in its essence than the Muslim, Buddhist or Confucian civilizations. In an official note addressed to Baron Philip Brunnov, Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, the head of the British Foreign Office Lord Russell made this comment: "I recognize the aims of the Russian government as quite legal; and on the whole, I have always sided with any civilized power against a barbarous country. We (Britain.—*E.S.*) ourselves proceeded in India according to imperative force of circumstances, which frequently involved us further than we initially wished to go."[31]

Many high-ranking Russian and British officials were genuinely proud of the colossal role the two empires were called upon to play in the East. For example, Lord Loftus, the head of the British Embassy to St. Petersburg, believed that England and Russia "...ought to have common interests in the promotion of civilization and in the development of industry and commerce in our extended spheres, without jealousy and without seeking aggrandizement."[32] A similar point of view was propounded by the Russian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Gorchakov concerning the prospects of the spread of Christian enlightenment to the so-called "barbaric" state entities: "The Russian position in Central Asia corresponds to the views of all the civilized countries involved in contacts with the semi-savage nomadic population that does not possess an established social organization. In such cases it always happens that a more civilized state has, in order to secure its border and commercial relations, to dominate in a certain way those (tribes.—*E.S.*) whose troublesome and bellicose character turns them into undesirable neighbours."[33]

In this context, to borrow a metaphor from the British historian Edward Said, the Occident was seen as "a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alien-

ation, and strangeness." [34] In spite of the general European content of the concept of the "white man's burden" effectively proclaimed by the Russian and British empires in the mid-19th century, the character of the Russian and British advance to the spaces of Eurasia differed in several ways. Unlike the British, who were guided by the principles of the Anglican, essentially Protestant ethics, although their critics maintained that London's foreign policy was aimed exclusively at exploiting colonies and deriving hyper profits,[35] many Russians sincerely believed that they alone were real champions of European rights and freedoms because the Russian state had always protected Europe from the countless nomadic hordes seeking to invade the Old World from the depths of Eastern Asia. Andrey Subbotin, an observer for St. Petersburg *Ekonomichesky zhurnal,* used this simile to support this proposition: "The very role of Russia as the outpost of Europe that more than once saved it from perishing, entitles Russia to advance to the countries from which these hordes emerged, thus having delayed the Russian state's development for such a long time. Possessing adjacent areas of Central Asia due to geographical and historical necessity constitutes a partially justified compensation for the centuries-long struggle against the Asian hydra, with Russia having to suffer greatly because it found itself on the route from Asia to Europe, for preventing the Asian hordes from drowning out the European states and protecting the latter with its broad back."[36]

The Russians, in the opinions of some commentators, sought to fulfill the great historic mission of their state, namely, to bring the lands that remained after the collapse of the Golden Horde under its dominance. The fact that most of the nomads in Central and Eastern Asia made forays not only into the Russian border areas, but also into the farming villages in Persia, Afghanistan or Chinese Turkistan was an additional stimulus for Russia to advance to the East. The slave markets of major trade centers in Asia were never so full of people of all races and nationalities as in the mid-1850s—the early half of the 1860s.[37]

It is also indicative that the British political elite for a long time entertained the "Peter Pan theory." Peter Pan was a fairytale character who chose to remain a child all his life. The advocates of that theory were inclined to see the Asians as children who would never grow up. Therefore they needed constant patronage and guidance on the part of the advanced nations, including the Russians who, in spite of their autocratic regime, were duty-bound, in the opinion of Western politicians, to cooperate with other Europeans in performing their mission in the East.[38]

Thus, an analysis of the complex of factors that triggered "the Great Game" suggests that while for St. Petersburg geostrategic ambitions prevailed over cultural and civilizing aspirations and economic considerations, for London the two last groups of motives for interaction with Russia in Eurasia after the Crimean War were no less important. However, the desire of Britain's Victorian elite to bring Central and Eastern Asia into the system of the world economy proceeding from its own interests was by the mid-19th century limited by two circumstances: little knowledge of the Eurasian spaces and the potentially colossal cost of bringing them into the world economy.

Over time, especially towards the end of "the Great Game," after the signing of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, priorities changed both on the banks of the Neva and the Thames. For Russia, which was experiencing industrialization, economic aspects of relations with Britain in Asia increasingly came to the fore whereas for Britain military-political consolidation of the empire in the context of regrouping of powers on the eve of the First World War acquired paramount importance.

NOTES

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Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Ideological Control and KGB's Fifth Directorate in 1967-1989

Aleksandr SMYKALIN

The Soviet totalitarian state's ideological function was key to its very existence. The mass media was the vehicle of that function. Its job was to ideologically educate the country's population in a well-defined spirit, but that activity was successful inasmuch as it could fence off the Soviet people from the West's "pernicious influence" and ward off propaganda advertising a lifestyle "alien" to people living in a socialist society. Ideological control in the Soviet Union was exercised by the Fifth Directorate of the State Security Committee (KGB).

The predominance of socialist ideology was open to question in the 1950s through1970s. According to General Filipp Bobkov, head of the Fifth Directorate, in 1956-1960 4,678 people were convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (under Article 58-10 of the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code). 1,072 people were convicted in 1961-1965 under Article 70 of the 1958 RSFSR Criminal Code. The figure for 1966-1970 was 295 and for 1981-1985 was 150.[1] According to human rights campaigner Sergey Kovalyov, a total of 2,468 people were convicted in 1966-1986 under Article 70 (Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) and Article 190-1 of the Criminal Code of RSFSR (Dissemination of patently false reports defaming the Soviet state and social order). On the other hand, on December 18, 1987, the KGB asked the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to absolve 401 convicts and 23 suspects from criminal liability. Both groups had been charged under those articles.[2]

The Fifth Directorate was established under Protocol 0096 issued by KGB headquarters on July 25, 1967. That marked the emergence of the KGB's ideological counterintelligence. According to popular opinion, the Fifth Directorate only kept an eye on dissidents. In fact, however, it also dealt with many other issues. Its First Division was responsible for counterintelligence in the sphere of cultural exchange, shadowing foreigners, and investigating activities in associations of creative artists, scientific research institutes, cultural institutions and healthcare establishments. The Second Division together with the First Directorate jointly planned counterintelligence activities against centers of ideological

A. Smykalin, D. Sc. (Law), professor, head of Chair of History of the State and Law, Urals State Academy of Law. The article was first published in Russian in the journal *Voprosy istorii*, No. 8, 2011.

subversion by imperialist powers and acts to frustrate the activities by the People's Labor Union (NTS) and nationalist and chauvinistic elements. The Third Division was responsible for counterintelligence activities among university students covered by student exchange programs and the professorate. The Fourth Division was responsible for counterintelligence among religious, Zionist and sectarian elements and against foreign religious centers. The Fifth Division gave practical help to KGB local agencies in their work to prevent mass antisocial manifestations, pinpointed the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents and leaflets and verified terror notifications. The 6th Division summarized and analyzed reports concerning the adversary's activity to promote ideological subversion; it was also responsible for long-term planning and information work. The 7th Division was established in August 1969. Its official function was to "identify and screen persons planning to use explosive materials or devices for anti-Soviet purposes." This division was given the function of locating the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents, verifying notifications of "central terror," screening the people involved and controlling such activities by KBG regional agencies. "Terror" meant any verbal or written threats against the country's leaders. Threats against local administrations ("local terror") were dealt with by KGB local agencies.

Those were not altogether baseless fears. Former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov confessed in an interview for the *Izvestiya* newspaper that in the 1970s through the 1980s the state security agencies identified and "prophylactized" more than 1,500 people harboring terrorist schemes.[3]

The 8th Division established in July 1973 was charged with the function of "identifying and curbing acts of ideological subversion by subversive Zionist centers." The 9th Division (established in May 1974) was responsible for "the most important screening activities concerning persons suspected of organized anti-Soviet activity (excluding nationalists, clergy and sectarians)." It also suppressed the hostile activities of persons producing and distributing anti-Soviet materials and uncovered the anti-Soviet activities of foreign revisionist centers in Soviet territory.

The 10th Division created in the same year was responsible (jointly with the First Directorate) for counterintelligence actions against ideological subversion centers of imperialist states and foreign anti-Soviet organizations (excluding hostile organizations run by Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists).

The 11th Division, established in June 1977, was in charge of "operational security actions to disrupt subversive acts by the adversary and hostile elements before and during the summer Olympic Games in Moscow." But after the Olympics the division was not closed—it was put in charge of surveillance of sporting, healthcare and scientific organizations.

Group 12 was tantamount to a Division. It was set up to coordinate activity with the security services of socialist countries.

The job of the 13th Division (established in February 1982) was described somewhat ambiguously. It was supposed to "identify and curb manifestations that might transform into politically harmful groups helping the adversary conduct ideological subversion against the Soviet Union." Actually, the description

covered informal youth movements—Krishna followers, punks, rockers, mystics and others. They were mushrooming in the early 1980s. This division was the KGB's response to young people defying control by the Komsomol.[4] The 14th Division (established in February 1982) was in charge of the Soviet Journalists' Union and the staffs of mass media and sociopolitical organizations. The 15th Division (established in November 1983) was engaged in counterintelligence work at all branches and installations of the Dynamo sporting society.[5]

Initially the KGB's 5th Directorate had a staff of 201 employees. Its curator was First Deputy Chairman of the KGB Semyon Tsvigun. By 1982 the staff had swelled to 424. Nationwide, a total of 2,500 employees served under the aegis of this directorate. It had a big staff of agents—200 for each region on average.[6] Given that there were 123 regions in the Soviet Union, the number of agents (serving under the 5th Directorate alone) amounted to 25,000 countrywide.[7]

The structure of the Fifth Directorate existed until mid-1989. In the summer of 1989 it was decided to abolish the Fifth Directorate and establish the Directorate of the KGB of the USSR for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate Z). That was done following transformations that had taken place in the country and changes in criminal law, particularly in the disposition of Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. The 1989 decision provided the legal basis for Directive No. 00124 issued by the KGB chairman abolishing the Fifth Directorate and establishing Directorate Z.

Vadim Bakatin served as KGB chairman for sixty-three days—from August 23 to October 22, 1991. On September 25 of that year he fired 31 executives and another thirteen were warned about their "political immaturity and lack of foresight in their actions to comply with orders issued by superiors." All that, Bakatin said, "helped the activities of the putschists."[8]

On August 29, The Committee for Government Communications, which later became known as *FAPSI* of the Russian Federation, was formed on the basis of three KGB directorates—the Directorate of Government Communications, the 8th Main Directorate and the 16th Directorate. On October 1991, a resolution issued by the State Council of the USSR abolished the KGB. As plans stood then, the Central Intelligence Service *(CSR)*, the Interrepublican Security Service *(MSB)* and the Committee for the Protection of the State Border of the USSR were to be formed on its basis.

The KGB of the RSFSR then existed on paper rather than in reality. In May 1991, it had a staff of 14 employees working in four offices inside the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. On November 1 that agency was given control of the 7th Directorate, the 12th Division, the jail of pretrial investigation *(SIZO)* and a number of units of the Operational-Technical Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

Decree No. 233 issued by the President of the RSFSR on November 26 transformed the KGB of the RSFSR into The National Security Agency *(ANB)* of the RSFSR. Soon afterward—on December 19—Boris Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs *(MBVD)*. It was to incorporate *CSR, MSB, AFB* and structures of the Ministries of the Interior of the

USSR and RSFSR. Viktor Barannikov, a career police officer, was appointed Minister. However, that decree was never implemented: on January 22, 1922, the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR ruled that it did not conform to the Constitution of the RSFSR. As a result, on January 24, 1992, the President issued a decree establishing the Security Ministry *(MB)* of the RSFSR.

Agents were the most valuable asset of the Fifth Directorate. KGB Chairman Yury Andropov had made it clear to operational staff that they should be treated with care and skill and demanded that past mistakes be avoided. Speaking at a meeting of counterintelligence executives on March 23, 1978, he issued this warning: "As you know, there was a period when some aspects of their activity were casting aspersions on all our work. I am talking about what people called "squealing," i.e., when agents largely focused on collecting trifling and irrelevant information. Such directives for agents conflicted with the moral and ethical norms that are inculcated in the family, school and work collectives. Those are things of the past, but they should not be forgotten if new mistakes are not to be made. We are doing the right thing when we orient agents towards the achievement of the important goals of ensuring the security of our state that are entrusted to our agency rather than peeping through cracks and counting empty bottles."

Working with agents is the most difficult and sensitive job of all. In the words of the Tsarist gendarmerie Colonel Sergey Zubatov, an agent should be protected as much as a beloved woman with whom you have an illicit relationship. A definite style of training agents and working with them took shape over the years of the Fifth Directorate. To start with, they painstakingly scrutinized the prospective source of intelligence to see strong and weak points of his character and psyche; his behavior was analyzed; he was asked to analyze different situations acting as an expert or he was offered some form of help. As soon as the two sides developed a warm friendly relationship the work entered a new important phase—the agent's recruitment. This was followed by a report to superiors who gave permission for undercover work, with the agent being assigned an assumed name. As a rule, recruitment arrangements were finalized at a safe house controlled by the special service or, as a last resort, in a hotel room. In accordance with regulations, the finishing touches were put to the agent's recruitment in the presence of the head of the unit employing the operative.

General Bobkov, a longtime head of the Fifth Directorate, had a good knowledge of the mentality of the nascent agent. His recommendation was that operatives should meet with the agent the day after recruitment in order to size up his mood and say words of encouragement. As a rule, this kind of atmosphere at the start of cooperation served as an inspiration to the fledgling agent. It is true, though, that some agents agreed to cooperate on condition that formal papers were not signed. Some were only ready to supply verbal intelligence.

Two files were kept on each agent: one reflecting his work, and the other concerning his personal matters. The former file contained messages, intelligence received from the agent, official papers confirming the agent's agreement to cooperate and his alias. The agent's card filled out by an operative officer was kept separately. It contained a brief list of relevant rules of procedure. In accor-

dance with current KGB regulations, contact with agents was allowed only at secret addresses—apartments owned by the secret service or used by them under an agreement with the tenant. Quite often such tenants were not paid in Soviet times. Operatives and agents met twice or four times a month.[9]

Recruitment situations were unpredictable because of their wide diversity. A top official of the central headquarters of the country's law-enforcement agency told the author of the present article that when he was a young professor at an academy of law he was set to go abroad for a 10-month probation period as a trainee. At that time he had regular contact with a KGB curator. To his angry remark that he had no intention of being "a squealer on the KGB's payroll" the operative responded by saying, "Only highly qualified people work here for money." The result of it was that they never met again and the young Candidate of Science (Law) did not go abroad for a probation period because of "objective" circumstances. He recalled the lack of professionalism within the local KGB years later when he was in the rank of General in Moscow. I sensed that the bitterness he felt over the failed trip abroad would have been with him as long as he lived.

The KGB's special service was charged with a great number of functions. Throughout its history the Fifth Directorate was responsible for revealing, preventing and suppressing the activities of foreign intelligence agencies, centers of propaganda and foreign anti-Soviet organizations aiming to undermine or weaken the Soviet Union's moral and political potential. Much attention was given to preventing ideological subversion. Bobkov notes that "After the establishment of the Fifth Directorate contact was promoted with the corresponding services of friendly states. It was abundantly clear to them that counterintelligence work was essential for combating espionage and protecting the constitutional system... The staff of the Fifth Directorate may have become aware of this even before other KGB staffers since we knew such weak points and the potential forces capable of cooperating with our adversaries only two well."[10]

The notion of "ideological subversion" was coined fairly recently. Andropov had this to say addressing his agency's top executives in February 1979: "Ideological subversion is being carried out in a sphere embracing political, philosophical, legal, moral, aesthetic, religious and other views and ideas, i.e., in the sphere of ideology... Its distinguishing feature today is that it is not pursued by a conventional propagandist apparatus but specially organized services. These services... mainly stake on special subversive and seditious methods."[11] The most critical and perilous acts of ideological subversion were qualified as anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR).[12] Materials with "an ideologically degrading content" created and clandestinely distributed among the population or sent abroad for distribution there were considered a form of ideological subversion. The KGB's "preventive measures" boiled down to a state security official lecturing a person identified as someone who was engaged in undesirable activities and warning that person against acting in that manner in the future. That was more than a formal lecture: the person in question signed a paper stating that the KGB had officially warned him/her about the impermissibility of anti-Soviet behavior; on occasion "nega-

tive" actions were censured by the person's workmates at an open meeting. Sometimes the media chipped in. Then a state security official assigned an agent to report the person's behavior after "prophylactic" work with him.

The "official notification" mechanism was based on an ordinance issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 25, 1972 concerning "the application by state security agencies of notification as a measure of prophylactic effect" (needless to say, the ordinance was off limits to the public domain). Lubyanka staff was informed about the ordinance and instruction detailing its application by the KGB's Directive No. 0150 of March 23, 1973.[13] Prophylactic interviews did have an effect. The number of people convicted under Article 70 dropped to one-third from 1971 to 1975. Courts of law reviewed 396 cases over that period. The result was that 73 people were convicted in 1973, 47 in 1974 and 22 in 1975.[14] It should be borne in mind, though, that prophylactic measures were not the only method of bringing extrajudicial pressure to bear on freethinkers.

Punitive practices against dissidents did not boil down to "edifying" conversations. Six types of repressive measures the authorities used against dissidents in the 1970s can be pinpointed:

1) custodial coercion by incarcerating people in prison or corrective labor camps;
2) conditional conviction, with the convict obliged to work;
3) exile;
4) expulsion from the country;
5) custody-free corrective labor at the person's workplace or one assigned by Ministry of the Interior agencies; in this case the person had 20% of his salary deducted;
6) compulsory "treatment" at a mental hospital.[15]

This means that in the 1970s punishment was much milder than in 1937 when people recognized as "enemies of the people" were shot as a rule.

Prophylactic measures were a common method used by the fifth divisions of the KGB's regional departments. For instance, 92 people were subjected to prophylactic measures for treacherous intentions and terrorist and anti-Soviet views in the Sverdlovsk region from 1963 to 1967, i.e., even before the establishment of the Fifth Directorate in Moscow.[16] Even so, there were two vacancies in the Fifth Directorate as late as 1968.[17] The Sverdlovsk region was one of the country's leading cultural centers. There were six theaters, the Ural branch of the Academy of Sciences, 12 institutions of higher learning, 35 vocational schools, and 56 research institutes. There were more than 50,000 students at the region's universities, colleges and vocational schools. Nearly two thousand writers, composers, artists, actors, cinematographers, architects and journalists represented its creative intelligentsia.

A dissident movement as a phenomenon of the intellectual life of Soviet society was already in existence in the 1960s and 1970s. Khrushchev's Thaw

lasted for only a short period. It gave way to growing conservative tendencies. The process of "creeping reaction" manifested itself in diverse spheres of public life. Notions like "developed socialism," "maturity" and "stability" were inculcated into social sciences. They were reflected in works of literature and other arts as "successes" and "accomplishments." Human rights campaigners spoke out against re-Stalinization although pro-Stalinist sentiments were quite strong within "the lower classes" of society.[18]

Ideological instability of Soviet society, especially among the country's younger generation, was a characteristic phenomenon in the early 1970s. The introduction of troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 dispelled the last illusions. Those years saw the emergence of double moral standards("doublethink")—people hypocritically acknowledged the successes of "developed socialism" but at the same time they had their own assessments of political events (which remained with the inner circle of close friends). That situation whipped up ideological control over cultural and scientific centers. The crackdown on dissent gained momentum. In the opinion of Aleksandr Prishchepa, "the KGB's Fifth Main Directorate was established for the express purpose of opposing dissent." He maintains that efforts by "'competent bodies' had reduced the dissident movement practically to nothing by 1984. Some 1,000 people—up to 90% of activists—found themselves in jails, labor camps or special-purpose hospitals."[19]

According to the KGB, 3,096 groups of "a politically harmful nature" were identified in 1967-1971. 13,602 members of those groups were subjected to prophylactic measures. The figure includes 2,196 members of 502 groups in 1967, 2,870 members of 625 groups in 1968, 3,130 members of 733 groups in 1969, 3,101 members of 709 groups in 1970 and 2,304 members of 527 groups in 1971. The geography of the groups is indicative: Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Tula, Vladimir, Omsk, Kazan, Tyumen, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia, Kazakhstan... There was a sizable number of clandestine groups in the Urals.[20]

The late 1960s saw a growing network of special-purpose "hospitals" controlled by the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior. They were built in addition to ordinary mental hospitals run by the Ministry of Public Health. In a letter sent to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on April 29, 1969, Andropov outlined a plan to set up a network of special-purpose mental hospitals and put forward his suggestions on how they could be used to "protect the Soviet state and social system."[21] There are a great many publications dealing with the KGB's use of psychiatry in its work.[22]

The first regulations describing a procedure for the urgent hospitalization of mental cases posing a public threat were published in 1961. They marked the start of a new era in the history of punitive medicine—people's extrajudicial incarceration to the detriment of their health under an arbitrary decision by local authorities rather than a ruling by a court of law. The regulations were reissued in 1971 with only minor changes. It was in 1963 that the Valery Tarsis case and his book *Ward No. 7* attracted the world public's attention to the issue of punitive medicine in the Soviet Union for the first time.

In the 1960s, punitive medicine expanded its sphere of activity. Special-purpose hospitals were opened in the following cities: Chernyakhovsk (1965), Minsk (1966), Dnepropetrovsk (1968) and Oryol (1970). There was a growing number of political prisoners in mental hospitals. Meanwhile, the Iron Curtain was falling into a state of decay as it gradually turned into "an iron lattice window." When reports of psychiatric repressions reached the West they were fed back to the Soviet Union via radio stations. People in the Soviet Union became aware of an ever growing number of instances of psychiatric repression. The names of the victims of punitive medicine became known across the world: Vladimir Gershuni, Vladimir Borisov, Viktor Feinberg, Peter Grigorenko, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, I. Yakimovich. These names were best known in the 1960s, but in the 1970s the list was considerably larger. However, the West was aware of only a handful of such people. They were a tiny fraction of the cases that reached the Soviet public. Many more were not known at all.[23]

In late September 1967, three units formed the KGB's Fifth Department in Sverdlovsk Region. A general idea of its work could be obtained from an analysis of the report concerning *the organization of counterintelligence activities against the adversary's ideological subversion* made by Pyotr Muzykin, head of the KGB Department for Sverdlovsk Region at a staff meeting in Sverdlovsk on July 10, 1968. He praised the Fifth Department's staff as an "efficient collective. When the Department was being formed, special care was given to ensure a balance between old and young cadres. Some top posts were given to comrades who joined the KGB after working in the Communist Party or The Young Communist League. In the first months, the efforts of operatives were focused on assessing the current situation, notably, in connection with upcoming celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Soviet government. They reviewed the agents' potential, recruited a considerable number of trusted persons and extended contact with the public and Party and Komsomol activists at enterprises and establishments."

The reporter also noted some specific aspects of work in Sverdlovsk Region. "Our region is off limits to foreigners, but this does not protect us from penetration by bourgeois propaganda. The adversary uses radio broadcasts, international correspondence and face-to-face contacts with our citizens in Soviet territory and abroad in order to stage hostile ideological acts. 5,227 people visited foreign countries in 1967-1968 alone. Over 1,400 have at one time or another had contact with foreigners in Soviet territory. Some 12,000 are in constant correspondence with foreigners. More than 3,000 have relatives abroad. They, too, actively correspond with them and meet them on a regular basis."[24]

KGB agencies did not only keep tabs on such facts and store information. Their work also had a more offensive aspect. All reports concerning contacts by scientists, experts and young people with individual foreigners and foreign organizations and research centers were summarized and systematized. A concrete result of such work in Sverdlovsk Region was that the Department filed five cases for operative control, including two relating to a group of persons. Fifty-seven people were subjected to prophylactic measures. Several instances of brewing unhealthy situations were pinpointed at regional enterprises, which

could otherwise have resulted in antisocial manifestations. In such cases Communist Party functionaries were informed and prophylactic measures taken.

Young people were the prime target of ideological control. "The poisonous seeds of bourgeois propaganda" found a fertile breeding ground in the midst of ideologically immature young people. The older generation had been brought up in the "Soviet" spirit. Most of them had gone through the Great Patriotic War and had firm life principles. They had blind faith in the Communist Party. Young people who tuned in to foreign radio broadcasts were fully aware of a different life in foreign countries. Many of them sought contact with young people abroad if only by correspondence. They had undivided trust in "the privacy of correspondence" guaranteed by the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution (Article 56) and did not suspect that all letters sent abroad were subject to *mandatory perlustration*. Nor did they know that counterintelligence lingo dubbed letters "documents." In 1967-1968 several hundred such "documents" were sent to foreign radio stations from Sverdlovsk Region. The abovementioned report presented by the Sverdlovsk Region KGB chief said as follows: "Analysis of international correspondence conducted by the KGB Department indicates an increasing number of letters sent to radio stations in capitalist states, notably by young people in the region (vocational school students, sophomores, senior school students and young employees between the ages of 17 and 19). Last year (1967) 258 documents were sent to foreign radio stations, mostly from Nizhny Tagil, Kamensk-Uralsky, Alapayevsk and Revda. Broadcasts by The Voice of America, Deutsche Welle and Canada are becoming increasingly popular. Their music and informative broadcasts are interspersed with hostile commentaries on topical political issues. The facts indicate that these broadcasts have a negative ideological effect on the formation of Soviet young people's aesthetic tastes and particularly their ideological mindset. The KGB Department reports all such facts to municipal KGB divisions and local Party functionaries, investigates individual senders of documents, with special attention being paid to establishing the causes and circumstances stimulating young people's growing interest in such programs."[25]

The Church was another important area of KGB activities. The ideology purveyed by the Church did not fit into the framework of the Communist state. Besides, in accordance with the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the Church was formally separated from the state and had no rights as a legal entity. The KGB was especially concerned about sectarian groups. First, unlike the Russian Orthodox Church, their activities were illegal. They had printed material at their disposal. Quite often they received it from abroad through clandestine channels. Second, young members of a sect were brought up in the spirit of sectarian dogmas.

This means that these church dissidents represented by definition a "fifth column" in the Soviet state. They were under stringent ideological control. Such sectarian groups were very active. The Urals was by far a less problematic region in this respect than other regions in the country. But in 1967 there were some 70 sectarian groups with a total membership of about 2,000 in Sverdlovsk Region. The most active of them were Evangelical Christian Baptists. They distributed illegal religious literature published by an illicit printing-press. They would go outside

Sverdlovsk Region for conferences discussing what could be done to attract young people to the groups and set up more printing hubs.

In 1967 criminal proceedings were instituted against four sectarian leaders in Nizhny Tagil. Lots of religious literature and duplicating machines were confiscated in the course of investigation. The open trial that followed had an important prophylactic effect, in particular on other sectarians.

Secret agents took part in prophylactic measures aimed against a sectarian group in the town of Polevskoy, also in Sverdlovsk Region. Legalized materials provided the basis for four articles in the local press, exposing the antisocial activities of the sectarians.

Ideological control over "autonomist inspirations" was high on the KGB agenda. More than 50,000 Germans lived in the region during the period under review. Many of them had been top state and Party functionaries in the former Republic of the Germans of the Volga Region. They sought to impart mass and organized character to the movement. The KGB Department noted that "we (the secret service) hold good positions in this sphere." In other words, the activities of German "special settlers" had been reliably blocked and were under the constant ideological control of the regional committee of the Communist Party and the KGB headquarters in Moscow.

In 1967-1968 16 authors made and distributed 128 leaflets and 16 anonymous letters containing "slanderous fabrications" about the state system and the foreign policy of the Party and Soviet government. That happened in Sverdlovsk Region, the sphere of responsibility of the 5th Division of the KGB's department for that region. The letters of some anonymous authors contained threats against leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state. The 5th Division identified 14 authors of leaflets and anonymous letters. In the opinion of the regional KGB, the author of "malicious anti-Soviet proclamations" presented special interest. Evidence incriminating him was supplied to the prosecutor's office. In 1967, he was sentenced to three years of imprisonment in a high-security jail. Prophylactic measures were taken against 234 "radio thugs" in 1967-1968. In accordance with a directive of March 28, 1968, operational measures were taken against them jointly with the Law-Enforcement Department of Sverdlovsk Region, the Urals Military District, the Voluntary Society Assisting Army, Aviation and Fleet *(DOSAAF)* and the Communications Department.

In 1967 and early 1968, a tense situation began to take shape at some industrial plants in several towns in Sverdlovsk Region. In the view of the authorities it could trigger mass absenteeism from work, mass disturbances and the like. Conditions for such "antisocial manifestations" did emerge in 30 instances during sixteen months. They resulted from inadequate supplies of materials and equipment, spasmodic production, poor organization of work, low living standards and wages and improper bonus-awarding practices. In January 1968, twenty lumberjacks failed to report for work in the industrial community of Kedrovka (near the town of Kushva). They were employed on a gold field belonging to the Uralzoloto trust. In March, 36 bus drivers and conductors refused to report for work in the town of Polevskoy, thereby disrupting passenger traffic in that town.[26]

Agents were not the only ones used in assessments of the situation. Other methods were included what was called perlustration (mail control). A memo sent to the head of the Fifth Division of the KGB Department for Sverdlovsk Region pointed out that "mail control helped seize a document originating from the wife of Dmitry Korol, Secretary of the Kamyshlov regional committee of the *VKP(b)*. Mariya Korol had sent it to someone by the name of Korol... possibly their relative living in the village of Kochki of Rodnin District, Altai Territory. In this document Mariya Korol distorts the real situation in the district by saying that collective farmers have very low living standards and there is a big loss of cattle. She attached official material to her document. It speaks of the loss of cattle in the district as she quotes from a report her husband Dmitry Korol presented at a district Party conference."[27]

In this case prophylactic measures amounted to a request made by Lieutenant Colonel Sukhanev, head of the Kamyshlov municipal division of the KGB. He said he would like to have Korol, Secretary of the Kamyshlov district committee of the *VKP(b),* see to it that his wife Mariya Korol did not spread anti-Soviet agitation."[28] He noted that Mariya Korol was a Party member and a teacher at one of the schools in the town of Kamyshlov.

The above are isolated instances of antigovernment activities in Sverdlovsk Region, but they were present on a larger scale throughout the Soviet Union. The situation became especially tense in the 1970s. Analysis of materials supplied by the Moscow Helsinki Group with reference to documents issued by the KGB of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party indicates that in 1975-1979 the secret services filed 26-48 terrorist intents a year. In 1975-1983 72-126 threats of physical violence were targeted against party and government activists each year. 10,206 instances of anti-Soviet acts (anonymous leaflets, letters and graffiti) were identified in 1975. The figure for 1977 is 10,708, for 1979—16,648 and for 1981—22,502. Some 10% of the total number of authors identified in 1975-1980 were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Komsomol members were nearly twice as many. The number of identified nationalist and "antisocial" groups remained more or less on the same level.

In 1975-1982 16 to 20 thousand people were "prophylactized" each year. This practice had also been used in the 1950s and 1960s, but then the Soviet KGB did not keep centralized records of it. It only started to keep such records when the Fifth Directorate came into being in 1967.[29] The architects of this form of KGB activities believed that it would completely eradicate politically harmful behavior and high treason. As it turned out later, however, their expectations had not materialized.

The pertinent question is why the section of the population that was under the surveillance of the Fifth Directorate was "ideologically immature." The following factors can be singled out in this connection:

1) a discrepancy between the goals declared in the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and reality;

2) living standards dropping from year to year;

3) a growing impact of propaganda coming from Western special centers such as The Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, *Svoboda* (Liberty) and other radio stations.

In the view of Communist Party ideologists and KGB top executives, ideological subversion was a component element of anti-Communist policies and a direct outcome of the "bridge-building" doctrine put forward by the US Administration. Its main objective was to "help write an end to communism by peaceful methods if possible."[30] This entailed the main forms of control practiced by the Fifth Directorate:

1) opposing radio propaganda, especially propaganda targeted at Soviet young people;
2) opposing sectarianism;
3) countering "autonomic" trends in the minds of German resettlers, Mesketian Turks and other unlawfully deported ethnic groups;
4) combating widespread "antisocial manifestations" (absenteeism from work, strikes and mass disturbances).

The Fifth Directorate existed from 1967 to 1989. It represented the last attempt by the Soviet regime to keep the state from further falling apart by resorting to totalitarian methods.

NOTES

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22 V. Pervomaysky, "The Mental Derangement Criterion and Limits of the Expert Psychiatrist's Competence," *Gosudarstvo i pravo,* 1991, No. 5; B. Protchenko, "Concerning the Notion of Mental Insanity," *Sovetskaya yustitsiya,* 1987, No. 17, pp. 20-22 and others.

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24 *AFSB* Sv. Obl., f. 1, op. 1, d. 550, l. 60ob., 62, 64, 66, 68, 69.

25 Ibid., l. 32.

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28 Ibid.

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30 S. Vorontsov, op. cit., p. 389.

Translated by Gennady Nikiforov

The Plot of Chekhov's Comedy The Cherry Orchard As a Model of History

Nina RAZUMOVA

The fate of *The Cherry Orchard* in Russian culture is truly paradoxical. The play is the most famous part of the writer's creative heritage and is invariably included in school curricula having become a kind of canon. That proved to be a disservice to the play. By putting an anthological gloss on it Soviet literary scholarship has for decades consigned the play to the interpretation that took shape on the crest of the wave of social upheavals in the early 20th century. That interpretation has a predominantly historical aspect, which is the focus of this article. However, the interpretation is too narrow and superficial, limited as it is to the characteristic of social development. To this day the scheme "the past is the landowners, the present is the capitalists and the future is the revolutionary youth" has been prevalent in the interpretation of the play with only slight variations.

However, a sociologically orientated reading of the play runs counter to the logic of Chekhov's work. His artistic vision does not seek to snatch out concrete historical and social realities of the period, which lends the plot a more general meaning. *The Cherry Orchard* undoubtedly, far from being inferior to other Chekhov's plays in its historical sweep, being consciously a summing up, is far superior to the other works as it concludes the experience of his whole life and offers advice to those who will go on living after him, albeit the advice is formulated without any pretence at prophecy or exaltation. *The Cherry Orchard* is the most ambitious presentation of Chekhov's idea of history, which with him is not an attribute of society's life, but an inherent qualitative characteristic of being.

Speaking about the interpretation and artistic modeling of history in such a sweeping ontological meaning one has to bear in mind the underlying isomorphism of these notions with the notion of human life, above all as regards its inexorable finiteness. The concept of history essentially correlates or is the reverse side of the concept of death; these extreme variants are the concept of death as the limit that cuts short the unique manifestation of the individual (the heroic anthropocentric view); and as the culmination of the sinful journey on earth and the exit (entry) into the other being (an analogue of the eschatological religious concept of history).

N. Razumova, professor, Tomsk State University. The article was first published in the collection *The Image of Chekhov and Chekhov's Russia in the Modern World,* St. Petersburg, 2010 (in Russian).

Chekhov—especially in his mature and final period[1]—occupies a very special place between these two extremes. Additional insights are offered by a comparison with the experience of Russian comedy, above all its two great masterpieces, *Woe from Wit* and *The Government Inspector* that form the foundation of the classic period of Russian literature while *The Cherry Orchard* marks its end. The comedies respectively of Griboyedov and Gogol are artistic embodiments of the two abovementioned opposite concepts of history. *Woe from Wit* presents a dramatic clash of personified and "articulated" truth with its opponents who are unable to keep abreast of it on the historical journey. Death does not play any significant role in the plot (the mourning of Sofiya's mother merely explains her inept ideas of self-upbringing) because history is seen (as Ivan Goncharov shows in his article "Myriad of Agonies") as a steady forward movement initiated by an outstanding personality. Not so in *The Government Inspector.* Yury Mann has revealed the close link of Gogol's comedy with his reflections on the essence of history that have a universal character and noted as an essential feature of the play the fact that it looks more like a "circle rather than a segment (line, stripe), which has a beginning and a continuation beyond the stage."[2] Indeed the plot of *The Government Inspector* portrays not one instant in a sequence of historical events, but provides the gist of history as such, which matches its religious-mythological concept. The final disaster is a model of the Last Judgment and the mute scene is an analogue of death as the completion of profaned pseudohistory and the exit beyond its limits. Because of its special role death is located on the outer fringes of the plot of the play and is not present within it (unless one counts in very cursory references such as this: "the officer's widow lied to you when she said I flogged her... she flogged herself").[3]

In Chekhov's works death is present in abundance and in many shapes (as has been mentioned).[4] The evolution of its presentation in Chekhov's main dramas is as follows: in *The Seagull* Treplev's death expresses his individual failure as a person who has been unable to come to terms with the world. Marked as "comedy," his death is specified basically as not tragic, which effectively underlines the innovative philosophical nature of Chekhov's concept of comedy; at the same time the fact that death concludes the plot attests that the author's interest is focused on an individual human life, on worldly success or failure, on its inner quality and achievements.

In *Uncle Vanya,* subtitled "Scenes from Country Life," death occurs after the finale. In this consoling perspective drawn by the play's heroine Sonya there emerges a model of history that on the face of it looks religious but essentially is still orientated towards all human aspirations on this earth. In Chekhov's frame of reference, that has proved to be impossible.

In *Three Sisters* death precedes the action of the play and provides the starting point of the plot immediately lending it a new and broader meaning: this is not about an individual human fate, but about the Fate of man as such whose finite nature in infinite time of the world makes success impossible in principle. The focus of the plot is shifted away from the individual because his concrete qualities ultimately make no difference to the original imbalance. However, the

semantic "weight" of the individual merely increases and his ontologically programmed failure acquires a dramatic and almost tragic character in the play (which is underlined by the author's description of the play as a "drama").

In *The Cherry Orchard* the entire plot is permeated with the motive of death.[5] Its presence in the play is not confined to the deaths of concrete people, Ranevskaya's husband and son and the old servants. It is also present in the characters' reflections on their own death and on death as such, the mention of deceased ancestors, the presence of Firs, the oldest of the old characters in Chekhov's dramas, the reference in a remark to the second act to "large stones which apparently are old tombstones,"[6] etc. Most importantly, death is part of the plot because of the situation of the loss of the cherry orchard, the feeling that "life in this house is finished now..."[7]

The day of the auction is relentlessly approaching, like death, and the fact that the characters take a passive and fatalistic attitude to the prospect indicates not so much their impracticality and fecklessness as the objective ontological logic of this plot's event.

But here—even to a greater extent than in the story *The Bishop,* which shows that life goes on after the death of the hero with whom the author closely identifies—the play stresses that death is not a catastrophe and "not final": a catastrophic event—the auctioning off of a landed estate—is separated from the finale by a fourth act although the play is about the demise not only of a single person but of an entire lifestyle. The expectation of a catastrophe is resolved through the continuation of life. Death has practically lost its existential character to become a universal component of being, an ontological factor that does not oppose man to the world but incorporates him into the world in a complicated way.

This stems from the peculiar worldview Chekhov acquired in the later years of his life. It revolves around a new understanding of man whose task is seen not as fulfilling one's personal ambitions (like *The Seagull* and *Uncle Vanya*), not an intense search of the meaning of human life in the eternal movement of the world (like in *Three Sisters*), but as the manifestation of the general laws of that movement. The author's position is unusual in that it does not single out any of the characters, or indeed man as such, who is not separated out of the life of the world and does not become the focus of attention.

Chekhov elaborates the approach pioneered by Gustave Flaubert, a new philosophical and artistic perspective in literature; however, his movement does not coincide with the mainstream modernist vector. He captured and expressed the shift that separated the world perception of the 20th century from the classical culture of the past, but in interpreting that shift he stressed not the rift, but the ways of opposing that rift. With Chekhov, overcoming the anthropocentric tradition is not a source of the absurd that sucks man into the void and chaos of a world deprived of its center, but a condition of immersion in a harmonious whole that is salutary for man.

The renunciation of the anthropocentric position is manifested, among other things, in Chekhov's casting aside the traditional love intrigue which has always provided a concentrated idea of a person's aspirations and was a measure of the

person's success in the world. The fact that Ranevskaya's Paris love affair is remote in space and emotionally blurred, the half-hearted mutual attraction between Varya and Lopakhin, and especially the fact that Anya and Petya reject love as a matter of principle ("I'd stoop to such vulgarity! We are above love")[8]—all add up to an antithesis to *The Seagull* with its "loads of love." Now love is characteristic only of a certain type of consciousness which is unmistakably placed in the past as a feature, even the basis of a culture that has exhausted itself. One should recall Chekhov's remark: "By the way, there is not a single shot fired in the play."[9] All these are symptomatic of the dying away of individual and personal aspirations as the focus of the author's interest.

The differences in the way the characters interpret "life" is also symptomatic. While for Ranevskaya it is "my" life, Lopakhin demonstrates a duality considering life also as something that belongs to man: "Oh, if only the whole thing was done with, if only our uneven unhappy life were changed!"[10] and in its own objective flow: "Here we stand pulling one another's noses, but life goes its own way all the time,"[11] for the young it is only a general impersonal flow; at the end of the play their cheerful exclamations "Goodbye, old life!", "Welcome, new life!"[12] contrast with the lyrical duet of sobbing Ranevskaya and Gayev.

The erosion of personality as an external expression of the anthropological approach is also manifested in the relationship of the characters and the cherry orchard. For Ranevskaya and Gayev the orchard is an analogue of their very own individual lives: "My dear, my gentle, beautiful orchard! My life, my youth, my happiness, goodbye, goodbye!" In Lopakhin's consciousness the orchard is at once "an estate more beautiful than anything in the world" and a place of his hard-nosed practical activities: "Come and look at Yermolay Lopakhin laying his axe to the cherry orchard, come and look at the trees falling!"[13] Even for the youth—Petya and Anya—the orchard is not something concrete, and it easily transforms itself into a metaphoric perspective: "All Russia is our orchard... We'll plant a new garden, finer than this."[14]

In the light of the above the focal event of the plot, the sale of the estate, is quite perceptibly not only a metaphor of the social and historical transformation of Russian life, but an inevitable parting with a less nationally anchored principle of the perception of the world that determined the fate of man as something exceptional and distinct from the rest of the world. By contrast, a different approach is asserted which at a time of profound social and historical upheavals can potentially protect man from a catastrophe. But it is asserted not through a discursive declaration but by the entire artistic structure of the play.

A distinctive feature of *The Cherry Orchard* is an extraordinarily clear-cut plot. The linear course of events that reflects the inexorable course of life itself, is combined with a conceptually meaningful relationship between its stages, especially the beginning and the end that stresses the profound qualitative change that occurs in the interim period. The obvious analogies do not render the plot a confined character; at the end of the play the plot moves outside the house, the final remark describes sounds coming from outside, sounds that Firs does not hear because he is deaf. The plot guides the viewer/reader along with the char-

acters of the play beyond the habitual existence and makes them participants in the life of the large world.

The juxtaposition of the beginning and the finale underlines the stages in the semantic transformation that takes place in-between. The first act is idyllic in spirit. The march of time is not noticeable, the atmosphere of blissful semislumber reigns, all the characters relate to one another almost like members of one family and beautiful nature blends harmoniously with human life. The audio sequence in the first act is reminiscent of a music box: the ringing of an old cupboard being opened, birds singing in the garden, the shepherd's pipe and finally a virtual audio image, the "little bells" Anya hears as she falls asleep. But that cozy little world is nearing the end of its existence, which determines the dynamics of the plot. In an immobile idyllic world when nothing changes, no action is possible.

Compared with the first act, the second act takes the characters out of the sleepy idyllic world into moving time, into history. That act, in contrast to the first act, is set in the wide expanse of "the field,"[15] "a distance that is not stage-like"[16]; there are no motives in the plot to justify that change, which lends extra power to the space that is suddenly flung wide open and the time that is embodied in it. Death acquires a tangible and plastic expression shown in its ontological inclusiveness. It is shown as a stage in the inexorable course of life that reconciles the sacred and the secular ("an abandoned chapel"), smoothes out the differences between the natural and the man-made ("tombstones" are turned into "large stones"). The former graveyard as an element of landscape gives a tangible portrayal of time that does not reject man but assimilates him.

Against this broad background the conversations of the characters about seemingly casual topics acquire a special significance revealing different human positions with regard to the world. It is at this point that the characters referred to above fall into distinct groups. Today the "youth group" claims special attention. Petya Trofimov (a comical excessively voluble character, what, in spite of the difference of age, makes him similar to Gayev), delivers a particularly significant remark about death: "Who knows? And what does it mean—you'll die? Perhaps a man has a hundred senses, and when he dies only the five known to us are destroyed and the remaining 95 are left alive."[17] These words have an ironic ring in the context of the dialogue; however, they are confirmed by the very structure of the plot which does not end after "death", i.e., the sale of the cherry orchard. Thereby Trofimov is given an indirect but very strong support from the author, being a mouthpiece of the play's conceptual message.

This is not to say, however, that he occupies a privileged position in the play similar to the classicistic reasoner type. His "argument" is not backed by the authority of personal virtues but merely by his youth, that is, the simple natural similarity of his and Anya's life situations as both look forward to the future. It is not by chance that Chekhov wrote that the role of Anya "can be played by anyone, even a totally unknown actress as long as she is young and looks like a girl and has a young and ringing voice."[18] The fact that Petya and Anya win the argument in *The Cherry Orchard* is due solely to the fact that they will go on living.

Their ideas will come true not because they are better but simply because the future belongs to the young. This is a concept echoed in Chekhov's last story *The Bride* in which the heroine's individuality takes the back seat to the fact that she is young, which is her main characteristic.

The system of characters in the play is indeed based on the triad "past—present—future." But its foundations are not social, rather, they reflect the three main positions of man in the current of time: the past, which is always "mine," because it is an individual life that has been lived; the present, in which the material and practical participation of man is necessary and which transforms the potential future into the past; and finally the future, which is as yet abstract and has no flesh, but will be embodied in the reality of the present for those who survive. With respect to an individual human life these positions are adequately covered by the notions of old age, maturity and youth.

The second act contains a key element in the play, "the sound of a breaking string." The author's remarks lend it a poetic ambivalence: it belongs both to man and the world, it is caused by objective material circumstances and by subjective lyrical consciousness of man which is summed up in the words "the sound of a breaking string" to which an emotional epithet "sad" is attached. The characters variously attribute this sound either to human activity or to natural causes thus stripping both theories of much of their meaning. Lopakhin's version that attributes the sound to a falling bucket in a pit is no more convincing than Gayev's suggestion that it is the voice of a heron. The juxtaposition of these two opinions renders both of them a rather comical effect because they are so incomplete. However, the two versions, while being comically different, in a way mutually complement each other, something that the author is content to have us believe. The voice of the world is at the same time natural (according to Gayev) and man-made (according to Lopakhin) and the "chemistry" of that unity cannot be decomposed. "The sound of a breaking string," which has become a sort of emblem of the play expresses in a concentrated form the principle of interpenetration of man and the world as the basis of the ontology of Chekhov's final play.

The third act brings us back within the walls of the house. But now, after the wide spaces of the second act, the confined space is perceived as artificial, as sinister isolation from the world that is fraught with an explosion. The action is organized in a way reminiscent of classical tragedies, notably the recognized classicist *Horace* by Pierre Corneille. There the main event, the battle of the Horacii against the Curiacii, takes place behind the scenes while on the stage we see how it is being perceived by the other characters; in Chekhov's play the auction in which Gayev and Lopakhin participate takes place off the stage while all the others await news about its outcome. But the similarity casts in sharper relief the startling differences. In the classicist tragedy the acts of the heroes were measured against the moral norm that follows the logic of the world order so that man is its center and essentially its analogue. Here the actions of the characters are devoid of any lofty purpose or any difficult moral choice that face the heroes of classicist tragedy; Lopakhin's victory in the auction is the result of an impulsive commercial gambler's instinct. Neither in man, nor in the world does one find

the abstract logical norm that would determine their unity and would enable man to see the world exclusively as a projection of himself. Such a view today appears to be narrow, cloistered and not reflecting the actual movement of the world.

That movement is conveyed through the movement of the plot based, like in all of Chekhov's mature plays, on the course of natural time. The inclusion of time in the plot undermines man's exclusiveness and it distinguishes Chekhov's plays from the masterpieces of Gogol and Griboyedov that are concerned exclusively with the human—social and moral—sphere. In *The Cherry Orchard* the image of the natural objective world is harmonized, containing nothing that is negative or hostile to man: no foul weather, like in *The Seagull*, no fire, like in *Three Sisters.* The characters in the fourth act have survived the catastrophe that destroyed their habitual way of life, but the world remains the same: "It's October outside, but it's as sunny and as quiet as if it were summer," says Lopakhin.[19] The world has turned out to be larger and stronger than people's existence in it, and it is in this wide and solid world that they find the foundation of a new life that continues outside their previously confined world of narrow horizons. The character of time changes accordingly. In the first three acts it was limited to the past and the present and to the prospect of the auction that is perceived in apocalyptic terms. Now it freely flows into the future defying human measures and restoring its natural continuity. The final departure of the characters from the house is a gesture symbolizing release from the former anthropocentric view of the world. History that appeared to them in their previous life as a catastrophe threatening their personal existence, has now unfolded to embrace the life of the world in its movement that organically combines man and nature, the spiritual and the material, the subject and the object.

The final scene of the play highlights the basic ontological mechanism of history: the finale shows Firs, by no means the play's "main" but simply the oldest character who has, naturally, reached the end of his life first; he does not die on the stage (that rejects even the potential finiteness traditionally associated with death) but lies still and blends with the world of objects that surround him, as if in a state of anabiosis. (This is a fragment of the usual process that leads to the transformation of tombstones into simply stones). This is accompanied by the sound of a broken string that marks the inseparable unity of man and the world and the sound of the axe that expresses human activity in the process of being; it is anonymous (by analogy with the tombstones) and ambivalent as the destruction of the past and at the same time the creation of the future. Man in Chekhov's last play is an inalienable and many-sided participant in the life of the world involved both in creative and destructive events. Thus, Chekhov's last play emerges as an artistic model of a special concept of history that provided an alternative to the author's personal tragedy and the crisis in social development. Social phenomena fit into the general dynamics of the life forces eternally renewing themselves, that are not directed specially or exclusively at man; it is this large-scale view that paves the way for man in resolving the contradictions that he cannot resolve with his own resources.

NOTES

1 The periodization referred to has been explained in the monograph: N. Razumova, *The Work of A.P. Chekhov in Terms of Space,* Tomsk, 2011 (in Russian).

2 Yu. Mann, *Gogol's Poetics,* Moscow, 1988, p. 253 (in Russian).

3 See: N. Razumova, "*Woe from Wit, The Government Inspector, The Cherry Orchard:* On the Problem of Historicism," *Gogol and Time,* Tomsk, 2005, pp. 128-137 (in Russian).

4 See, for example: A. Kuzicheva, "On the Philosophy of Life and Death," *Chekhov and Leo Tolstoy,* Moscow, 1980, pp. 254-263; I. Sukhikh, "*Death of a Hero* in Chekhov's World," *Chekhoviana: Articles, Publications, Essays,* Moscow, 1990, pp. 65-76 (both in Russian).

5 Zinovy Paperny noted "the general atmosphere of 'the past', 'semi-funereal atmosphere of doom, complex transitions from being to nonbeing,' "the motive of 'life spending itself' that is so characteristic of Chekhov's last play" (Z. Paperny, "*Contrary to All the Rules...": Chekhov's Plays and Vaudevilles,* Moscow, 1982, pp. 205, 206, in Russian).

6 A. Chekhov, *Collected Works and Letters* in 30 vols, Moscow, 1974-1983, vol. 13, p. 215.

7 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 251.

8 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 233.

9 Ibid., Letters, vol. 11, p. 256-257.

10 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 241.

11 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 246.

12 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 253.

13 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 240.

14 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 227, 241.

15 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 215.

16 Ibid., Letters, vol. 11, p. 242.

17 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 223.

18 Ibid., Letters, vol. 11, p. 293.

19 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 243.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Chekhov and the Polemic about the Art of His Times

Margarita ODESSKAYA

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries Nietzsche's philosophy dramatically changed the former idea of classical philosophy and life, the relationship between ethics and aesthetics and revised the entire 19th-century axiological system. The former idealistic notion that the artist rises above reality and awakens kind feelings by his work was replaced by the idea that *beauty* is on the other side of *goodness and truth* and the place of Christian God is occupied by the Will for power.

In Russia the perception of West-European aesthetic ideas in the 1880s—1890s was aided by the reading of the works of Gustave Flaubert, Charles Baudelaire, Friedrich Nietzsche, Emile Zola, and the Goncourt brothers in literary circles, and by translations of their works. Along with the reading and translation the process of analysis and interpretation of the latest aesthetic theories was taking place. Those who maintained that aesthetics was autonomous (*beauty* does not go hand in hand with *virtue*) were ever more vocal in upholding their position in art.

The attitude to Oscar Wilde and his aesthetics declared in his *Intentions* (1891) and in works of fiction, for example, in the novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray,* was rather mixed in Russian society at the end of the century. Oscar Wilde's ideas were shared by the authors of the *Severny vestnik (Northern Herald)* and its editor Akim Volynsky, as well as Zinaida Vengerova, who wrote an entry on the English writer for the Brockhaus and Efron Dictionary in 1892. The opposite opinion was expressed by Lev Tolstoy in his treatise *What Is Art?* He puts Oscar Wilde in the same category with Nietzsche as a proponent of decadent immoral art: "Decadents and aesthetes like Oscar Wilde elect as the theme of their works the negation of morality and praise of debauchery."[1]

Zinaida Gippius in her 1896 story *Zlatotsvet (Golden Flower)* highlights the split between "fathers and sons" in the literary circles in the late 19th century provoked by the new aesthetic ideas, in particular Oscar Wilde's declarations. It is not by chance that a literary circle in the Gippius story discusses a speech on

M. Odesskaya, Cand. Sc. (Philology), associate professor at the Teaching Russian as a Foreign Language Center at the Russian State Humanities University. The article was first published in the collection *The Image of Chekhov and Chekhov's Russia in the Modern World,* St. Petersburg, 2010 (in Russian).

Oscar Wilde's aesthetics delivered by one of its members. The story recaps the main provisions of Oscar Wilde's *The Decay of Lying*. Opinions are divided: the speaker "paraded his adherence to Wilde" while the "grey-bearded" part of the company committed to holding up the banner, was outraged by the immorality, mediocrity and drabness of Western art and signs of its decline. The reaction to new trends in art among the literati reflects the real situation, the polemic between "fathers" and "sons" somewhat ironically described by the author from the viewpoint of the "sons." In his essay *The Decay of Lying: an Observation* directed against naturalism Wilde claims it is not Art that imitates Life but vice versa, Life imitates Art. "Life is Art's best, Art's only pupil."[2] Art is more diverse than life and it offers a model of beauty, style and manner of behavior while real people follow the models set by art. Literary characters, in Oscar Wilde's opinion, are not only objects of imitation, they determine life and influence it.

Chekhov left no evidence of being acquainted with the work of Oscar Wilde. Still it is hard to imagine that he did not know, at least by hearsay, the extravagant declarations and the behavior of the English writer that shocked Victorian society. In 1895 the press, including *Novoye vremya* and *Severny vestnik* which published Chekhov's works, discussed Oscar Wilde's *cause celebre* in their pages. The Russian playwright did not make sensational statements like Oscar Wilde and probably had not even read the theoretical works of his famous English contemporary. All the more convincing is the proof that the same processes often take place in art in parallel. Chekhov's heroes feel that they are derivative with regard to their literary predecessors. As early as the play *Ivanov* (1887) written before Oscar Wilde's essay *The Decay of Lying* (1889) and works on aesthetics brought together in *Intentions* (1891), the hero, Ivanov, thinks of himself as the "product of literature," a walking quotation, an image-cliché that has undergone a series of transformations from Hamlet to "superfluous people": "I am nearly killed by shame when I think that a strong, healthy man like myself has become—oh, heaven only knows what—by no means a Manfred or a Hamlet!"[3] This is not the only such instance in Chekhov's works. Chekhov's characters do not only know, but seem to corroborate Wilde's thesis to the effect that literature is always ahead of life. While on the one hand, thinking of themselves as real people, his characters, like Layevsky, understand that they are re-enacting on the stage of life the roles that have already been written by Shakespeare, Pushkin, Lermontov, Turgenev and Tolstoy.

Not only people, but Nature imitates Art, Oscar Wilde claims. Art influences our perception of Nature and shapes this or that style of vision under the impact of new artistic discoveries. "For what is Nature?" asks Oscar Wilde and answers it in the essay *The Decline of Lying* equating the creative artist to God, who has created the Universe. "Nature is no great mother who has borne us. She is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life. Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us... To look at a thing is very different from seeing a thing. One does not see anything until one sees its beauty. Then, and then only, does it come into existence. At present, people see fogs, not because there are fogs, but because

poets and painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of such effects."[4] Natural phenomena, colors and manner of their portrayal are subject to fashion, Oscar Wilde stresses. "That white quivering sunlight that one sees now in France, with its strange blotches of mauve, and its restless violet shadows, is her latest fancy, and, on the whole, Nature reproduces it quite admirably. Where she used to give us Corots and Daubignys, she gives us now exquisite Monets and entrancing Pissaros."[5] While other views of Nature become obsolete and banal and cease to attract the artist, "nobody of any real culture, for instance, ever talks nowadays about the beauty of a sunset. Sunsets are quite old-fashioned. They belong to the time when Turner was the last note in art."[6]

Chekhov more often than not set out his views on art in his personal correspondence. Thus, in a letter to Aleksey Suvorin (dated February 24, 1893) analyzing critically the works of Turgenev, whom he at first rated very highly and treated as an aesthetic model, Chekhov declares that Turgenev's landscapes as a type of artistic perception of Nature was outdated: "The descriptions of nature are good... but I feel that we are getting tired of this kind of descriptions and that something different is needed."[7]

Chekhov ascribes to his characters reflections on the apparent world created by human consciousness. The hero of the story *U znakomykh (A Visit)* (1898) understands that not only Turgenev's landscapes are outdated but the old perception of the world, the idealistic consciousness and the corresponding type of individual reflected in preceding literature: "Dates on moonlit nights, white clad figures with thin waistlines, mysterious shadows, towers, estates and such "types" as Sergey Sergeyevich and as he, Podgorin himself, with his cold boredom, constant annoyance, inability to adapt himself to real life, inability to take from it what it can offer and the poignant and gnawing thirst for what does not exist and cannot exist on earth—all this is outdated."[8] Inability to adapt oneself to real life and the thirst for what does not exist and cannot exist on earth are the features of the idealistic hero cultivated in the 19th-century literature and they have lost their former unalloyed character and romantic attraction. Chekhov records the collapse of the former idea when "superfluous people" towered over their environment because they rejected the reality in which they lived. The playwright challenges the literary cliché: with Chekhov "superfluous people" suffer from hysteria (Ivanov, Layevsky) or megalomania (Voynitsky). This is not to say that Chekhov has changed plus for minus in his assessment of these characters, on the contrary, he has demonstrated that all assessments are relative. A reappraisal of values is the new feature that grips human consciousness in the late 19th century. The juxtaposition of the real to the ideal world and total failure to understand the oneness of being, the coexistence of good and evil is the basis of idealistic consciousness that had exhausted itself by the end of the century.

It looks as if what alienated Nikolay Mikhaylovsky from Chekhov—according to Lev Shestov, was the fact that "the critic could see yet another proof that the so-called theory of art for art's sake was fantastic,"—but it was exactly what attracted the philosopher himself.[9] The lines from Charles Baudelaire's poem chosen by Shestov as an epigraph determine the main discursive

thrust of his article. Proceeding from the ethical premises of the *Narodniki* criticism as represented by Mikhaylovsky, "who shrank away from the source" (from Chekhov's works) "with fear and even disgust," Lev Shestov examines the reason for this disgust in a totally different axiological context. It is obvious that Shestov in determining the peculiarity of Chekhov's talent as "creativity out of nothing" did not mean it as a negative assessment.[10] Referring readers to Baudelaire's poetry Shestov suggests that for the Russian writer, just like for the French poet, the categories of *Good and Evil* are not absolute antipodes juxtaposed to each other, but are one and flow one into the other. As Jean-Paul Sartre said, Evil for Baudelaire was "a counter-Good which had to possess all the characteristics of Good except that they appeared with a different mathematical sign in front of them."[11] In Baudelaire's system of coordinates Evil is of the same nature as man-animal and Good is an artificial category, which is why it needs gods and prophets. The laws of Good exist to be broken. As Sartre writes, "according to Baudelaire's conception, man is not a 'state'; he is the clash of two opposing movements which are both centrifugal and of which one is directed upwards and the other downwards."[12]

In Chekhov's artistic world, as Shestov shows, people are not divided into superfluous and nonsuperfluous, useful and harmful, good and evil. Shestov argues in his article that Chekhov simply has no use for and rejects the pat formulas of *Good* , he is a master of depicting "rotting and decaying existence" towards which he makes the reader feel not "the natural and legitimate feeling of outrage" but "unnecessary and dangerous sympathy."[13] The philosopher defines Chekhov's skill as the ability "with a single touch, even a breath and a look to kill everything people live by and are proud of."[14]

Shestov discerned and articulated what Chekhov himself shrank from admitting but could not help expressing as an artist. The writer (Chekhov) depicted a person who has been confronted with *nothingness* inside himself and in the surrounding life. The ideals instilled in man's consciousness through education, ideals that had been created over the centuries in order to explain the meaning of the existence of the world have been worn out and have exhausted themselves. Shestov drew attention to yet another important feature: "Chekhov's stories are peopled by materialistic characters who have a sneaking idealism in the 1860s mold."[15] That means that Chekhov's anti-idealism is not a juxtaposition of materialism and idealism, which would traditionally constitute the drama and conflict between antipode characters such as von Koren and Layevsky. A materialist by education and conviction, von Koren is an idealist in his worldview preaching the 1860s ideals. The conclusion suggests itself that one can talk about idealistic positivism and materialistic positivism as two conflicting systems of views in the 19th century. There is no positivism in Chekhov. "The only philosophy that Chekhov took seriously and therefore fought seriously against it was positivistic materialism,"[16] Shestov writes. He portrayed the drama and inner conflict of the writer who found himself face to face with emptiness.

The question that really engaged Chekhov's mind when he was trying his hand as a dramatist was what art should be like and the clash of new and old

trends and different ideologies. In *The Seagull* he presented a polyphony of opinions and judgements about art. The form of discussions that occupy much space in the Chekhov's play corresponds to Oscar Wilde's essays that have the shape of dialogues. Chekhov's characters—professionals, dilettantes and just lay people—discuss theater and literature.

Shamrayev, the estate manager, who is far removed from art, recalls a funny incident connected with theater and expresses his opinions in the same humorous key: "The stage is not what it was in his time. There were sturdy oaks growing on it then, where now but stumps remain."[17] The opinion expressed by the teacher Medvedenko about the play sounds like a parody, his remarks are an internalized surrogate of the Populist *(Narodniki)* view of literature with a touch of positivism: "No one has any ground for separating life from matter, as the spirit may well consist of the union of material atoms... Some day you should write a play, and put on the stage the life of a schoolmaster. It is a hard, hard life."[18]

It is notable that in the first draft of the play Medvedenko, like Chekhov's other comic characters (for example, the lackey Polikarp in *A Shooting Party,* reads Auguste Comte and Yepikhodov *(The Cherry Orchard)* appears to be struggling with Henry Thomas Buckle and reads the works of the Positivists Buckle and Herbert Spencer.

However, Doctor Dorn, an educated and well-traveled man, while he praises Konstantin Treplev's play on account of its abstract ideas and feels that if he were an artist he would "soar away into heights above this earth" still believes that "every work of art should have a definite object in view. You should know why you are writing, for if you follow the road of art without a goal before your eyes, you will lose yourself, and your genius will be your ruin."[19] What strikes one is that the doctor does not only assume the role of a mentor-father, but in a way paraphrases Chekhov's well-known critics who missed "a broader idea," ideals in the young writer's talented works. Examples are not far to seek. Take Mikhaylovsky, who reproached Chekhov for "casually walking past life and casually picking at one thing or another."[20]

Arkadina is vexed by the pretension to new forms and the challenge of tradition in her son's play. "Now it appears that he has produced a masterpiece, if you please!" the "great actress" says mockingly. "I suppose it was not meant to amuse us at all, but that he arranged the performance and fumigated us with sulphur to demonstrate to us how plays should be written, and what is worth acting... I notice, though, that he did not choose an ordinary play, but forced his decadent trash on us. I am willing to listen to any raving, so long as it is not meant seriously, but in showing us this, he pretended to be introducing us to a new form of art, and inaugurating a new era."[21] Chekhov skillfully weaves into the text of his play quotations from Shakespeare wittily reminding the reader of the famous dramatic provocation Hamlet resorts to in order to teach the royal couple a moral lesson. The play *The Mousetrap* is a mirror reflecting the *moral* vices of the royal "fathers" who are beyond criticism. Konstantin Treplev's play is a "sortie" against the *aesthetic* principles of the pillars who have gained "preeminence in art." Gertrude confesses to her son that she had seen her soul in

"bleeding," "mortal" sores; Arkadina, who jokingly quoted Gertrude's monologue before the play, cannot contain her outrage after the performance, she is insulted by the arrogance of the "sons," the rebellious decadents. It has to be noted that Chekhov does not confine himself to literary allusions; equally important are the parallels he draws with the "fathers" who really existed and upheld their ideals through their art. Significantly, Arkadina repeats with only slight changes the critic Mikhaylovsky who upbraided the "sons" for being bigger than their boots: "They consider themselves to be the salt of the earth who are annoyed by a handful of 'fathers' who protect the old ideals, while all the rest are allegedly on their side and are ready to recognize them as their heralds and leaders; they are 'the new literary generation'... In reality, this is ridiculous."[22]

Nina assesses Konstantin's play comparing it with Trigorin's "wonderful" stories which she finds charming. What she misses in the play of the young experimenting playwright is living people, action, love, all that forms the basis of a robust play. The actress finds it difficult to act in such a play. It has to be noted that the opinion of Nina, an inexperienced actress, coincides with that of critics and actors who said that *Ivanov* and *The Wood Demon* were not playable.

Trigorin, a talented writer, resents being compared with Tolstoy and Turgenev. It is a known fact that critics assessing the talent of the young Chekhov compared him to Turgenev and Tolstoy. For example, Gorlenko, describing Chekhov as "a representative of the genuine literary school" noted that "in terms of his manner he stands between Grigorovich and Turgenev, not attaining of course the level of the latter, but promising to surpass the former."[23] Such comparisons drew an ironic reaction from Chekhov. In a letter to his relatives from Taganrog he noted sarcastically: "The *khokhly* (Ukrainians), apparently taking me for Turgenev, take off their hats to me."[24] Chekhov was more straightforward in a letter to Leontyev-Shcheglov: "One has to be careful in drawing comparisons which, however innocuous, involuntarily invite suspicions and accusations of imitation and faking."[25] Chekhov's literary "double," Trigorin, understands that he should meet the criteria worked out by 19th-century Russian literature and follow them. That means that as a citizen, as a writer, it is his duty to speak of their sorrows, of their future, also of science, of the rights of man."[26] However, the well-known writer (Trigorin) feels that the only thing he can and loves to do is to paint only landscapes while in all the rest he is "false to the marrow of his bones." Thus there is a clash of the ethical and the aesthetical in his work. He does not feel free, he feels dependent on the critics and the readers. This echoes Merezhkovsky's thoughts on the dependence of the writer on the opinion of the editors of "thick" literary journals, critics and readers.[27]

Treplev believes that contemporary theater is in the rut. He criticizes theater for the morality that it tries to "fish out... of vulgar pictures and phrases." Chekhov himself in his reviews of plays and letters wrote a great deal about the triteness and moralizing of playwrights. For example, in his letter to Aleksey Pleshcheyev dated October 4, 1888, Chekhov criticizes Leontyev-Shcheglov's play *Country House Husband* for being full of clichés and "cheap moralizing." In his "strange" play Treplev thus formulates the credo of an innovative drama-

tist: "Life must be represented not as it is, not as it ought to be, but as it appears in dreams."[28] That is certainly a challenge to literary and stage canons. Chekhov was of a different persuasion and he portrayed precisely what Kostya so heavily inveighed against: "show us people in the act of eating, drinking, loving, walking, and wearing their coats."[29] However, things go full circle: when his works began to be printed in thick journals and he became famous, Treplev became aware that he was slipping into a rut. Eventually he comes to the conclusion that "good literature is not a question of forms, new or old, but of ideas that must pour freely from the author's heart."[30] But that is not the final judgement about what art should be like. In his last conversation with Nina Treplev admits that "I am still groping in a chaos of phantoms and dreams, not knowing whom and what end I am serving by it all."[31] Unlike Nina, he has no faith.

The Seagull is the most metatextual and metatheatrical of Chekhov's plays. An argument about art leads to the destruction of idealistic ideas of life and creative work. A stuffed body of a seagull is the symbol of the collapse of Nina's idealism. After using the stuffed body of a seagull as a model in his plot for a short story where the girl is an embodiment of purity, beauty and freedom, the writer (Trigorin) felt like representing her in the shape of a stuffed seagull, a dead bird that preserves its external beauty but is empty inside. Having done its bit the model ceases to be of any interest to the artist. Nina the actress has played the part realistically and put Trigorin's plot into life. The artist acts as an antipode of Pygmalion. Purity is ruined. The actress continues to demonstrate melodramatic acting methods on the provincial stage. The stuffed seagull and the ruins of a theater symbolize lifelessness, emptiness, destruction of a living dream and of art.

All the four characters in the play are sure that they serve Art. But each of them lives in an illusory world. Narcissism is the world of Trigorin and Arkadina. Life as it appears in dreams is Treplev's world. Perhaps Nina's words to the effect that she has understood what her mission is challenge the idealistic perception of the world. One should live not in an illusory world of the stage, but in the real world, live an ordinary life, be patient, that is, be able to bear one's cross. This is what Nina arrives at after going through all the trials.

The discussion about art is still open-ended. One thing is clear: art and creativity are connected with faith. Art is a long journey of knowledge, gains and losses. Interestingly, there are similarities in Chekhov's thoughts about art and God. After *The Seagull* in 1897 he made an entry in his diary: "Between 'there is God' and 'there is no God' there extends a vast field that only a truly wise man can cross with great difficulty."[32]

Chekhov's concept of art is difficult to discern because he did not state his position in articles and manifestos. He did not openly take part in the polemics of the 1880s—1890s about the relationship between the ethical and the aesthetical in art, triggered by Dostoyevsky's speech at the unveiling of a monument to Pushkin, and by Lev Tolstoy's *A Confession* and later in his treatise *What Is Art?* However, one does find in Chekhov's works and letters his reaction to the overwhelming issues that formed the subject of the debate between "fathers" and "sons." Chekhov's works and letters reflect the process of reappraisal of values

that was taking place in art, esthetics and philosophy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. *The Seagull* is not only Chekhov's dramatic masterpiece, but also a vivid testimony to his reflections on art.

NOTES

1 L. Tolstoy, *What Is Art,* Moscow, 1955, p. 462 (in Russian).

2 O. Wilde, *Lord Arthur Savile's Crime and Other Stories,* Hampshire, 2003.

3 A. Chekhov, *Collected Works and Letters in 30 volumes*, Moscow, 1974-1983, vol. 12, p. 37 (in Russian).

4 O. Wilde, op. cit.

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7 A. Chekhov, Letters, vol. 5, p. 15.

8 Ibid., vol. 10, p. 22.

9 L. Shestov: "Creating out of Nothing (Anton Chekhov)," *Anton Chekhov: Pro et contra,* St. Petersburg, 2002, p. 566 (in Russian).

10 Andrey Stepanov writes about it in an article "Lev Shestov on Chekhov." He discerns parallels between Shestov's philosophical system and Chekhov's rejection of ready-made "worldviews" noting that the "title of the article on Chekhov relates directly to the fundamental proposition from *Apotheosis of Groundlessness:* "All creation is creation out of Nothing." See: A. Stepanov, "Lev Shestov on Chekhov," *Chekhoviana: Chekhov and the Silver Age,* Moscow, 1996, p. 75-79 (in Russian).

11 J.-P. Sartre, *Baudelaire,* New York, 1967, p. 187.

12 Ibid., p. 39.

13 L. Shestov, "Creation Out of Nothing," p. 575.

14 Ibid., p. 568.

15 Ibid., p. 590.

16 Ibid., p. 595.

17 A. Chekhov, *Works*, vol. 13, p. 12.

18 Ibid., *Works*, vol. 13, p. 15.

19 Ibid., *Works*, vol. 13, p. 18-19.

20 N. Mikhaylovsky, "On Fathers and Sons and Mr. Chekhov," *A.P. Chekhov: Pro et contra,* p. 85.

21 A. Chekhov, *Works*, vol. 13, p. 15.

22 N. Mikhaylovsky, "On Fathers and Sons and Mr. Chekhov," p. 81.

23 A. Chekhov, *Letters*, vol. 2, p. 443.

24 Ibid., *Letters*, vol. 2, p. 82.

25 Ibid., *Letters*, vol. 2, p. 204.

26 A. Chekhov, *Works*, vol. 13, p. 30.

27 Merezhkovsky believes that in Russia, unlike in the West, there is a family aristocracy but not "an aristocracy of spirit": a writer depends on the editor and the editors "in their literary tastes are incorrigible moralists, timid pedagogues of the immature mob" (D. Merezhkovsky, "On the Causes of Decline and the New Trends in Contemporary Russian Literature," *Leo Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky: Eternal Fellow Travelers,* Moscow, 1995, p. 530, in Russian).

28 A. Chekhov, *Works*, vol. 13, p. 11.

29 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 8.

30 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 8.

31 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 59.

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Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Ancient Greek Atomism: Hypotheses of Its Origin and Types of Atomistic Theories

Maria SOLOPOVA

Ancient Greek atomism is invariably a theme of much interest to those scholars whose research is in the area of classical studies in philosophy. However, the range of problems offered by any classical theme is really inexhaustible. The subject we are going to address here is no exception in this sense although the last 150 years have seen it discussed time and again in its various aspects. The present article proposes to specify the meaning of the term "atomism" in historical and philosophical studies, to discuss two interpretations of atomism (the narrow and the broader), and to analyze Greek sources that provided material for these interpretations. The second part of this article discusses hypothetical origins of atomism in Greece, including the hypothesis on the borrowing of the atomistic ideas from the East. The third part focuses on the linguistic origin of atomism and attempts to analyze whether or not the Greek texts revealed a connection between concepts of atoms and letters of the alphabet.

I. On the Types of Atomistic Doctrines

We can speak of atomism as a philosophical teaching starting from the point when philosophical minds evolved the concept of "atom" as an *indivisible body* and first-principle. The history of atomism traditionally begins in the latter half of the 5th century B.C., when the atomistic physics of Democritus (*circa* 460-370)[1] came into being and prominence. It was taken further by Epicurus (341-271) and finalized by Titus Lucretius Carus in his poem *On the Nature of Things* (*circa* 50 B.C.). However the history of atomistic ideas cannot be restricted to these teachings alone. In fact, studies on the history of atomism would consider doctrines that neither use the term *atom*, nor deal with anything material. Therefore, we should primarily specify the concept of *atomism* in order to understand what teachings we classify as falling into the category of ancient Greek atomism and what grounds we have for doing so. Are these solely the teachings that

M. Solopova, D. Sc. (Philosophy); senior research fellow, Institute of Philosophy, RAS. This article was first published in Russian in *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 8, 2011.

employed the term *atom* (in Greek *atomos* means uncuttable, indivisible) or also others that dealt with any kind of minutest bodies and certain indivisibles?

As applied to the philosophies of Democritus, Epicurus and the Epicureans, the term *atomism* can be used in a restricted sense. It is the *atomism* of the *Atomists*. But what can we regard as atomism in the broad sense, and on what grounds? Some grounds for an expanded interpretation of atomism[2] (i.e., as any teaching on the discrete structure of being) can be found in ancient writings themselves. In his treatise *On Blending and Growth* (*De mixtione et augmentatione*),[3] the peripatetic philosopher and commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (early 3rd century A.D.) criticized the Stoics for their doctrine of the "total blending" and represented them as adhering to the view on matter as a continuum. They were opposed by the supporters of theories that regarded matter as discrete, who in turn held dissimilar views and were locked in a debate between themselves. Of interest to us is the passage, in which Alexander names these philosophers (following below is an abridged excerpt from *De mixtione*; the Greek text conveys the notion of discreteness as follows: *ek diôrismenôn te kai kekhôrismenôn sômatôn*, composed "of discrete and separate bodies"):

"Some of the latter say that the first-principles and elements are infinitely numerous indivisible bodies only distinguished from one another by size and shape, and that other things come to be by the composition and particular interlinking of these things as also by their position and order; Leucippus and Democritus seem to have been the first to take this view, and later Epicurus and those of the same persuasion; others say that there are not atoms but certain uniform and infinitely numerous bodies from which the coming-to-be of perceptible bodies occurs by compounding and composition, a theory that Anaxagoras and Archelaus seem to have held; some were inspired to say that the first-principles and elements of everything were actually certain partless bodies, and there is one theory which makes bodies come to be from planes, and yet another from numbers" (*De mixtione* 213, 18-214, 6 Bruns).

The entire body of Greek philosophical writings we have at our disposal displays no other similar attempt to unify the doctrines of the discreteness of being and matter on the basis of the typological proximity principle. Thus, Alexander mentions five theories of discreteness: that bear the names of

1) Democritus and Epicurus,[4]
2) Anaxagoras and Archelaus, and also some others without specifying their names,
3) Diodorus Cronus ("the partless bodies"),
4) Plato ("the planes-triangles") and
5) the Pythagoreans ("the numbers").

We can add to the list Xenocrates, the probable author of the treatise *On Indivisible Lines* preserved in the Aristotelian corpus, as well as Heraclides of Pontus and Asclepiades of Bithynia. (Heraclides, a contemporary of Plato and Aristotle, introduced a typologically close doctrine of "unconnected corpuscles" (*anarmoi ogkoi*) that was supported by Asclepiades in the 1st century.

The tradition of grouping together different theories on the discrete structure of matter is derived from Aristotle's reasoning in *Physics*, *On the Heavens*, and *On Generation and Corruption* that often compare the physical theories of Plato with those of Leucippus (Democritus) and pronounce them as being basically similar. In the *On Generation and Corruption*, for example, we find the following passage:

"For although both Plato and Leucippus postulate elementary constituents that are indivisible and distinctively characterized by figures, there is great difference between the two theories: the "indivisibles" of Leucippus (i) are solids, while those of Plato are planes, and (ii) are characterized by an infinite variety of figures, while the characterizing figures employed by Plato are limited in number" (*On Generation and Corruption* I, 8, 325b25-29; transl. by H.H. Joachim).

In another passage Aristotle says that both Plato and the Atomists were adherents of the doctrines of indivisibles because they attributed a specific shape to the first-principles (*stoicheia*, elements): Plato attributed to fire the shape of a pyramid, while Democritus the shape of a sphere:

"For any one who gives each element a shape of its own, and makes this the ground of distinction between the substances, has to attribute to them indivisibility; since division of a pyramid or a sphere must leave somewhere at least a residue which is not sphere or a pyramid. Either, then, a part of fire is not fire, so that there is a body prior to the element—for every body is either an element or composed of elements—or not every body is divisible" (*On the Heavens* III, 7, 306a30; transl. by J.L. Stocks).

In Aristotle, we could find even more comparisons of this kind. Besides, Aristotle approximates the atomism of Democritus not only with Plato's teaching but also with that of the Pythagoreans. Displaying his characteristic knack for seeing the actual meaning behind an author's writing, he remarks apropos of the Atomists: "Now this view in a sense makes things out to be numbers or composed of numbers. The exposition is not clear, but this is its real meaning" (*On the Heavens* III, 4, 303a).

It also follows from the above Aristotelian passages that we have the right to add to the history of atomism the teachings that made no use of the term *atomos*, employing instead certain other Greek synonyms for the "indivisible," such as *adiairetos*.

Considering the above passage from *De mixtione* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, it would be more correct to speak of the discrete theories of being and matter rather than of atomism in the broad sense of the word. The term *atomism* should be indicative of school affiliation, but neither Plato, nor Anaxagoras, nor Diodorus were the Atomists. At the same time, one has to speak about the atomism of the Platonists, the Megarians and the Pythagoreans, which tends to dilute the whole notion. A special consideration of the atomistic problems may furnish a convenient framework for using the maximally broad of all possible meanings of the word "atomism" in a bid to find some common typological traits and grounds for comparison.

The most important of all teachings that are usually listed under the heading of atomism[5] is a version of geometrical atomism found in Plato's *Timaeus*. Qualifying Plato's doctrine that all elementary bodies arise from planes-triangles as atomistic

helps one to understand the history of the atomistic style of thinking in Greece without restricting oneself to the Democritean materialistic atomism. *Timaeus* (53b and thereafter) treats of the structure and rise of the elements—"the four most beautiful bodies"—from two types of right triangles: "For out of the triangles we have chosen arise four kinds" (54c1). Plato's speculation seems to reveal an acquaintance with Democritus' writings (even though he never mentions him by name) and purports to demonstrate their basic inadequacy. In fact, Plato speaks about each of the elements—fire, air, water, and earth—almost as Democritus would: "We must imagine all these to be so small that no single particle of any of the four kinds is seen by us on account of their smallness; but when many of them are collected together, their aggregates are seen" (*Timaeus* 56b7-c3; transl. by B. Jowett).

The further development of the atomistic ideas, at least in the Old Academy, looked like a continuation of the Platonic transition from the minutest indivisible *body* postulated by Democritus (three-dimensional magnitude) to the minutest fragment of *space*, the triangle (two-dimensional magnitude). After Plato, Xenocrates came up with a teaching on indivisible *lines* (thus taking the next step and transiting to one-dimensional magnitude). In the final analysis, we come to the inspiration of the entire Old Academy, the Pythagorean *arithmology*, or the teaching on *monades*-numbers (units without magnitude, indivisible by definition). This body-line-point sequence had an interesting culmination: in the 4th century B.C. the Pythagorean Ecphantus interpreted *monades* as indivisible bodies (DK51 B 2), thereby backing the doxographic evidence of Democritus' Pythagorean sympathies with the fact of Pythagorean sympathies for Democritus.

Let us note that far from all Greek writers used the term *atom*. Xenocrates did use it in a writing about indivisible lines, while Ecphantus employed the notion of *atomos*. Therefore, we can speak about their atomism from the formal terminological point of view as well. It is clear, however, that the term *atomos* by itself does not qualify a doctrine as atomistic. Since *atomos* is synonymous with *adiairetos*, we are justified in considering all theories of indivisible first-principles, no matter what the original term was, as integral part of the atomic style of thought.

As a result, it is fair to say that atomism was not a marginal teaching within the Greek philosophy as one can occasionally hear claimed. This view is excessively trustful with regard to run-of-the-mill criticism of Democritus' atomism, offered by the majority of philosophical schools that were opposed to its materialist and anti-providential features. The numerous critics—Plato himself was the earliest of them—belonged to the Platonic, Peripatetic and Stoic schools, a fact indicating that the Democritean atomism was unanimously rejected (an infrequent occurrence) by the majority of the contemporary philosophical elite. Yet atomism, as mentioned, can and must be interpreted not only in a restricted sense as a materialistic teaching of Democritus—Epicurus. Besides, atomism as an intellectual attitude manifested itself not only in philosophy but also in other areas, such as linguistics, medicine, mathematics and music.

If we take into account the texts that are of importance for the history of Greek philosophy, we will see that the history of atomism displays several types of atomism:

— the *mechanistic* atomism of Leucippus-Democritus and Epicurus;

— the *corpuscular* atomism of Heraclides Ponticus and Asclepiades;

— the *mathematical* atomism of the Pythagoreans, Plato and Xenocrates;

— the *dialectical* atomism of Zeno of Elea and Diodorus Cronus.

It is only by studying all these teachings that we can understand the atomistic theory's problems in Greek philosophy, problems that had been most vividly enunciated by Democritus of Abdera. But what were the reasons for the rise of atomism? The next part of this article is devoted to identifying the origins of the atomistic ideas in Ancient Greece.

II. The Origins of the Atomic Theory

So, how and why did the notion of atoms come into being? Here the following lines of reasoning are possible: atomism was either

1) borrowed by the Greeks, or

2) was a discovery of theirs, and then either came into being without any prerequisites, or was a logical step in the development of the earlier thinking on the organization of the Universe and man.

Before we address the hypotheses on the origin of atomism, reflected both in ancient sources and modern studies, it is worth mentioning the fact that the available hypotheses concerning the origin of atomism imply precisely the physical atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, viewing the other types of atomistic perceptions as in certain measure dependent on the latter.

1. The borrowing hypothesis. If atomism was borrowed, what was its source and how did the borrowing take place? India was the only country in the 5th century B.C., whence the Greeks could have borrowed their atomism. But up to this day, modern science has nothing of substance at its disposal to confirm the theory. We may refer to the authority of Thomas McEvilley, who wrote: "The relationships between the Greek and Indian schools of atomism have been ignored by most scholars and treated with cavalier brevity by others. Guthrie, for example, cites Cyril Bailey's conclusion that no such relationships existed, and Bailey in turn cites Keith's book *Indian Logic and Atomism*."[6] McEvilley himself believes that one can speak about the Indian atomic theories influencing the Greek atomism at its origin and indicates as candidates such 6th-century B.C. schools of Indian thought as Ajivika, Jain and Carvaka, although the written canons of their teachings were developed much later. Yet not a single scholar finds it possible to consider this influence in earnest.[7]

However, we know of sources that report about Democritus' travels to the East, including to India. These sources date back to the late Hellenistic period (Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus of Rome, Claudius Aelianus, Diogenes Laertius) and cannot be seen as entirely reliable. But what they say should be taken into account as hypotheses, if suggested a long time ago. Following below are some quotes mentioning Democritus' sojourn in India:

"Democritus, son of Damasippus, a native of Abdera, conferring with many Gymnosophists among the Indians, and with priests in Egypt, and with astrologers and magi in Babylon" (Hippolytos of Rome. *Refutation of all Heresies* I, 13 = DK68 A 40).

"So he traveled to the Chaldeans and to Babylon and to the magi and to the sages of India" (Claudius Aelianus. *Miscellaneous History* IV, 20 = DK68 A 16).

"And he proceeded further to the Chaldeans, and penetrated into Persia, and went as far as the Persian Gulf. Some also say that he made acquaintance with in India, and that he went to Aethiopia" (Diogenes Laertius. *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* IX, 35 = DK68 A 1 – Diogenes refers to Demetrius of Magnesia and Antisthenes of Rhodes).

It is quite likely that this adventure tradition is based on some traces of Democritus' real biography.[8] All reports of this kind at least testify to the fact that late antiquity allowed of a possibility that atomism had been borrowed from without. For all that, the idea of external influences was for the Greeks a culturological cliché (See: the biographical tradition of travels to the East undertaken by Pythagoras, Plato, Pyrronos, and others). In reality one has to speak of a source of falsifications that tampered with Democritus' works rather than of a source of Eastern influences he was allegedly exposed to. We know one of the sources, from which the late Hellenistic writings drew their information on Democritus as a disciple of the Persian magus Ostanes and possibly that of Gymnosophists (which is, of course, an anachronism). He was Bolus of Mendes, an Egyptian priest of Alexandria (2nd century B.C.). Obviously echoing Bolus in that Ostanes had been the teacher of Democritus, Pliny the Elder wrote in his *Natural History* that "Pythagoras and Democritus... who visited the magi of Persia, Arabia and Egypt" (XXV, 2, 5). But none of the Greek texts mentions Indian atomism or says that it was *atomism* that Democritus imported from India and Babylonia (nor do they specify any other ideas).

2. The invention hypothesis. Earlier we outlined two possible options for discussing the hypothesis that the Greeks had invented atomism on their own: one is to show that atomism had no theoretical precursors, and the other that it was grounded in earlier philosophical tradition. The "without-premise origin" of whatever is necessarily a doubtful proposition. A more likely candidate, with a certain degree of convention, is the empirical hypothesis that tops the following preliminary list of hypotheses on the genesis of atomistic ideas. The other versions postulate the existence of sources of influence, both philosophical and non-philosophical, that prepared the emergence of atomism.

1) *The empirical hypothesis*: atomism is a consequence of empirical experiences and direct observations. A case in point is a well-known text from the treatise *On the Soul*, where Aristotle mentions "motes in the air" that are like atoms:

   Aristotle. *On the Soul* I, 2, 404a3-4: "those which are spherical he calls fire and soul, and compares them to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows" (transl. by J.A. Smith).

   John Philoponus. *On Aristotle's On the Soul*, 67, 21 (ad locum): "These motes exist in the air, but as their smallness makes them invisible,

they do not seem to be at all. Only the sunbeams, when coming through the window, prove their existence. In the same way the *atoms* are subtle and invisible due to their smallness."

But why did those observations of the motes in the air take shape as a physical doctrine in the latter half of the 5th century B.C. and not earlier? We can note that the "visual perception" was not the only argument adduced. In Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *On the Heavens* we read of tactile sensations as being crucial in the making of the atomistic hypothesis: "Democritus, as Theophrastus reports in *Physics*, arrived at the atomistic theory as those (before him), who gave explanations about warm and cold, and the like, argued unprofessionally" (Simplicius. *In Arist. De Caelo* 564, 24 Heiberg, ad loc. *De Caelo* III, I, 299a2 = DK68 A120).

Aristotle says in no uncertain terms that the main idea of atomism consists in making the theory "agree" with the phenomena and thus explain the visible multiplicity and mutability of the physical world: "Leucippus, however, thought he had a theory which harmonized with sense-perception and would not abolish either coming-to-be and passing-away or motion and the multiplicity of things" (*On Generation and Corruption* I, 8, 325a23-26), and Commentary by John Philoponus *ad locum* (In Arist. De gen. et corr. 158, 12-20 Vitelli).

2) *The archaic hypothesis*. At the same time, we know of studies on atomistic representations in children and in some primitive cultures.[9] In his famous work *Primitive Culture* Sir Edward Taylor provides data making it possible to identify a genetic connection between the atomistic teaching on the soul and animism.[10] As such, this hypothesis goes beyond the philosophical discourse, pointing to the problems of a relationship between philosophy and mythology in the intellectual culture.

3) *The physiological hypothesis*. In his time, William Heidel suggested considering the origins of atomism from the physiological point of view as a result of observations of the human body. He pointed to the discontinuity in swallowing and breathing as a possible projection to the atomistic theories.[11] One may also indicate the heart's palpitation and the pulse as a no less working hypothesis drawing on the graphic heuristic models from the medical area.

4) *The metaphysical hypothesis*. Yet another highly influential hypothesis puts the genesis of atomism in the historical and philosophical context: atomism comes into being as an answer to the earlier philosophy's questions about one and many, divisibility and indivisibility, motion and rest, finite and infinite... The Eleatic ontology, particularly the logical paradoxes of Zeno of Elea, and Pythagorean mathematics became the productive causes of the atomistic theory. Generally, it is Aristotle and his suggestion that atomism emerged as a critical reaction to the Eleatic doctrine[12] that we should accept as the source of this particular approach to the theoretical rationalization of atomism. The metaphysical hypothesis that views atomism as a logical step forward in the development of Greek

philosophy reminds us once again that atomism is a teaching on both atoms and void, because the said problems have no solution in theory unless the existence of void is admitted.

It is hardly possible to choose just one hypothesis as the only correct option. Certainly, there is some truth in each and this is reason enough for close consideration. The list, as was stated before, is a preliminary one and open to amendments. It will be amended in the next part of this article discussing the fifth, *linguistic*, hypothesis that postulates alphabetic influences on the rise of atomism.

III. Linguistic Hypothesis: Atoms and the Alphabet

So, the linguistic hypothesis on the origin of atomism implies that the shaping of atomistic perceptions was influenced by the alphabetic lettering. Since we have no reasons for asserting that the Greeks borrowed their atomism, the same problem can be formulated in a different way: If we cannot establish how Indian atomism influenced its Greek counterparts and *vice versa*, it is fair to assume that both these cultures generated atomism independently of each other. Prof. Victoria Lyssenko, Russian Indologist and coordinator of the Conference "The Atomic Principle: Language and Thought," suggested that we should give thought to a possibility of there having exited one single source that generated similar phenomena in Ancient Greece and India.[13] Could the alphabet have been that common generating model? The linguistic hypothesis is congenial with the ideas that the British Sinologist Joseph Needham (1900-1995) first expounded in his fundamental project *Science and Civilisation in China* (1954-2008; the publication of this multi-volume series is carried on by his colleagues and disciples). Needham attached significance to the fact that the civilizations, which in this or that period had witnessed the rise of atomism (he meant the Greek, Indian and Arab civilizations), were characterized by the use of alphabetic systems. This made them distinct from the Chinese civilization that used the hieroglyphics and where we can not find any traces of atomism. With certain reservations, Needham sees as plausible the fact there was a correlation between alphabetism and atomism.[14]

Let us try to estimate the fruitfulness of this hypothesis from the historical and philosophical point of view as applied to atomism both in the broad sense as a style of thinking and in the narrow sense as a teaching of Democritus and Epicurus. "From the historical and philosophical point of view" means that we will address predominantly the sources as direct testimonies of the realization of problems in question and will discuss the terminology they used. All indirect evidence has to be dropped: our own imaginative interpretations (possibly correct ones) will add nothing to the history of atomism in ancient times.

Coming back to the assumed relationship between atomism and alphabetism, we should primarily consider the terminology of the philosophical teachings on the elements. After all, the Greek for both an element and a letter (of the alphabet) is *stoicheion*. It is often implied that the "letter" is its first and original meaning, while "element" is a derived meaning that was used by analogy. Charles H. Kahn, a schol-

ar of authority in the field of Classical philosophy, says of the term *stoicheion* the following: "In Greek, as afterwards in Latin, this expression is based on a comparison of the physical principles to the letters of the alphabet (the primary meaning of *ta stoicheia*. This comparison seems to have been introduced by the Atomists)."[15]

Assuming this is true, let's ask who was the first to give to the first-principles of nature the name of elements? There are four different answers to this question: Empedocles, Democritus, the Pythagoreans, and Plato. Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* that Empedocles was the first to call fire, air, water and earth *stoicheia* (elements): "He was the first to speak of four material elements," *Met*. I, 4, 985a32. Yet it is well known that Empedocles described the four first-principles as "roots of all things" (*pantôn ridzômata*, DK31 B 6) rather than *stoicheia* (elements). In this passage, Aristotle uses "element" as a technical school term without emphasizing Empedocles' priority. He stressed a different thing: it was Empedocles who first mentioned the four elements, "yet he does not use four, but treats them as two only" (*Met*. I, 4, 985a33).

Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* quotes Eudemus of Rhodes as saying that Plato was the first to name the first-principles *stoicheia* (fr. 31 Wehrli). Hermann Diels, for this reason, asserts in his classic essay on the concept of *element* that no one before Plato used the term in the meaning of the physical principle.[16] Diels himself admits[17] as much, as after him does John Burnet in *Early Greek Philosophy*.[18] According to Burnet, the Pythagoreans might have been the source of that usage for Plato: after all, the four elements are identical with the four of the regular solids mentioned in *Timaeus*, which were known to and discovered by the Pythagoreans. Of the ancient writers, the term's Pythagorean origin is discussed by Sextus Empiricus. Sextus reports that the Pythagoreans likened philosophers with those studying the language and the structure of speech: since words were composed of syllables and syllables of letters, the letters were the first to be investigated; the visible cosmos was similarly composed of what could not be seen by the eye, for which reason one needed at first to understand what its constituent principles were like (*Against the Mathematicians* X, 249-250 = *Against the Physicians* II 249-250).[19]

The idea of the priority of the Atomists (particularly, Democritus) is based on a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* I, 4, 985b5: "Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being" cf. also *On Generation and Corruption* I, 2, 315b6-15.

Plato introduced the term *stoicheion* in its physical meaning in *Theaetetus* (201e) and used it in the same sense in *Timaeus* and *Sophistes*. Yet one is under the impression that this particular meaning had been a familiar one for some time, which makes it possible for us to assume that it had been in use before Plato. Although Plato made a use of the term *stoicheion* with the meaning of "letter" in his early dialogue *Cratylus* (431e10-11: "the letters alpha or beta, or any other letters" cf. 393d etc.) to mention just one.

In *Metaphysics Delta* (see Book V, Chapter 3), Aristotle distinguishes between three main meanings of *stoicheion* as accepted in grammar, physics and geometry. In grammar, these are elements of speech, into which it is divided,

while these elements cannot be divided into other sounds of speech distinct from them in form. In physics, they speak of the elements of bodies, meaning the ultimate parts, into which the bodies are divisible, while these parts themselves can no longer be divided into others distinct from them in form. In geometry, they speak of the elements of demonstration. Let us note that Aristotle does not say that one of the meanings is the main one, while others are derivatives. One could presume that the geometrical meaning was the latest were it not for the mathematician Hippocrates of Chios who had authored a geometry handbook called *Elements* (*Stoicheia*) or his older contemporary Theudius who wrote *Elements* that was used as a teaching aid in Plato's Academy.

Let us now try to sum up the main points we should keep in mind. The origin of the term *stoicheion* goes back to the 5th century B.C., a significant period in the history of ancient philosophy, when the so-called post-Parmenides pluralistic systems appeared in Greece. It is no accident that Aristotle ascribed the priority in using the term to Empedocles, for it was Empedocles with his teaching on the four roots, who was among the first pluralists. We can only surmise Democritus' priority from hints found in Aristotle and from a direct comparison likening atoms to letters. But who made the comparison—Aristotle or Democritus—is totally unclear. At any rate, if Democritus was indeed the author, he did not, in all evidence, use the term as systematically as Plato. None of the surviving texts preserves this usage, whereas all sources testify that Democritus presumed atoms and void to be the first-principles. He could have hardly defined atoms and especially void as "stoicheia" (= letters). There is more reason in viewing Plato as the innovator: by introducing the neologism he drew the bottom line under the terminological mess in the earlier philosophy. It was a response to the long-felt need to find a new word and decide how to call the first-principles identically rather than "things," "roots," "seeds," or "atoms."

The idea itself to divide the universum into things and things into elements in the same way as speech (*logos*) can be divided into words and words into letters is older than "pluralistic" systems of ancient Greek physics. It can be discerned already in Heraclitus' teaching on the Logos, particularly in fr. B 1, where Heraclitus draws an analogy between words and things, division of the world's things "in accordance with nature" and the right division of speech into words, which is necessary for correct understanding:

"Of this Truth (*Logos*), real as it is, men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For, although all things come to pass in accordance with this Truth (*Logos*), men behave as if ignorant each time they undertake either speech or deeds, whereas I, for my part, explain such words and things taking apart each of them according to its real constitution and then showing how it is" (DK22 B1/fr. 1 Marcovich = Sextus Empiricus. *Against the Mathematicians* VII, 132).

The alphabet as a heuristic principle could, of course, have influenced the emergence of atomism as for that matter of any corpuscular theory. Aristotle observed time and again that the pluralistic systems were about combination, aggregation and dissolution of the first-elements, not about their coming-to-be

and passing-away. Empedocles says clearly as much. It remains to cite the following comparison: elements are combined together in the same way as letters are in different words. It is another matter that with the rise of Democritus' atomism, the alphabetic model comes nearly to the fore: no one insisted as vehemently as Democritus that the *order*, in which his first-elements combined, was their fundamental property. Cf. John Philoponus' characteristic explanation in his commentary on Aristotle's *On Generation and Corruption*:

"Those who assume there is more than one element can draw a distinction between coming-to-be and alteration, believing that coming-to-be and passing-away occur through aggregation and dissolution, whereas alteration results from the changing of position and order. This was the assumption of the followers of Democritus and Leucippus" (In Arist. *De gen. et corr*. 10, 15 Vitelli, ad loc. I, 1, 314a8; transl. by Maria Solopova).

It is Leucippus and Democritus, the completers of the early physical tradition, that John cites as an example.

However atomism could have influenced certain more fundamental ideas, like the perception of the world as an ordered cosmos, for the alphabet is not a mere assemblage of letters but their definite order, which notion is conveyed in Greek by the word *kosmos*. Besides, the same letters were used as numerals in Greek mathematics: should we therefore assume that the alphabet influenced its coming-into-being as well?

* * *

In conclusion, the present writer would like to suggest certain views regarding the connection between atomism and the alphabet. Was this connection subject to reflection in ancient Greek writings? Judging by the fact that in *Metaphysics* Aristotle writes about atoms being similar to letters, it seems to have been perceived at rather an early date.

1. *Democritus*. In a famous passage from Book I of *Metaphysics* Aristotle explains the three fundamental properties of atoms—"shape," "arrangement," and "position"—for which he uses some letters of the Greek alphabet: "For they say that what is differentiated only is "rhythm," "contact," and "turning." "Rhythm" is shape, "contact" arrangement, and "turning" position; for *A* differs from *N* in shape, *AN* from *NA* in arrangement and *Z* from *N* in position" (Met. I, 4, 985b14-20).[20] This alphabetic comparison was later reproduced by Aristotelian commentators. John Philoponus, for one, uses the alphabetic analogy from *Metaphysics* in his commentary on Aristotle's *On Generation and Corruption*:

"Often two bodies composed of the same atoms will be different in consequence of the arrangement of their atoms: in one, spherical atoms will be positioned before the conical ones, while in another, the conical atoms will come first and the spherical second, like in the syllables *ΣΩ* and *ΩΣ*. After *Σ* all, it is the order of the same letters that makes the difference. Similarly, the difference results from the position of atoms in complex bodies, where they prove to be now tilted,

now upright, and now overturned,—like the letter *Z* differs from *N* only in position, as well as *Γ* from *Λ*" (In *De gen. et corr.* 13, 3-15 Vitelli, ad. loc. 314a23).

The Christian writer Lactantius in *Divine Institutes* explains: "Vario, inquit ordine ac positione convenient, sicut litterae: quae cum sint paucae, varie tamen collocatae innumerabilia verba conficunt. At litterae varias formas habent. Ita, inquit, et haec ipsa primordial" (*Divinae institutiones* III, 17, 22).

2. *Epicureanism*. It is well known, that some of the anecdotes in the biographical section of Book 10 of Diogenes Laertius' *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* represent Epicurus' father or himself as a teacher of grammar ("and assist his father in his school for a pitiful fee" X, 4). For Epicurus, the alphabet as a heuristic principle might well have served as a model that made the foundations of atomism obvious and clear to him. Likewise, one should not reject out of hand the assumption that the comparison with letters was used before Epicurus by Aristotle, if not Democritus himself. The fragments from Epicurus contain no evidence of him comparing letters with atoms, but the Roman poet and Epicurean Titus Lucretius Carus used the comparison more than once. The idea that the word is similar to the cosmos in its composition and that we describe the cosmos by means of words was combined in his mind with the atomistic theory and proved highly fruitful:

> Why, even in these our very verses here
> It matters much with what and in what order
> Each element is set: the same denote
> Sky, and the ocean, lands, and streams, and sun;
> The same, the grains, and trees, and living things.
> And if not all alike, at least the most—
> But what distinctions by positions wrought!
>
> (Lucretius. *On the Nature of Things*
> II, 1014-1019, transl. by W.E. Leonard).

Yet another reason could be added to our consideration with regard to the earliest use of the comparison and the rationalization of the idea in the context of the physical theory of the elements. Based on the above Aristotelian passage from Book I of *Metaphysics*, we can assume that Democritus himself was thinking about establishing an analogy between the atomic structure of matter and letters of the Greek alphabet. If so, the hypothesis would prove fully in keeping with the very spirit of that literary and sophistic age. After all, our Presocratic philosopher lived during the heyday of sophistry, when the first language theories were being developed in Greece.

Notice also the tendency to obscure and mystify the origin of atomism in certain ancient sources. To quote Strabo the geographer, Stoic philosopher Poseidonius of Apamea (in Syria) believed that one Mochus, a Phoenician, was the originator of the atomistic tradition:

"If we are to believe Poseidonius, the ancient opinion about atoms originated with Mochus, a native of Sidon, who lived before the Trojan times" (Strabo. *Geography* XVI, 2, 24).

We may interpret this brief report as a case of considering the alphabetic hypothesis, which made an allowance for the tricky question: "Why not earlier?" OK, let it so be that Democritus taught about being by using the language structure as a model, so that atoms turned out to be like letters of the alphabet. But why did this discovery fail to be made in Greece at an earlier date? As a reaction, there appeared in the Hellenistic period a legend that atomism had come into being in times immemorial *along* with the alphabet. And the theory was devised by those who brought the alphabet to the Greeks—the Phoenicians! This latest Syrian-Phoenician hypothesis is irreproachable in its own way, even if it is fantastic and betrays the patriotic sentiments of its inventor, a native of Syria.

NOTES

1 Let us abstract ourselves from the "Leucippus question"—whether he really existed as a historical personality and was the teacher of Democritus. The atomism of Leucippus and Democritus in any case implies a physical and cosmological teaching.

2 This interpretation of atomism is a standard one in specialized reference books on philosophy and history of philosophy. See, for example, the article "Ancient Atomism" by S. Berryman in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-ancient/: "Since the Greek adjective atomos means, literally, "uncuttable," the history of ancient atomism is not only the history of a theory about the nature of matter, but also the history of the idea that there are indivisible parts in any kind of magnitude—geometrical extension, time, etc."

3 Hereinafter *On Blending and Growth* is quoted in Robert Todd's English translation from: R.B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A study of the De Mixtione with preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary*, Leiden, 1976.

4 Their disciples Lucretius, Philodemus and Diogenes of Oenoanda should also be added.

5 Sylvia Berryman's article consistently discusses the following personalities and teachings: Leucippus and Democritus, Plato and Platonists, Xenocrates, Diodorus Cronus, Epicurus and natural science (medical) theories.

6 Th. McEvilley, *The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies*, New York, 2002, p. 317. True enough, the author tends to look for direct influences that Indian philosophy brought to bear on its Greek counterpart, rather than simply interconnections between the two.

7 Cf. W.K.C. Guthrie's remark in *A History of Greek Philosophy* following an exposition of the doxographic reports on Greek educational travels to the East: "These voyages of study may have taught him much about special subjects like mathematics and astronomy, but the atomic theories themselves seem to spring entirely from the contemporary state of philosophical questions in Greece itself" (W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*. In 6 vols, vol. 2, *The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, Cambridge, 1965, p. 387).

8 The well-known report in Diogenes Laertius about Democritus' early schooling by the Magi and Chaldeans whom King Xerxes had left with his father as his tutors (Diog. Laert. IX 34 = DK68 A 1) is clearly fictitious because Democritus' date of birth (460 B.C.) and the likely date of Xerxes' forces passing through Abdera (480 B.C.) during the Greek-Persian wars are patently anachronistic. Where Democritus' adult voyages are concerned, he and his brothers, said Aelianus, set out on a long journey with mercantile purposes to carry on the

business of their father, a rich trader. It is not an impossibility that for him the voyage turned into one of study. The same happened to Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoa, who arrived from Cyprus to Athens as a merchant but later changed his life and became a philosopher.

9 R.A. Horne, "Atomistic Notions in Young Children and Young Cultures," *Journal of Chemical Education*, 1958, No. 35, p. 560.

10 E.B. Taylor, Primitive Culture, London, 1871.

11 W.A. Heidel, "Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. 22, 1911, p. 111.

12 See, for example: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I 8, 325a1 fol.

13 The conference *The Atomic Principle: Language and Thought* was sponsored jointly by Russian Anthropological School (Russian State University for Humanities) and the UNESCO chair *Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures* (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences), Moscow, 17-18 Sept. 2010. Ms. Lyssenko discusses the said thesis in her article: V. Lyssenko, "Between Materialism and Immaterialism: Atomism in India and Greece," *Materialism and Immaterialism in India and Europe*, Ed. P. Ghose, PHISPC 12 (5), Delhi, 2010.

14 J. Needham, *Science and Civilization in China,* vol. 4, 1, *Physics and Physical Technology*, 6th ed. Cambridge, 2004, p. 12-14.

15 Ch. H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, New York, 1960, p. 120. For more detail on the term *stoicheion*, see: T.J. Crowley, "On the Use of *Stoicheion* in the Sense of Element," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, vol. 29, 2005.

16 H. Diels, *Elementum*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 17. This view is supported by subsequent researchers such as Walter Burkert: W. Burkert, "ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ. Eine semasiologische Studie," *Philologus*, vol. 103, 1059.

17 H. Diels, op. cit., S. 13, anm. 1.

18 J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3d ed., London, 1920.

19 "For they say that those who are genuinely philosophizing are like those who work at language. Now the latter first examine the words (for language is composed of words); and since words are formed from the syllables they scrutinize the syllables first; and as syllables are resolved into the elements of written speech, they investigate these first; so likewise the true physicists, as the Pythagoreans say, when investigating the Universe, ought in the first place to inquire what are the elements into which the Universe can be resolved" (Sextus Empiricus. *Against the Mathematicians* X, 248-250 = *Against the Physicians* II 249-250).

20 This passage from *Metaphysics* makes one doubt the text's authenticity: the letter *Z* (zeta) was not part of the Greek alphabet in the Aristotelian, let alone Democritean, times. What supporters of its authenticity essentially try to do is to slightly edit the text by reading the letter in the old fashion: in fact, Aristotle says, *Z* – id est *H* (the older form of the letter Z being just an Η laid upon its side) – and *H*. Cf. W.K.C. Guthrie, op. cit, p. 393, n. 2; H. Diels, op. cit., S. 13, anm. 1. Diels admits that the letters-atoms comparison may after all go back to Democritus himself.

Translated by Aram Yavrumyan

Universal and Corruption Norms of Interaction in Russian Politics

Vladimir RIMSKY

The Patrimonial Nature of the Russian State

As is common knowledge, the concept of "bureaucracy" was invented in 1745 by the French economist Vincent de Gournay, who merged the word "bureau" meaning both an institution and a writing desk with the Greek ending *cratia* denoting power or dominance. Thus, since its inception in France in the mid-18th century the notion of "bureaucracy" implied the authority of the officialdom.[1]

Max Weber developed in his time an ideal model (in the sense of a theoretical pattern and benchmark for comparisons with reality) of a rational bureaucratic rule to secure a legal dominance in the state, under which everyone obeys a legitimately imposed , objective, impersonal order and the superiors determined by this order. The rational bureaucratic rule, in keeping with Weber's model, is exercised by a hierarchy of officials, in which subordinates obey superiors and have a duty to meticulously perform the orders handed down from on-high. All members of the bureaucratic hierarchy must obey only the impersonal order as imposed by law, technical rules and other norms, which exclude any personal appropriation of office and envisage regular recording of all proposals and decisions in written documents. Officials must own neither the control tools nor official property which ought to be separated from officials' private or household property in the same way as their jobs are separated from their places of residence. The impersonal order of the bureaucratic organization precludes subordination to a superior's personality and only implies subordination to him in line of duty within one's terms of official competence. The terms themselves should be objectively delimitated in line with one's official duties and skills level, the latter to be verified with the help of examinations. Officials should be appointed, not elected. They sign a contract, receive a fixed salary, see the service as their only or main profession, and submit to office discipline and control. Their entire activities must be continuously fixed on paper; the relevant written documents should contain all the proposals, decisions and orders issued by the superiors as well as the decrees of the authorities. This paperwork secures a permanent over-

V. Rimsky, head of the Sociology Division, INDEM Fund. This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Politicheskiye issledovaniya (POLIS)*, No. 4, 2011.

sight of the bureaucrats' activities and high intensity of their work. Their careers, or promotion procedures, are determined by seniority and its efficiency. Weber believed that this kind of state governance and big business organization was the most perfect one "in the sense of exactness, permanence, discipline, fitness and reliability, as well as intensity and extensity of work in its formally universal applicability to any tasks... The bureaucratic rule means knowledge-based domination, wherein lies its specifically rational foundation."[2]

As an opposite of this bureaucratic rule, Weber named a much older patriarchal one-man rule, where power was handed down in line of inheritance. Here the *dominus* is obeyed by tradition but he obeys the tradition as well. In Weber, economic decentralization makes the patriarchal rule become transformed into a patrimonial rule based, as before, on personal fealty to his lord (boss), if enriched with some new reciprocal obligations accepted by the lord and his subjects. These obligations are determined and regulated by customs that restrict the lord's omnipotence and compel him to defend his subjects from outside aggression and, if needed, provide help. As a result, "it is not the lord's omnipotence that proves fixed in tradition but certain definite limits to his arbitrariness."

Weber regarded the patrimonial state as an accomplished embodiment of the patrimonial domination, where "the ruler exercises his authority over the entire state in the same way as he does with regard to his own domains. The patrimonial ruler believes that the subjects exist primarily for the purpose of satisfying his needs."[3] Under a patrimonial political regime, the administrative staff are recruited both from the lord's personal servants and his subjects particularly devoted to him. Those appointed by the lordly grace "are allowed to do anything compatible with the tradition and the ruler's interests to keep the subjects ready to obey and capable of maintaining him economically."[4] A patrimonial functionary views his powers as a personal privilege bestowed on him by the lord. This functionary obeys the tradition, but the tradition does not predetermine his conduct in all possible situations. If, therefore, a functionary's actions are not mandated by the tradition, he can decide independently whether or not to take some or other action, and such decisions are not infrequently adopted with an eye to remuneration. Thus the patrimonial functionaries serve both their lord and their own private interests. What they do not serve are public interests. Neither do they pursue any impersonal objectives.

Weber regarded the patrimonial officialdom as an intermediate type between the patriarchal rule and a rational bureaucracy, admitting a possibility of transitions from patriarchy to patrimonial rule and from patrimonial rule to rational bureaucracy. Even though Weber thought it possible to refer to patrimonial functionaries as officials, he pointed to substantial distinctions between this type and the rational bureaucracy. Under a patrimonial rule, first, any bureaucratic impartiality in decision-making is something impossible, with all decisions left to the personal discretion of officials; second, the officialdom and the ruler are not involved in contractual relations that are a *sine qua non* of a rational bureaucratic rule; third, as distinct from rational bureaucracy, there are no regularly paid salaries: instead of cash, officials are given the rights (benefices) to appropriate some or other benefits, such as lands, grain from the lord's stocks, or monies for the "administration of office"; and, finally, fourth, these benefices made officials practically irreplaceable and

capable of restricting the ruler's authority. The thing is that any sweeping dismissal of the officials necessarily required that the ruler should compensate their privileges or benefices and that was not always practicable. The benefices *per se* often were subject to buying and selling, something that enabled the officials to form close-knit groups that monopolized certain positions and their inherent privileges.

As a result, the ruler and the officials in a patrimonial state were constantly at crosspurposes. The ruler was not always able to appoint his devout subjects to positions of importance to himself, because the positions could be appropriated by groups of officials.

To circumvent those privileges, rulers resorted to various subterfuges, appointing foreigners or members of lower walks of life, something that spawned favoritism. Another essential trait of patrimonialism, according to Weber, was subordinating economic resources to political authorities, specifically with the help of imposing foreign trade monopoly. Weber pointed out, however, that the patrimonial authorities were not a serious obstacle to the development of most different economic systems, capitalism included. And yet he believed that progress of industrial capitalism of the modern type required predictability and stability of governmental decision-making, which were features characteristic of a rational bureaucratic rule, but not a patrimonial state.

The patrimonial rule may to some or other extent involve a clear-cut sharing of powers, a hierarchy of positions, and "a special training that qualifies one for a position as well as the regular money remuneration," all of which are mandatory components of a rational bureaucratic rule. But unlike the latter, the patrimonial rule is distinguished by the "personal nature of power relations," because an official is devoted to his lord on the basis of a personal relationship.

The modern historical science and sociology are not of a single mind on whether or not Weber's patrimonialism concept can be applied to the Russian political institutions, both in the 19th and early 20th centuries (before the 1917 revolution) and in the Soviet/post-Soviet period.[5] But that they displayed certain signs of patrimonialism was noted by Weber himself, while the post-Soviet political regime in Russia retained many characteristics of prerevolutionary and Soviet patrimonialism. Problems are largely addressed at officials' personal discretion rather than on the basis of impersonal and universal legal norms. The contract system in state governance is sooner a legitimate form of personal allegiance to higher-ups than an impersonal relationship between superiors and subordinates in the exercise of public functions. The regular money pay received by high-ranking civil servants is augmented through various material and nonmaterial privileges they receive as well as through their corruption-related incomes. Like in the previous centuries, the Russian officialdom continues to project some important constraints on the bearer of the supreme power in such areas as, for example, personnel management and distribution of state budget funds between different agencies. To surmount these constraints, Russian Presidents, like former rulers before them, often had to appoint to civil service positions businessmen, university professors, or human rights activists, i.e., members of social groups external with regard to the bureaucratic corporation.

The patrimonialism of the system of state governance is a serious obstacle to the emergence of a law-governed political regime in Russia, where the authorities and citizens, as they interact in addressing social problems, would obey the universal norms of law and legislation, while the government authorities would defend the rights, freedoms and property of citizens. The main reason is that in any interactions between citizens and the authorities, formal relations are not strictly separated from informal ones and may interchange.[6] If Russian bureaucrats exercise their official powers within the framework of patrimonial relations, then their personal discretion would inevitably become of more importance for solving problems than the universal legal norms. To accept and implement decisions in the interests of citizens locked in a cooperative relationship with them, the officials would inevitably demand—and receive—some or other kind of corruptive remuneration. This is why the bureaucracy in present-day Russia is the trailblazer in using corruption norms to address social interaction problems and in translating the stereotypes of this social behavior to the socium.

Authority's Inseparability from Property As a Prerequisite of Corruption

Patrimonialism of the current Russian state contributes to the preservation of an inseparable link between power and property.[7] In Russia, the division of power into power exercised as sovereignty and power exercised as property had been in progress during many preceding centuries, but the process was much slower than in the Western countries. Even today it cannot be seen as accomplished.[8] Under the modern conditions in Russia, the inseparability of power from property has led to a situation where one can only dispose of private property under the control of governmental or municipal officials whose powers are at the level of a private business that formally owns the property in question.[9] Any businessman in modern Russia may lose his property, even the property he has created with his own hands rather than received during the privatization of Soviet public property. Some relevant expedients to that end are corporate raiding and judiciary persecution on counts of crime, administrative offenses, or breach of rights of or obligations to business partners. In these conflicts, resources available to the authorities, primarily the judiciary and the law enforcement, are used by raiders and their opponents for their particular, private purposes. The authorities in such cases fail to perform their normative functions as state or municipal government and *de facto* find themselves involved in corruption-related practices.

In many interactions with the authorities, private civilian and business interests are secured with the help of corruption.[10] Modern Russian bureaucracy largely generates and maintains corruption not only in relations between the authorities and citizens but also in other spheres. The aim behind the generation and maintenance of corruption, even though it may not be always rationally recognized by the bureaucrats, is to draw a rent from the entire national property. The rent is revealed in most different areas, from the registration and licensing of some or other businesses, to their auditing by different agencies, to the phasing

out of free healthcare and education to be replaced by mandatory paid arrangements. Lobbying for political decisions enables the bureaucratic corporation to significantly expand its capabilities with regard to collecting the corruption rent. This can be done, for example, with the help of putting into effect laws that expand the privileges of some or other categories of officials, increase expenditures for some or other budget items, or introduce additional levies and taxes.

In certain cases, the corporation, to obtain the corruption rent, would actually extort it by political means. At first, for example, a public campaign is instigated against introducing some laws that allegedly threaten the interests of both ordinary citizens and business people, whereupon these laws are quashed, ostensibly under the pressure the public brings to bear on agencies that have the relevant legislative powers. But those abolitions are often accompanied by the granting of certain additional privileges to some or other functionaries.[11] For example, renouncing a tax increase often goes hand in hand with an actual increase in the level of other tax or non-tax payments for private businesses. Abolishing the ban on nonprofit organizations receiving grants from sources other than government or municipal budget is accompanied by a dramatic intensification of oversight on the part of the authorities, etc. These actions should be estimated as corruption-related, if we understand corruption as the deriving of advantage from one's government position and the concomitant public status, exercised by any means and under any circumstances.

The Bureaucratic Version of Objective Reality

The bureaucratic system of state governance always shapes its own interpretation patterns and behavioral models for all citizens, including the top officials. These patterns and models are defined by laws, rules and instructions, as well as by generally accepted values, behavior styles and informal interaction norms current within the bureaucratic corporation. The continuous documenting leads to a more or less adequate reflection of these patterns and models in written documents, the habitual and only possible means for their presentation in the bureaucratic system. Often it is these documentary presentations of interpretation patterns and behavioral models that shape the images, representations and meanings of the reality controlled by the bureaucratic system. In effect, the documents formalized by the bureaucratic system form a bureaucratic reality of sorts.

The documents in this bureaucratic reality structuralize social facts in keeping with the state governance canon and fix certain interpretation patterns not only in relation of behavior but also of reality itself, because it must obey norms and rules imposed by those who control it. The bureaucratic reality is formed so professionally that it is seen by both the officials themselves, and politicians, and ordinary citizens as an integral world whose patterns and models define and essentially restrict the chances for adjusting and standardizing public experience. These patterns and models are viewed as the only professional and acceptable tools for use by the officials manning the bodies of power and administration at

all levels: federal, regional and local.[12] Not only do officials at all levels replace the objective reality with its bureaucratic version as enshrined in documents, also they are quite successful in imposing their own representation of reality on politicians, journalists and through them on the majority of citizens.[13]

In the Russian patrimonial system of state governance, the precision and definiteness of the bureaucratic reality are somewhat disturbed by the need for meeting the particular interests of different social groups of officials and citizens and businessmen affiliated with them. With the help of professionals, each of these groups is fairly successful in replacing the objective reality with its bureaucratic version that benefits this or that particular group. As a result, decision-makers find it extremely difficult to prefer some more objective, including scientifically founded, versions of reality to the bureaucratic versions. Standing too high in the hierarchy of governmental service, and keeping aloof from all the bureaucratic nitty-gritty the top state officials are almost always forced to take decisions that follow the logic of the bureaucratic reality and are suggested by officials competent in the relevant specific spheres. Under the patrimonial system, these decisions are sooner in accordance with the interests of the "related groups" of officials than the public interests. By the same token, the system of state governance would extremely infrequently accept decisions suggested by outsiders, such as independent experts, scientists or public activists for the latter remain alien to the patrimonial system of governance. The outsiders never have the right to privileges, specifically the privilege to be allowed to take part in decision-making.

Exceptions from the norm are possible but only due to initiatives coming from heads of agencies or heads of state that might incorporate some former outsiders in the state government system with an eye to implementing certain important projects likely to interfere with the interests of separate or even considerable groups of officials. If there are no such exceptions, the bureaucratic reality within the system of state government is shaped so professionally that it proves capable of replacing the current social reality in the minds of the majority of citizens and the officials themselves. Without realizing it, numerous specialists and experts analyze and generalize their own and other people's experience of studying social reality in meanings and notions of bureaucratic reality. In the process of socialization, which is particularly intensive when children attend the secondary general education school, these meanings and notions, patterns and models of the bureaucratic reality sink into the minds and sway the rationalization of social processes and phenomena, as well as social reality as a whole. More than that, in the system of state governance, these bureaucratic patterns and models have actually become a professional norm, the only one that is acceptable and admissible for functionaries in Russia.

The Bureaucratization of Russian Politics

Having absorbed the meanings and notions, patterns and models of the bureaucratic reality, Russian politicians and statesmen keep in mind no views on methods of running a modern state other than bureaucratic. It is for this reason

that the bureaucratic corporation is so efficient in imposing on them its well-honed decades-old patterns of thinking and representations of reality. Among other things, this makes politicians assume perceptions regarding the existing social problems and methods of addressing them that are at odds with the social reality. In consequence, it is only with much difficulty that ordinary people can get politicians and statesmen to understand the real public problems and make them look for and realize appropriate decisions. This means that the activities of politicians and state governance agencies as well as those of the administrative machine as a whole are only to a small degree determined by the priorities and interests of the majority of people. Their representations and evaluations of the reality are simply rejected by the bureaucratic corporation as incompatible with its own thinking and actions.

Under these circumstances, those wishing to succeed in Russian politics have to minimize their personal involvement in efforts directed at dealing with the real problems of ordinary people and public problems in the broad sense. It is largely for this reason that Russian politicians interpret their professional duties as being focused on the fight for power or its retention if it has been gained. Under the patrimonial system, a winner in politics takes it all: an access to political and governmental decision-making promoting his own or corporate interests, a chance to own or dispose of the bureaucratic corporate property, various privileges, and so on. A loser gains nothing, remaining an outsider for the state governance system. His vision of social reality is of no interest to the decision-makers, while the resources enabling him to continue his political activities become severely restricted.

The political opposition in present-day Russia must constantly make choices. Either it becomes a party to informal understandings with the representatives of the authorities and gets a chance to use some material and nonmaterial resources of property and power that are really owned by the bureaucratic corporation alone, or it does not enter those understandings and is left without prospects for success in the political rivalry. The understandings between the opposition and the authorities must be informal because by the patrimonial system's formal criteria the opposition cannot aspire to share any resources available to the bureaucratic corporation. This is why the authorities' policy of counteraction to members of the political opposition keeping aloof from the informal understandings simply becomes a means of intimidation, symbolic or heavy-handed, meant to demonstrate the inadequacy of their claims to power. Similarly, the authorities periodically resort to intimidation in respect of the private business community, trying to suggest that it is the authorities who really own all national property and that, the same as political opposition, private business can under no circumstances aspire to power. This state of affairs in Russian politics is linked to corruption because in actual fact it is an obstacle to numerous social interests being represented in the system of power.

As a result, the understanding of politics as a totality of strategies and methods for solving society's economic and state governance problems is actually lacking in Russia's modern political practice. In the post-Soviet period, the lack of

understanding resulted in Russian politicians and statesmen being totally unable to carry out large-scale and successful reforms in those spheres. Very often, real reforms were replaced by the declaration of their general principles, ideological preferences or abstract programs that could not be implemented by virtue of their overly general nature and orientation to short-term, tactical goals. Even reforming the bodies of power themselves proved ineffective, being undertaken more with the political aim of retaining or gaining power than in order to enhance the efficiency of state governance or to solve the national strategic problems.

There was some reason in explaining why a quite rational choice of an ideological rationale for reforms became embodied in a simplistically understood liberal approach interpreting state governance as a totality of functions and procedures geared to rendering governmental services. Actually this ideology precludes the vision that state governance can be value-oriented and that it can and must address national strategic objectives rather than be simply a source of governmental services for realizing current problems and short-term interests. The Russian bureaucratic corporation's choice of the simplistically understood liberal approach to state governance determined the configuration of a bureaucratic reality it was shaping, a reality admitting things other than the formulation of strategic problems or quests for methods of solving them. The state governance in Russia, therefore, focused on short-term objectives, whereas long-term strategies, plans and programs became mere declarations that might or might not be put into practice.

In parallel to digesting the meanings and perceptions, patterns and models of the bureaucratic reality, ordinary people and businessmen in Russia assimilate an attitude to real national development strategies adopted by the bureaucratic corporation, something that makes the majority of them stop planning their own future and activities over a relatively long period.[14] One year or even several months is the longest term they look forward to. It is largely for this reason that the most people in Russia refuse to become active in addressing public problems. After all, it will be long before his or her decision brings results and these will not necessarily benefit the citizen. In the private business sector, the reluctance and inability to plan the future leads to an extreme difficulty in implementing commercial projects that will become profitable a year or several years after having been launched. Among other things, this explains why the Russian economy finds it so difficult to attract investments for development: these cannot be expected to yield profits in the short term as is habitual and "normal" in the eyes of Russian businessmen and bureaucrats.

Unable and unwilling to plan their future, the majority of people in Russia have entrusted politics to politicians who are believed to possess an exclusive title to this sort of activities. For the politicians themselves, this is an objectively beneficial state of affairs because no one interferes with their particular interests. But this stable alienation of citizens from politics only sustains the official inability to solve public and private business problems. Any official project is determined by the bureaucratic reality and therefore practically never includes an adequate understanding of problems and methods of their solution. These projects remain irrelevant for large social groups that are wary of becoming

involved in their implementation and more often than not simply wait for the bureaucratic corporation to solve the problems on its own. But all the projects meet the interests of some or other groups of bureaucrats, something that makes the majority of ordinary people even more convinced that they were right in deciding to keep off the official projects and politics in general. As a result, all major post-Soviet reforms in Russia were projects suggested by separate groups of officials rather than by large social groups.

The Lack of Universal Norms in Russian Politics

The impossibility to implement in post-Soviet Russia some reforms and projects that would meet the interests of large social groups results in Russian politics being structured as a number of separately existing spheres of particular interests of some or other groups of bureaucrats as well as citizens and businessmen affiliated with them. For this reason present-day Russian politics is not regulated by the universal and values, norms and priorities common for all politicians and bodies of power, whose emergence is obstructed by the patrimonial nature of state governance.

It is accepted in Russian politics and in the system of state governance to coordinate decision-making with governmental agencies whose interests might be affected by those decisions. More often than not, this coordination takes into account the agencies' short-term interests and follows informal interaction procedures rather than the dictates of Russian legislation. In most cases this practice leads to compromises that cannot solve the problems in hand as imposing unacceptable restrictions by lobbyists representing different interests, who later would attempt to remove the restrictions and thus cancel the compromise.

In a patrimonial environment, political rivalry in Russia is directed at enabling politicians to gain access to some or other resources available to governmental or municipal agencies, not at gaining public confidence. Political parties, opposition parties included, regard being in favor with heads of some or other agencies as a far more important political asset than being supported by ordinary citizens, voters, independent experts and specialists. To all intents and purposes, the content of political programs has ceased to be a political resource of parties in recent years because the programs are not oriented to trouble-shooting communication with citizens, public organizations and private businesses. It is even dangerous for the existing political parties to become involved in tackling real problems on the ground that this activity is certain to mark them as foes in the eyes of the bureaucratic corporation and as candidates for banishment from politics. So, practically all political parties in Russia, both the registered and the informal, realize in politics particular interests of their leaders, which means shaping their political status in the case of opposition parties or protecting their political standing in the case of parties supported by the bodies of power.

The decision to register a political party in modern Russia is within the discretion of powers that be and has no relation to whether the party enjoys public

support. That is why last-years' elections cannot decide the question of power in Russia. Rather than being addressed through elections, the question of power is always settled by means of nonpublic coordination of interests between the bodies of power and major corporations of private business, while the political parties sooner obey their coordinated decisions. Both disobedience and involvement in efforts to solve real social problems is often punished by banishment of political parties from politics, the authorities refusing to register them or their electoral slates, including with the use of court indictments. Another technique is a rigged vote count unfavorable to blacklisted parties allowed to run in the elections.

The elections themselves are meant to make the electorate demonstrate their submission to high-ranking civil servants and their political decisions reached jointly with the heads of other bodies of power and major private business corporations. The decisions are about the candidate for RF President, the composition of the State Duma, the presence of some or other politicians in the legislature, and so on. This being so, the elections only confirm the people's resolve to stay out of politics.

This noninvolvement stance of Russian citizens serves to vacate the political sphere for the professionals and at the same time relieves the latter of any obligations to the mass of people, as well as of any necessity to lend an ear to their demands and to participate in solving their problems. The political sphere in Russia has become independent of people's private and even public life. This gives a free play to private interests of those allowed to participate in politics but hinders the implementation of their political decisions, let alone large-scale reforms of national importance. Where the mass of people are not involved in politics, all the political and governmental decisions have to be carried out by those who accepted them, i.e., by bodies of power or by some or other groups of bureaucrats that are opposed by other groups of officials with whose interests these decisions interfere.

Political rivalry in this context is an undesirable factor that detracts from the efficiency of the bodies of power by virtue of intensifying the confrontation between different groups of officials. This is why the bodies of power at different levels take pains to reduce rivalry, while formal rivalry-regulating institutions are actually held in abeyance. Playing their role are some informal social institutions that cannot switch on the universal rivalry-regulating norms and sustain the corruption norms in this sphere. Thus, Russian politics supports compromises in official decision-making. These compromises are always short-lived and unable to contribute to the implementation of long-term strategies. Along with the massive noninvolvement of citizens in politics, they emerge as an important factor hindering efficient and sweeping reforms in Russia.

The fact that groups of officials and political parties are engrossed in promoting their particular interests leads to greater societal differentiation as regards the accessibility of some or other resources provided by the bodies of power. Various social groups are constantly vying for the right to use those limited resources. This is why only very few people can get better housing, give their children a good education that would entitle them to a highly-paid job, enjoy good medical services, have a high old-age pension, and so on. That results in a

steadily growing confrontation between different social groups in Russia, the failure to understand the problems of others, and the wish to solve one's own problems at the expense of the resources available to other social groups. In consequence, the level of interpersonal and intergroup trust tends to decline.

Under the existing conditions, neither the groups of bureaucrats, nor the political parties, nor the leaders of various social groups in Russia are able to shape some universal norms for regulating the political process. All of them, as for that matter other political entities, are engaged in promoting their particular interests. Following any universal norms will always lead them to a defeat in political rivalry. In this context, a very high level of stability in Russia's political system guarantees an extremely low likelihood that the importance of universal norms prescribed by the formal institutions and designed to regulate political rivalry and the political process will be considerably enhanced in the immediate future.

NOTES

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Translated by Aram Yavrumyan

Does Activity Theory Have a Future?

Elena SOKOLOVA

The title of this article is somewhat provocative, which is not surprising because it is based on a report delivered at Boris Bratus Moscow General Psychology Workshop on March 24, 2011. The workshop meetings always discuss problems of intense methodological interest, and the theme was suggested to me by the organizer himself. But I would formulate the issue in somewhat broader terms: Does "activity psychology"[1] have a future? What I mean is not only the activity *theory* proper but also a relevant methodology, including a philosophical methodology, as well as empirical and practical investigations pursued within the activity psychology framework.

Usually references to activity theory or activity psychology imply primarily Alexei N. Leontiev's ideas, whereas activity psychology should be viewed as resulting from the efforts of his entire school, starting from its first Kharkov-based stage, and even from the broader scientific movement known as the Vygotsky—Leontiev—Luria School.

The question formulated in the headline is not a new one in Russia. Actually it cropped up at the very start of the *perestroika* period, when a campaign of wholesale criticism of things Soviet, psychology included, was launched. But its main target was Marxism as the philosophical basis of activity psychology and many other concepts in the humanities area. In his comments on these "criticisms" Vadim Mezhuyev wrote sarcastically that "owing to the efforts of all kinds of journalists, some of whom were former CPSU ideologists and functionaries, this name [Marx] became the symbol of all gloom and evil in Soviet history."[2] Since the founders of activity psychology always openly pointed to its Marxist roots, the negative attitude to activity psychology came as no surprise.

Banal though it may seem, but you can see big things only at a distance. In 1986, when perestroika was making its first steps in Russia, West Berlin hosted the First International Congress on Activity Theory. Simultaneously, an international society, International Standing Conference for the Research on Activity Theory (ISCRAT), came into being, as did its official mouthpiece *Multidisciplinary Newsletter for Activity Theory*. Established in 2002, ISCRAT's successor, International Society for Cultural and Activity Research (ISCAR), invites, once every three years, cultural and activity researchers from all over the world for

E. Sokolova, D. Sc. (Psychology), lecturer, Department of Psychology, Moscow State University. This article was first published in Russian in *Voprosy psikhologiyi*, No. 4, 2011.

conferences. (The term "cultural and activity psychology" that already has taken root in Russian writings has been suggested by our Western colleagues as well.) A regular international ISCAR congress was held in Rome in early September 2011. Outside of Russia, the term *cultural-historical activity theory* (CHAT) is also in use; true enough, it denotes current investigations in the relevant areas.[3]

Even though the cultural and activity investigations may appear as a small trickle in comparison with the mainstream (mostly represented by cognitive psychology), the fact that our foreign colleagues do address the said problems requires that the Russian researchers undertake an unbiased analysis of the hard-of-comprehension (within and without Russia) activity psychology. Inasmuch as this theme is inexhaustible, this article will consider (of necessity in few details) the future of activity psychology in three aspects: philosophical-methodological, historical and practical.

On the Way to General Psychology as "Dialectics of Psychology"

At the turn of the 21st century, there were renewed debates as to whether the current state of psychology could be described as critical and where some possible ways out of the crisis lay. Leaving aside the debates for reason of the theme's vastness, I would only like to limit myself to the following remark. The way out of the crisis suggested by Lev Vygotsky and later to some or other degree expanded upon by Leontiev and his school is opposed to the currently more popular "methodological pluralism" and "methodological liberalism." While stating the obvious monistic trend in the cultural and activity psychology, the defenders of the two latter concepts very often reduce monism to "a one-sided vision of the reality" and/or regard it as an egocentric position opposed to all others. But the monism of cultural and activity psychology is of a different order. Its specifics can only be revealed under the condition that one understands the concrete as unity of the varied and accepts dialectical logic as the only possible logic for achieving the goal that was formulated way back by Vygotsky, who urged developing a concrete, monistic and dialectical psychology, or, to put it differently, a general psychology as the dialectics of psychology.[4]

It is not by chance that the words "the concrete," "monism" and "dialectics" are placed side by side. For Vygotsky and Leontiev, these are the concepts of the same order. They understood "the concrete" in the Hegelian sense as unity of the varied rather than as a separate, single and empirical phenomenon. Conversely, "the abstract" was for them one-sided and "abstract" knowledge.[5] In discussing this theme, both Vygotsky and Leontiev allied themselves with the French philosopher and psychologist Georges Politzer whose works had already made an attempt to evolve a similar concrete psychology in drama terms. Concrete psychology, in his book, was able to dialectically "remove" the opposition of academic and everyday psychologies.

Originating in antiquity, the dialectical logic is a higher type in relation to the "or—or" logic (a dogmatist's logic, as Hegel put it) and the "and—and" logic

(a skeptic's logic, to quote Hegel again), something that was brilliantly demonstrated by Evald Ilyenkov. A dogmatist's logic is often associated with monism, the latter understood as a "one-sided vision of reality." What is suggested in its stead is a "network" logic (the "and—and" logic) as the basis of a "many-sided" vision of the world.

Meanwhile, scientists that went through the school of dialectical thinking do not think it possible to represent the world on the basis of the network approach as "the concrete," i.e., as *unity* of the varied, or as an integral organic system rather than a sum total of discrete phenomena or that of networked phenomena kept together by external links. According to Hegel, "Unless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production. Unsystematic philosophizing can only be expected to give expression to personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation of its contents. Apart from their interdependence and organic union, the truths of philosophy are valueless, and must then be treated as baseless hypotheses, or personal convictions. Yet many philosophical treatises confine themselves to such an exposition of the opinions and sentiments of the author."[6] Even earlier, the necessity for theoretical speculation to proceed from the general to its "parts" was emphasized by Baruch Spinoza (an analysis of his works in this aspect can be found in Evald Ulyenkov[7]). This is why Vygotsky in his time suggested reorganizing the entire general psychology as a systematic organic whole on the basis of dialectical logic, rather than summarizing the available points of view and building "bridges" or a "network" to keep them together.

Monism is an inalienable principle of dialectical logic. This idea is substantiated in two philosophical works that Leontiev had in his library, leaving numerous margin notes.[8] These works are Ilyenkov's *Dialectical Logic* (first printing 1974)[9] and Lev Naumenko's *Monism As a Principle of Dialectical Logic.*[10] Both authors understand monism as a "consideration of the world's multifarious phenomena in the light of a single principle, the single foundation of all that exists,"[11] not as one-sided cognition of reality. Leontiev consciously puts monism at the base of the activity theory, and it is the monism of Spinozian and Hegelian type that stands opposed to the dualism of René Descartes. Testifying to that effect is Leontiev's statement dating back to 1934, when activity psychology proper was coming into being: "The great fallacy of Cartesianism, one truly tragic for psychology, was precisely in that the real, concretely historical opposition of life's inner, spiritual processes and outer material processes, an opposition generated by the social division of labor, was made absolute. That gave rise to a grandiose mystification of consciousness. Our prime task is to destroy this mystification in psychology."[12] What can be the basis of everything that exists? In the 17th-century monist Spinoza it is an integral and sole substance called God or Nature, the modes of which are all things existing in the world and which is the *causa sui*. After Hegel and Marx, substance came to be understood as a universal (general) reciprocal action. To quote Frederick Engels: "Spinoza: substance is *causa sui* strikingly expresses the reciprocal action." It is this universal reciprocal action that comes out as *causa finalis* of all things, which "excludes any absolute primary or absolute secondary."[13]

Each science operates at a certain level of analysis with regard to this integral substance, singling out a substance that is *specific* for the range of phenomena considered by this particular science and yet is *universal* for all phenomena. Said Naumenko: "The fate of a science is entirely dependent on what it considers as a substance of this kind."[14] According to dialectical logic, after the *integrity* of a concrete substance is fixed, there should take place the isolation of *distinctions* within the integrity which nevertheless persists as integrity and a whole: "Every particularity and singularity is realized precisely from the side which makes it belong to this whole, is an expression of precisely this concrete 'substance,' and is understood as an appearing and disappearing instant of movement of this concrete, specific reciprocity system."[15]

Here we should once again stress the difference between dialectical logic and the postmodern ideas regarding the *nature* of connection between separate phenomena. The postmodernists believe that everything connects to everything through a "rhizome," a "web," a "net," whose center can be in any point, etc. According to dialectical logic, even though everything connects to everything, we, in making a theory, should take into account only the *essential* connections between the phenomena, while rejecting those that are external relative to the nature of the integrity under study.

But what special substance does the Leontiev School put at the base of all the phenomena studied by psychology? This substance is activity as a special form of reciprocity: "It is human activity that forms the substance of human consciousness."[16] I would only add that activity (including animal activity) is the substance of the psyche as a whole.

And yet, psychology studies activity as a substance (in the above sense) in one aspect alone. Let me quote Leontiev once again: "Activity *is* included in the subject of psychology, but not as some special 'part' or 'element'; it is included as a special function. It is a function of positioning a subject in the objective reality and converting the latter to a form of subjectivity."[17] Properly speaking, this is the psyche conceived as a function (we even prefer to say a "functional organ") of reality, while its main "work" is orienting a subject in *its* world and regulating—on the basis of this world's construed image—the subject's activity.

What is the benefit of understanding activity as a "substance" perused by psychology in a special function? This secures the *integrity* of the subject of psychology despite the current assertions about the "polysubjective" nature of psychology (as we see it, supporters of the latter view confuse the subject of science as a whole and the subject of a particular study). The above definition of the subject of psychology prescribes general orientations for studies in all areas of psychology, including animal psychology. Some latest Russian works in the area of animal psychology argue that it is only the conceiving of the subject area of zoopsychology as "(a) the unfolding and construction of actions (b) within the context of vital situations (c) by an integral active subject"[18] that helps to preserve the specifics of scientific zoopsychology as distinct from other sciences that study animal behavior.

Consequential upon this universal definition of the subject of psychology is activity psychology suggesting an anti-dichotomous solution to a number of fun-

damental problems in psychology, formulated in terms of *internal—external*, *reflection—construction*, *universal—single*, *maieutics—manipulation*, *intellect—affect*, and others.[19]

In our view, it is necessary to continue developing the "dialectics of psychology" suggested by the cultural and activity school, which means consistently applying its principles to every particular psychological investigation. Even though many Russian methodologists still think of "dialectics" as a dirty word, some researchers outside of Russia, surprisingly, have turned precisely to dialectical logic in their search for new methodological tools.[20] A well-founded campaign of criticism began in the early 21st century, directed against postmodernism and its network approach as a possible methodological basis of scientific investigations as such. What is of a particular interest is that this also takes place in the writings of a prominent Russian philosopher, Vyacheslav Stepin, a favorite referent for supporters of the "network" approach, who associate his "postnonclassical ideal of rationality" with postmodernism. Meanwhile, he is a vehement critic of postmodernism and tends to associate the postnonclassical ideal of rationality with "universal evolutionism,"[21] i.e., with what is in fact a system dialectical vision of the world.

A notable fact in the context of efforts to evaluate prospects for the psychological activity theory is that researchers, who abide by Vygotsky's ideas and rightly criticize certain investigations conducted by his school for their "ecological invalidity," follow in the footsteps of Leontiev and the Kharkov psychological school. But they do not mention the relevant analyses that they are likely to ignore. Michael Cole, for one, argues that the character and quality of children addressing some or other intellectual problems depend on what more general activity their effort is incorporated in: whether adults "question a child" or children tackle the appropriate problems in the process of spontaneous interactions; that a child's mastering of a foreign language is more efficient in the context of activity requiring a command of language than in a situation where a child simply finds itself in a room with a TV set that "speaks" the language in question; that children from an African tribe that earns a living by engaging in trade are more proficient in the elementary arithmetical operations than children from an agricultural tribe,[22] etc. For many years activity theory ideas have been successfully developed in German-speaking and Scandinavian countries. But how modern Western writings perceive of, evaluate and take further activity psychology ideas merits a special study.

There Is No Future without the Past

If we view the activity theory as part of the historical progress of psychological knowledge, it is obvious that it has incorporated all the achievements of psychological concepts of the earlier epochs, in full conformity with the dialectical principles of cognition: "The more revolutionary a theory, the more is it a successor to the entire preceding theoretical development."[23] This approach is

opposed to a tendency to give up the plurality of alternative points of view and well-nigh mutually exclusive interpretations in favor of analyzing experiences as such, a tendency that has emerged in Russian psychology in recent years.[24] From the point of view of cultural and activity theory, these attempts are unproductive because we perceive the world through the prism of notions we absorbed earlier. The important thing, dialecticians say, is for these notions to result from a generalization of the "entire history of human thinking and its achievements."[25]

In this sense, the history of psychological knowledge ought to be regarded as a *unity* of the manifold, not as a "collage" or a "mosaic" of different points of view. This is why supporters of activity psychology share the approach Mikhail Yaroshevsky, a prominent historian of psychology, who thought it possible to see, behind the changing content of knowledge and a vast variety of viewpoints in the history of science, certain invariants that organize and regulate a scientist's thinking. These invariants are the principles and categories of scientific psychological cognition, as well as the fundamental psychological problems. It is only the recognition of these invariants that enables a dialogue between the conceptual systems of scientists that lived in different epochs and countries, a dialogue, the necessity of which is strongly emphasized today. It is clear, therefore, why Vygotsky, the mastermind of the general psychology project seen as dialectics of psychology, thought it absolutely essential to analyze all viewpoints that existed in the history of science, viewpoints capable of contributing to this kind of dialectics.

In our view, the activity theory incarnates many best achievements in the scientific psychological thought and, in its turn, can be regarded as a stepping stone to "concrete psychology." In this connection, I cannot but broach two "intersecting" ideas of activity psychology and some other, earlier concepts. In all evidence, these are not chance coincidences but something that proves the existence of psychology as an integrated science on the historical plane as well.

Aristotle (4th century B.C.) claimed in his treatise *On the Soul* that plants, unlike animals, experienced influences of an external object "*along with its matter*," whereas an animal soul was able to *perceive the forms of the sensate without its matter*. How strongly this relates to Leontiev's 20th-century definitions of irritability and sensitivity! Using both sets of terminology (Aristotle's and Leontiev's), we can say that sensitivity (an elementary form of the psychic) is perceiving an abiotic stimulus in its "form" rather than "matter," i.e., a perceiving subject experiences the *sense* of a stimulus, not its energetic or substantive components, whereas irritability is "perceiving" a biotic stimulus in its matter (i.e., its substantive and energetic components).

A similarly striking similarity in dealing with the "intellect"—"affect" relationship problem (as well as the correlated problem of knowledge as action) is found in Spinoza and the exponents of cultural and activity psychology. It will be recalled that in considering the affect "under the attribute of extent," Spinoza defined it as the body's state that increases or decreases its (the body's) capacity for action, while in considering the same affect "under the attribute of thinking," as an idea that increases or decreases the soul's capacity for thinking. Positive affects, in his view, increase the body's capacity for action and bring the soul to

greater perfection, which signifies a more adequate cognition of the world. It is already this postulate that clarifies Spinoza's main idea: the soul should seek greater perfection in cognition, while the body, a greater capacity for action. Since, however, he sees the soul and the body as ontologically one and the same thing (one and the same "individual" represented under different attributes), both aspirations ontologically coincide as well: cognition is possible only with the help of the thinking body's action in the world.

A close analysis of Spinoza's writings makes it possible to call into question the widespread view about the "contemplativeness" of his philosophical stand. In this regard, I fully agree with Andrei Maidansky who says that "Spinozaism is from head to toe *a philosophy of Action*." "Leaf through his *Ethics* (he urges the reader): it is full of the marching armies of words like 'to act' (*agere*), an 'act' (*actus*), 'action' (*actio*), and others of the same root. The idea's definition explains that this is by no means a passive perception of an external thing but 'the soul's action' (*actio* mentis)."[26] In his view, only two Russian philosophers could read Spinoza in this "active key:" Varvara Polovtsova, an obscure, if very interesting, student of philosophy, and philosopher Evald Ilyenkov.

Let us now consider rational knowledge[27] in the context of the intellect-affect relationship problem and admire Spinoza's solution. Reason and affect are united: a sage seeks the commensurability of affects in keeping with the reasonable cognition of the world, and, conversely, cognition of the world (Substance, God, Nature) in its necessity leads to an incomparable affect of love for God (Substance, Nature), which Spinoza quite dialectically calls "cognitive love." Let us compare this position with how this problem was solved by the Leontiev school: unity of activity is assured by the indissolubility of the operational and technical content of activity (cognition, "intellect") and its motivational and semantic component ("affect"). Thus, in the historical respect, Leontiev's school is a successor to Spinoza's monistic stance rather than to the dualism of René Descartes, representing a consistent attempt to construct a concrete—i.e., monistic and dialectical—psychology.

There Is Nothing More Practical Than a Good Theory

Since the start of perestroika, Russian psychologists embraced the view that the activity theory was extremely impractical because, unlike psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology, existential psychology, etc., which have truck with the real, "concrete" man, it only considered "man as such," the "abstract" man.[28] A similar view is conceived by psychology students who wish to master the profession easily and in no time. The activity theory seems to them an extremely difficult, cerebral construction having little in common with real life and obstructing the path to the rapid mastery of "influence"—or, still better, manipulation—techniques.

Meanwhile it is the activity theory that contains an immense practical potential, if "practice" is understood as something other than hurriedly organized train-

ing or the use of some unthinkingly acquired "competences." According to Vygotsky and Leontiev, practice is the *practice of life* ("a highly organized practice") rather than the use of ready-made tools developed by someone else. This kind of practice was the field of activity for many members of the Leontiev school during World War II, when, using the existing activity theory ideas and largely contrary to the traditional medical practice of the epoch, Leontiev, Alexandr Zaporozhets, Pyotr Galperin and others restored the ability for movement in injured hands by making a wounded soldier recover the capacity for a definite type of activity, such as labor activity. It was demonstrated, among other things, that "action-performing movements are determined, not only by the aim of action, given under concrete conditions (i.e., the task), but also by a patient's attitude to the action,"[29] i.e., by a definite motive for activity.

The dialectics of the motive and the task to make this or that action set in the course of work therapy (an aim under definite conditions) was displayed in the movement recovery process as follows. Psychologically (and physiologically, too) a wounded hand's movements, while, for example, it performed a joiner's manipulations, were absolutely different depending on whether a wounded individual sought to spare his injured hand, or wished to master a joiner's trade, or sought to emphasize his physical defect before a doctor, that is, seemed to be directly determined by a patient's motive.

But assigning an appropriate objective task could have modified the original motive: "For example, a patient's defect set distorts the movement and reduces its amount in objective goal tasks, but performing the action under given objective conditions may at the same time occasionally have a confusing influence on the set and radically change the motivation of activity and, therefore, its meaning for a patient. It is not immaterial, for this reason, under what conditions a patient's actions take place and to what extent these are capable of determining his attitudes. Therein lies the fundamental difference between, for example, the conditions of work-like and labor actions, between the conditions of a productive effort like the making of paper frames and the conditions, under which a socially important product is manufactured; consequently, under no circumstances must we consider them as solely technical differences."

Thus, infer Leontiev and Zaporozhets, "the recuperative training, as all kinds of training in general, can really take place hand in glove with indoctrination."[30] Not only were these activity psychology discoveries of immense practical importance, they also contributed to solving the abovementioned fundamental theoretical problem involving the intellect-affect relationship.

Yet another "testing range" for activity psychology was training and indoctrinating blind and deaf children. Created by Ivan Sokolyansky and Alexander Meshcheryakov, this training system emphasized the principle of "joint-and-separate dosed activity."[31] It clearly revealed an important dialectical principle of activity psychology: formation (conducted by a teacher under a definite program) is simultaneously a pupil's self-development and self-activity. From the point of view of traditional pedagogy and that of researchers accustomed to dichotomous logic (either manipulation and formation, or "self-unfolding" and

self-activity), "forming self-activity" is an oxymoron. But this is precisely what the activity psychology's training and indoctrination logic is all about.

School education was and still is a type of highly organized practices in activity psychology, where different developmental teaching systems based on the activity theory and the cultural and activity psychology as a whole have been developed and applied (Galperin's theory of stage-by-stage formation of mental acts, Danyil Elkonin's and Vassily Davydov's developmental teaching system, and others). According to cultural and activity psychology, education (both university education and all other types) is aimed at forming a capacity for thinking that will not only make it possible to address certain tasks but also to pose new ones, rather than at "acquiring" a certain sum of knowledge, or even some strictly defined "competences," as the modern idiom goes. Leontiev kept insisting that neither school, nor university education should be turned into the memorizing or into memory training.

The current education policy, I am afraid, gives the activity theory no hope for the future (at least for the near future). The recently introduced Unified National Examination (UNE, the mandatory merit ranking method used to rate school leavers as candidates for university admission) is oriented to results, not to the result-achieving process, let alone to thinking. In Russia, I believe, there is no need to explain what thought-free processes often lead to acquiring the coveted UNE points (in early June 2011, at the time of this writing , some outrageous details were leaked to the press about students using various mobile communication devices to "pass" the UNE in mathematics and other violations).

Consigned to oblivion was Hegel's idea (shared by the Leontiev School) that a naked result without a path leading to it is a corpse. Not only does the wish to obtain results "at any price" lead school-leavers to being unused to independent thinking, it is also immoral. No wonder that candidates for admission increasingly regard higher educational establishments (universities included) as supermarkets (sometimes in the literal sense) for selling knowledge and "narrow competences" and often their "simulacra" (as many teachers say bitterly nowadays). In all evidence, individuals responsible for higher education in Russia are unfamiliar with Evald Ilyenkov's warning that the orientation to a narrow and pragmatic specialization and "technicalization" of education against the background of a conscious renunciation of the fundamental development of universal human abilities and the plan to educate a student as "man of Mankind" (Maxim Gorky's aphorism, a favorite of Leontiev's) leads to professional cretinism and a chaotic interaction of "weak-sighted specialists."[32]

It must be said that the activity theory reveals its "practical utility" in the context of numerous everyday tasks as well. For example, a person's complaints that he has "bad memory" can be removed, not through "symptomatic treatment" ("memory training") but through an appropriate activity preceded by a psychological analysis of the reasons for the "inadequacy," which are present at different levels of a subject's activity structure. These can be the lack of an adequate motivation (as demonstrated by Zinayida Istomina and others), the specificity of a subject's aims (Pyotr Zinchenko), or the absence of adequate tools (methods)

of memorizing (these ideas were developed way back in the period when the cultural and activity psychology was making its first steps). Even where the "poor memorization and reproduction" problem lies in the deficiency of the psychophysiological functions, their inclusion in an activity that is of importance for a subject and secured in the operational and technical regard can, within certain limits, compensate those functions' deficiency, like movements of the injured muscles during the war were restored due to their inclusion in a subject's different forms of activity.

To sum up, the activity psychology's super-task in the practical sphere is, strictly speaking, *prophylaxis*, rather than the "symptomatic treatment" or treatment as such. A practical psychologist abiding by the cultural and activity tradition seeks to organize his own life and that of people and communities that are associated with him in such a way as to preclude, right from the beginning, the emergence of psychological problems or to equip a subject (individual and collective) with appropriate solutions if these problems arise in the future.

Conclusion

Let us generalize the foregoing and come back to the Leontiev School's contribution to psychology. To do that I will quote a very apt passage from Anna Stetsenko who said that the activity theory as an integral paradigm in psychology "prescribes the main parameters and grounds for this science's existence and development and gives hope for the survival of psychology as an independent science despite some powerful trends towards its dissolution in other disciplines (particularly in neurosciences and sociolinguistics)."[33]

A theory lives on as long as it develops and avoids becoming a dogma. We can say that the activity theory, in this regard, has a long life ahead. Its creators have put forward some really fundamental principles and provisions that must be developed in specific studies. The workings of this or that principle should be demonstrated in real empirical and practical works.

Many methodological problems of activity psychology deserve to be further discussed and analyzed. These are, for example, the nature of mental reality and the closely related interiorization problem, the more so that the term "interiorization" has many different meanings that generate heated debates on the status of this concept in the system of psychology's categories and on the essence of the reality it represents. Modern zoopsychological investigations (Western investigations included) make scientists go back to debates on the criteria of the mental that took place in Russian science some time ago and modify their views on psyche development stages in phylogenesis, suggested by Leontiev way back in the 1930s and later developed in activity psychology by Kurt Fabri and others.

The methodologists also criticize the term "reactivity" that the Leontiev School occasionally uses as it defends the "activity principle" as a whole. For example, Leontiev defined irritability as "the capacity of organisms to become active under the influence of the environment," and sensitivity, as a response,

through definite processes, to "influences that are not of direct vital importance."[34] But a living organism does not "react" to environmental impacts but interacts with the environment. The interaction should be understood, not as the "entering into a relationship" of some pre-given subject and object (unit, stimulus), but as an act of their reciprocal positioning. This understanding requires, in turn, a comprehensive discussion of the philosophical categories of "reciprocation" and "positioning" and their possible function in psychology.

Still evoking discussions is the range of units and activity analysis levels, introduced by the Leontiev School. (In their time, Vladimir Zinchenko and other authors discussed such important notions as "functional block," "live movement," and others that could help in dealing with relevant problems.) There is a need to further develop the category of act, which essentially encapsulates the whole of psychology of personality.

Therefore, as we see it, the activity theory belongs to the future of the psychological science and practice, not to its past. If we paraphrase Vygotsky's well-known words about Spinoza (the light of Spinoza's great creations, like starlight, travels for hundreds of years, and, therefore, it is only the psychology of the future that will be able to realize Spinoza's ideas[35]), we can say that it is only the future psychology that will be able to evaluate the contribution to psychology that was made and continues to be made by the activity theory and, in a broader sense, the entire cultural and activity tradition.

We should add, however, that, unlike the starlight, which comes to observers under its own power, the cultural and activity psychology's ideas will not "come" to other people, nor will be developed under new conditions, unless its supporters, specifically teachers and employees at educational establishments, work to this end. Being fully conscious of the revolutionary nature of the cultural and activity psychology and considering it as a "required future model," they should not only creatively develop its premises (without, however, turning them into a dogma) but also project its meanings and senses to new generations of psychologists, who will solve the contradictions of our complicated world under new historical conditions.

NOTES

1 A very apt term denoting this trend in psychology; its German equivalent is *Tätigkeitspsychologie.*

2 V. Mezhuyev, *Marx vs. Marxism: Articles on an Unpopular Theme*, Moscow, 2007, p. 5 (in Russian).

3 See: A. Stetsenko, "Prospects for the Activity Theory in the Context of Modern Psychology: A Non-Classical Approach to the Non-Classical Cultural Historical Activity Theory," *Psychological Activity Theory: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, Ed. A. Leontiev, Moscow, 2006, p. 17 (in Russian).

4 See: L. Vygotsky, "Historical Meaning of Psychological Crisis," *Collected Works*, vol. 1, Moscow, 1982, pp. 419, 420 (in Russian).

5 See: Hegel's *Who Thinks Abstractly?*

6 G.W.F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, vol. 1, New York, 1985, p. 138.

7 The logic of Spinoza's thinking is one of determination (definition) of parts from the whole, claimed Ilyenkov, whereas the positivists' (and, let me add, postmodernists') logic is one of parts being put together to form a whole, when no one knows beforehand what will come out of it all (E. Ilyenkov, *Apropos of a Report on Spinoza: Report to a Meeting of the Dialectical Materialism Sector of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences (September 1965) in Connection with the Intended Publication of* A History of Dialectics, URL:http://caute.net.ru/ilyenkov/texts/spinrep.html, 11.05.2011 (in Russian). But, as Ilyenkov stressed, a movement towards the inside of a whole takes place in the second case as well; it is only that the whole is implied intuitively "in the worst sense of the word, including in the one, where 'intuition' is generally an abstract opposite to 'thinking'" (Ibid.). Cf. the well-known appeals to intuitive vs. rational understanding by modern supporters of "the phenomenological psychology" (for an analysis of this issue, see: E. Sokolova, "On the Problem of Mediation of 'Direct' Perception of Meanings in a Text," *Zhurnal Mezhdunarodnogo instituta chteniya imeni A.N. Leontieva* (in Russian). Understanding in the context of science, culture, education (Materials of the 14th Conference on the Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading, January 14 through 16, 2010, Moscow State University, Moscow), Ed. I. Usacheva, Moscow, 2010, No. 8). Incidentally, the "intuitive cognition" in Spinoza is "synonymous with a rational understanding by a thinking body of the regularity of its actions within Nature," rather than something opposite to reasonable cognition. (See: E. Ilyenkov, *The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Scientific Theoretical Thinking*, Moscow, 1997, p. 57, in Russian.)

8 A.A. Leontiev, "A.N. Leontiev's Philosophical Marginalia," *The Psychological Activity Theory: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, p. 340.

9 E. Ilyenkov, *Dialectical Logic. Essays on History and Theory*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1984 (in Russian).

10 L. Naumenko, *Monism As a Principle of Dialectical Logic*, Alma Ata, 1968 (in Russian).

11 *Philosophy: Encyclopedic Dictionary*, ed. A. Ivin, Moscow, 2004, p. 523 (in Russian).

12 A.N. Leontiev, *Philosophy of Psychology*, A.A. Leontiev, D.A. Leontiev (eds.), Moscow, 1994, p. 44 (in Russian).

13 F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, K. Marx, F. Engels, *Complete Works,* Moscow, 1961, vol. 20, p. 546.

14 L. Naumenko, op. cit., p. 10.

15 E. Ilyenkov, *The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Scientific Theoretical Thinking*, p. 145.

16 A. Leontiev, *Activity. Consciousness. Personality*, Moscow, 2005, p. 121 (in Russian).

17 Ibid., p. 73.

18 E. Fedorovich, "Studying Animal Behavior in Situations of Novelty," *MGU Newsletter. Series 14. Psychology*, 2011, No. 1, p. 113 (in Russian).

19 For more details, See: E. Sokolova, "Methodological Unity *contra* Pluralism: A.N. Leontiev's School vs. Modern Dichotomization of Psychology," *Theory and Methodology of Psychology: Postnonclassical Prospect*, A. Zhuravlyov, A. Yurevich (eds.), Moscow, 2007 (in Russian).

20 See: a review of these works in A. Stetsenko, op. cit.

21 V. Stepin, *Philosophy of Science: General Problems*, Moscow, 2008 (in Russian).

22 See: M. Cole, *Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline*, Cambridge, 1996.

23 E. Ilyenkov, *The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Scientific Theoretical Thinking*, p. 220.

24 See: A. Ulanovsky, "Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychotherapy: Clarifying Vague Experiences," *Moskovsky psikhoterapevtichesky zhurnal*, 2009, No. 2, p. 43.

25 E. Ilyenkov, op. cit., p. 223.

26 A. Maidansky, "On the 'Activity Aspect' of Spinoza's Teaching," *Logos*, 2007, No. 2 (59), p. 203.

27 In the broad sense of the word; intuitive cognition, according to Spinoza, is the supreme variation of the reasonable. See: note 7.

28 See, for example: A. Orlov, "A.N. Leontiev-L.S. Vygotsky: An Essay on the Development of the Schisis," *Voprosy psikhologii*, 2003, No. 2.

29 A. Leontiev, A. Zaporozhets, *Movement Recovery: Psychophysiological Investigation into Recovering Hand Function after Injury*, Moscow, 1945, p. 25 (in Russian).

30 Ibid.

31 A. Suvorov, "Experimental Philosophy (E. Ilyenkov and A. Meshcheryakov)," *E. Ilyenkov: Personality and Creations*, Ed. I. Farman, Moscow, 1999, p. 179 (in Russian).

32 See: ibid., p. 195.

33 A. Stetsenko, op. cit., p. 19.

34 A. Leontiev, *Problems of the Development of Mind*, 4th ed., Moscow, 1981, pp. 51, 54 (in Russian).

35 See: L. Vygotsky, "Two Fragments from L.S. Vygotsky's Notebooks. The Psychophysical Problem," *Newsletter of the Russian State Humanitarian University. Psychology*, 2006, No. 1, p. 295 (in Russian).

Translated by Aram Yavrumyan

"Friendship of the Peoples" in the USSR: A National Project or an Instance of Spontaneous Interethnic Self-Organization?

Svetlana LURYE

Why are Russians, twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, still unable to create new ethically acceptable models of interethnic relations? I will consider this problem from the socioanthropological viewpoint. It consists in the study of a polyethnic society as an entity that develops under the impact both of exogenous and endogenous factors. On the one hand, the members of society are subject to ideological brainwashing (even tolerance is a kind of ideology connected with globalization) and, on the other hand, the members of diasporas are under the influence of their "mother" ethnic groups. Ultimately, however, society is a self-organizing (often spontaneously) structure.

I have chosen as an example the phenomenon of "friendship of the peoples." That system of relations between ethnic groups existed in large Soviet cities. It is interesting because, on the one hand, we are already far enough removed from the Soviet times to be able to look at the phenomenon without undue emotionalism, and, on the other hand, there are still many eyewitnesses around (including ourselves) who remember well that form of social organization. I will be focusing not so much on the official "friendship of the peoples" ideology as on how it was put into practice, a phenomenon far more profound and complicated than simply the implementation of a preconceived ideologem. I will deliberately confine myself to describing how "friendship of the peoples" society was perceived by the representatives of non-Russian diasporas in Russian cities, how they saw their own role, how they defined the role of the ethnic Russians (which may seem strange to the Russians themselves) and what conclusions it suggests as to the causes that brought down what seemed to be a durable system of interethnic relations. The empirical study was carried out in St. Petersburg in the shape of in-depth interviews. Fifteen members of each of the following diasporas were interviewed: Armenians, Georgians, Dagestanis, Lithuanians, Germans, Tatars,

S. Lurye, D. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Cand. Sc. (History), senior research fellow at the RAS Institute of Sociology (St. Petersburg). This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost (ONS),* No. 4, 2011.

Ukrainians and Finns, all respondents over 40 years of age who had first-hand knowledge of Soviet reality. First, a brief description of the theoretical basis of the study. First of all, one should sort out what exactly is the "friendship of the peoples" ideologem whose roots go back to the phenomenon described as a national project during the Great French Revolution, and to understand why the "friendship of the peoples" ideologem can be described as a national project in terms of ideology and in terms of social practice. To do that one first has to look at the problem of nationalism and national communities and at what nationalism is to a cultural (or ethnocultural) community.

Types of Nationalism

There are several concepts of nationalism, but nobody challenges the existence of at least two or more types of nationalism. More often than not scholars speak about the multiplicity of the types of nationalism. To gain an insight into this problem one should pay attention to the classical two-type scheme proposed by Hans Kohn in his time.[1]

In his opinion, there is the nationalism of the center (also described as the Western or French type of nationalism) and the opposing nationalism of the periphery (also called Eastern or German type of nationalism). The former was from the start politically motivated. It was formed in the process of nation-building and attainment of sovereignty, i.e., in the struggle against the monarchic principle of legitimacy. The nationalism of the center is focused on current political struggle and does not look back to the past, that is, it is geared to achieving practical rationally set goals. The nation is interpreted as an association of citizens. The nationalism of the periphery, on the contrary, focuses on the past, which is subject to instrumental interpretation on the basis of which the image of an "ideal" motherland is formed as a goal for the remote future. These key elements are not directly linked to the solution of practical political and economic tasks and are charged with a lofty emotional content. The nation in this case is seen as a community based on informal paradigms of traditional culture.

Thus, the German nation first appeared in the works of Romantic intellectuals as an eternal gift based on a common language and culture while the French nation was a political project (*projet politique)*. Over time something unexpected happened: both models were transformed, with the "Western" model retaining only its form, i.e., its projective component while its content became similar to the content of "Eastern" nationalism. In France, where the very idea of nationalism as a project originated, it was ideologically adjusted. In other countries nationalism was implemented as a kind of cultural-political project, but the underlying basis of the "project" consisted of elements partly borrowed from the German system, and partly worked out by the local intellectuals which they passed off for indigenous elements of each given culture. Thus in each case we are looking at a political project consciously based on a mythologem and artificially constructed.

Of the numerous definitions of a nation I find the definition given by Katherine Verdery to be most attractive in terms of the sociological-anthropological approach. It interprets the nation as a self-fulfilling symbol (or myth) which is able to create reality.[2] In her interpretation nationalism is a shell for various psychological and ideological constructs that are contained in this shell because it is the most effective way in which it can be instilled in mass consciousness. Culture has a function of adaptation (making the world more comfortable for man by adjusting perception), an activity-related function (representing the world as the object for human activity), a communicative function (turning the world into a means of communication and creating conditions for the distribution of cultural roles and their adequate interaction) and the function of self-organization which enables the sociocultural system to restructure in response to external changes, challenges or threats. Consequently, a nation is a form of the existence of culture that emerges under the impact of nationalist ideology.[3] Culture may also refer to ethnic culture of a single ethnic group or a polyethnic society which represents a combination of nations and ethnic groups that live in constant interaction and have compatible or overlapping generalized cultural scenarios.[4]

The above denies the opportunity of implementing a national project as the overarching scheme, in practice two nationalisms and two nations coexist, as it were, in each case: on the one hand, nationalism inculcated by ideologists and the nation as represented by ideologists and, on the other hand, nationalism as reflected in the consciousness of the people, and a nation that takes shape on the basis of an ethnic culture under the impact of national discourse, not so much official as reflected in popular consciousness.

Such a definition of nation can be applied to ethnicity and its sociocultural environment, that is, one can legitimately speak about a project of sociocultural environment aimed at promoting links between nations. That project, in predetermining the views of ethnic entities on the surrounding world and interaction with it, provides a certain perspective of a polyethnic society. For the most part neighborly relations arise spontaneously, but it is important for the purpose of this study to stress that even in that case a targeted project is possible. This is also a case of a self-fulfilling myth. Such a project in the Soviet Union involved the ideologems of "friendship of the peoples" and "the Soviet man" as a supranational characteristic.

The "Friendship of the Peoples" Project: Nationalism, Imperialism and Internationalism

I will not touch upon the sources of that cultural-political project except to note that unlike the wave of nationalisms in the late 19th—early 20th centuries the Soviet "friendship of the peoples" project is similar to the French model. It reveals, to a greater extent than other nationalisms, project features, it is based on the algorithms of the relations between citizens and society and the citizens

among themselves and has no romantic substratum characteristic of the Eastern type of nationalism. Both the Soviet and French projects were conceived as instruments of building a society of a fundamentally new type: both were explicitly aimed at solving pressing political tasks, both rejected the past and based the sovereignty of society on rejection of monarchic legitimacy.

That project framework was imposed on Russian culture which continued to be imperial in 1917, and on the cultures of the peoples within the Russian empire which by that time had a profound body of meanings and experience of coexistence shared with the Russians. Therefore, going back to Verdery's definition of a nation, one must bear in mind that the national reality that was actually taking shape was a derivative of national myths as present in popular consciousness and interpreted in accordance with their generalized cultural scenario.

However, no project was started from scratch, and in this case it would be relevant to note that not only nationalism is divided into types, but *imperialism* also has several types. The model of imperialism that existed in the Russian empire (the same as "friendship of the peoples" model) has also alternatively been described as Russian or French, the two definitions being treated as synonymous. The key feature that Russian and French imperialisms had in common was the tendency to assimilate the borderlands or colonies, to turn the whole population of the empires into Russians or, respectively, Frenchmen. Herein lies the similarity between the French, Russian and Soviet nationalisms.

If the Soviet "friendship of the peoples" project was about assimilation of citizens it would have been (at least a partial) replica of the French project. But the Soviet project, unlike the French one, did not envisage full assimilation, which was one of its key features. It was based on the ideologem of internationalism. Historically, it was the first project of its kind, a project of a multinational community (the Americans were not yet thinking about it while the European peoples were within the imperial paradigms).

It took for nations to implement the ideologem of internationalism, not to speak of the fact that from the point of view of Soviet ideologists a developed society invariably consists of nations the models of relations among which have to be developed and an image of "the Soviet man" committed to internationalism had to be created. Thus the project sought to implement two opposite goals. On the one hand, a deliberate attempt was made to awaken national consciousness and it could be argued that it had been formed with regard to a number of peoples. For each tribe that did not manage in the early 20th century to fit the characteristics of nationalism accepted for "civilized countries" had to become conscious of itself as a nation within Soviet society, to acquire its own literacy, its own written language, national theater, library and university. The scattered peoples with little sense of their own identity had to become aware of their unity and coherence. On the other hand, as soon as national self-consciousness became more or less discernible it was subject to repression as "petty bourgeois nationalism" that destroys the international project.

So, with one hand the Soviet authorities were creating nations and with the other hand they were suppressing, though not destroying them. As a result the

Soviet people had to be an ideal of internationalism, i.e., had to remain a group of nations without forming a single nation. National self-consciousness should not have correlated with projective nationalism connected with the myth of a "golden age" in the people's past and the myth of a "golden age" in the future, a myth that spread almost all over the world by the beginning of the 20th century. The "golden age" in the future could be achieved only by the Soviet people as a whole while a "golden age" in the nations' past could not have existed because of their social and national oppression.

The intricacy of such a dual policy and ideology generated excessive attention to interethnic relations and a cult of the "friendship of the peoples." This ideologem was the key ideologem in the Soviet Union. It found a particularly emotional (and probably unduly straightforward) expression in the national anthem of the Soviet Union, "Unbreakable union of free-born republics, Great Russia has welded forever to stand." That union was a "bulwark of the friendship of the peoples." This was the visible side of the medal, a project that was invented by cerebration. The "friendship of the peoples" and "the Soviet man" existed only as abstractions. In practice it was a complicated cultural system that was reflected in the idea of the Russians of themselves and the ideas that other peoples had of themselves, but most importantly, it reflected the way other peoples saw the Russians. This was the real foundation of the system of functional interaction based on interplay of interpretations and reinterpretations of the content of the national (in the event international) discourse, in a certain way borrowed and assimilated.

The "Friendship of the Peoples": Conception and Reality

To what extent did the implementation of the project correspond to the original concept? I will try to look at the cultural-political project "friendship of the peoples" at the grassroots level, which to a large extent helped the Soviet peoples to survive the horrors of totalitarianism.

Interviews with representatives of various nationalities in Soviet times revealed that most of the respondents (apart from the Ukrainians) were clearly aware of their nationality. Even those respondents who declared that they had forgotten about their nationality demonstrated during the interview that they actually always remembered it and in this context statements such as "I forgot that I was an Armenian, Tatar, a Georgian, etc." mean that "it was not particularly important for me, there were more important things" (Georgian man aged 51) or "being surrounded by people of other nationalities, I was never reminded of it, they took me for one of their own" (Tatar man, aged 47). Only two groups of respondents revealed a tendency towards a kind of pseudoassimilation, those against whom we fought during the Finnish War and the Second World War (Germans and Finns): "We hid everything that could betray us for Germans that we were. We kept mum. Since 1941 we tried to forget the lan-

guage previously spoken in the family, we changed our names to Russian ones" (German man, aged 69). "We were so Russified that we had lost all our traditions" (Finnish woman, aged 64). Tatars revealed a certain degree of disgruntlement: "All my friends are Russians, and not because I choose them, it just happened that way... But I was bitter because I had involuntarily to change my Muslim name to sound like a Russian one" (Tatar woman, 55). Another respondent takes issue with her: "I never hid the fact that I was a Tatar. I did not change my name to a Russian-sounding one. I was never insulted on grounds of my nationality" (Tatar man, 60).

The other respondents do not seek to denationalize or assimilate, but many sincerely express indifference to their own national history and traditions. To keep the fragile balance of the "friendship of the peoples" a person in the Soviet Union needed no more than to know that his or her old traditions existed, but understanding what they consisted in was not obligatory (although desirable in some aspects). Observing the customs was tolerated only inasmuch as folkloric features were concerned and in the presence of other nationalities, in the first place the Russians, or in other cases, exclusively in their own midst: "in Lithuania when we got together—and we have many relatives—we spoke only Lithuanian and sang Lithuanian songs. But we were not keen to draw attention to our nationality. Songs and language... we had them anyway... only this was at the day-to-day level, as for historical questions... but nobody asked them. What was the point?" (Lithuanian woman, 48).

It was allowed to have a general idea of each other as different nations without delving deep into the nationalities issue. Ethnicity was supported within the peoples to preserve a semblance of nations which were the building blocks for proletarian internationalism. Ethnic culture was often perceived as something that had to be demonstrated to others within the set limits: "We held festivals of our poets and there were sports links" (Dagestani man, 46). "Friendship of the peoples took the form of festivals, conferences and symposia, during which we got to know each other" (Lithuanian man, 57). It was preferable that such knowledge should have been acquired in a festive form, as the triumph of internationalism: "customs were observed only in domestic parties: toasts, songs, dances" (Dagestani man, 65). "We were so closely knit together that our customs and traditions intertwined with those of other peoples and everything was mixed up" (Georgian man, 56). The authorities did not object to the survival of the outlines of ethnicity because it was the basis of proletarian internationalism.

What happened in practice in the life of the peoples of the former USSR? The reader should be reminded that our respondents were representatives of ethnic minorities who saw many things through "non-Russian eyes" concentrating on things that were not very important for the Russians and distancing themselves from what seemed to be of prime importance for the Russians.

Ethnicity in major Soviet cities revealed outlines of a different pattern: "Nationality was dormant, as it were, within every person" (Tatar man, 48). The consciousness of the "Soviet man" often prevailed over ethnic consciousness. In

some cases Soviet was replaced with Russian: "I was proud that I was a Dagestani and that I lived in Russia" (Dagestani man, 68). "My grandfathers and great-grandfathers fought for Russia, the bones of our ancestors are buried in many places although our custom is to bury them in their own land. But then we considered this to be our own land, that is why we did not bring them to Dagestan to bury. This is our Russia and what the politicians do makes no difference to us, common people" (Dagestani man, 45). "I never had a wish to go to my birthplace in Tatarstan because I believed that I was living in my native land" (Tatar woman, 68). "Once I found myself in Russia I was confirmed in my feeling that after all I was more Russian than Armenian" (Armenian man, 42). "In certain situations, especially abroad, I always said 'we are Russians'. What's so strange about that?" (Lithuanian woman, 59). "I personally feel to be more of a Russian because we have all been brought up on Pushkin and Lermontov" (Armenian man, 45). "Of course we perceived Russian history as our own, we were born here and our ancestors lived here" (ethnic German woman, 57).

Many answers implicitly defined Soviet society as nationless, but the reason given was very interesting. For example: "Nation-wise, Soviet society was nationless, people were treated with respect" (Dagestani man, 78). To be treated with respect means to stand above national barriers. Or: nationality is to a large extent made irrelevant by the ability to properly build interethnic relations. Respondents often say that "there were no" interethnic relations: "the family lived in Byelorussia where they didn't even hear about such a thing as interethnic relations" (Tatar woman, 45). That means not so much the absence of conflicts but the fact that they were not explicitly expressed. If interethnic relations are thought to be right they seem not to exist. Ethnicity was synonymous with conflict and since there were no conflicts there seemed to be no ethnicity. "There were no interethnic relations. There was society. Period" (Lithuanian woman, 47). "There were no interethnic relations in the Union in any spheres, neither in company nor in day-to-day life" (Georgian man, 65).

At this point an important observation is in order. Ethnicity remained, but thanks to certain mechanisms people together and each person individually found a common language. That is not something that can be imposed from the top. "One would have thought that ideas of honor and morality were different and the words carried different associations for different people and yet in spite of all this we understood each other. And take the Muslims who occupy half of Russia. We understand each other, it only seems that we do not understand them, actually we understand each other very well" (Armenian woman, 55). The emphasis is laid on mutual understanding, more precisely, on the desire and still more importantly, on the ability to understand contrary to external (and not only external?) and ineradicable differences. It is somewhat reminiscent of a game, but a game played very seriously: "Perhaps it was an artificial society. There were many compromises, but nothing better has been invented to-date" (Lithuanian man, 55).

It is a society of interminable mutual compromises which are so numerous as to become the meaning of social life and to be polished to the level of an art.

Of course it is artificial, that is, man-made, and all the members of society are involved in creating it. It is artificial because it is partly a game. It is a society of relations, a society of communication: "People could communicate. It was a society in which people communicated" (Dagestani woman, 51). "There were no problems. Absolutely none. On the contrary, people were interested in how it came about" (Georgian man, 56). "People were interested to communicate" (Lithuanian woman, 49). "In fact, on the contrary, it was more interesting, people were interested in communicating because I for one, traveled, I could tell stories, I speak two languages, I know many songs, there was a lot of communication" (Lithuanian woman, 47). "There was total understanding among representatives of different peoples" (Georgian man, 57). "Every nation has many good features and its merger with other nations yielded a positive effect: a common language and understanding of each other" (Tatar man, 53). "A polyethnic society, I think, has nothing but advantages. It is like boiling beef: you can of course eat clear soup made from beef, but it is far better to eat *borshch*" (Armenian woman, 57). "Well, I don't know, I haven't seen it, I mean inequality. It was very seldom that people deliberately provoked you. Somebody might come to a party and start doing it. He was simply rejected. They did not allow him to upset what was already in place" (Lithuanian woman, 47).

Added to the art of compromise and sublimation of latent conflicts was the cult of communication and the cult of "the good man": "everything depends on the person. If he is a good person there will be only good persons around him" (Dagestani man, 50). "I do not remember any cases of tactlessness" (Tatar woman, 51). The essence of that idea is expressed in the following pronouncements: "Friendship of the peoples really existed because I have met many good people during my life" (German man, 55). "Friendship of the peoples did exist, they took me for one of their own and they behaved very tactfully towards me" (Georgian man, 56). From the angle adopted in this paper the answer is anything but paradoxical. Friendship of the peoples included the concept of goodness and tact as an element of goodness that was required if one wanted to be considered good and therefore accepted in society.

However, one wonders whether interethnic relations "did not interest people." To say that "they did not interest people" is a kind of a "play": "I look and I live like an internationalist, so whatever republic I came to I was at home, one of their own. I was a Moldavian in Moldavia, a Ukrainian in Ukraine, a Georgian in Georgia and in Baku I was usually a Jew. I didn't care who they took me for, I accepted everything without a murmur" (Armenian woman, 57). "Once there was such an incident. Traveling on a train I said I was Lithuanian to the people with whom I shared the compartment. They were men who had fought in Afghanistan. One of them said a lot of negative things about Lithuanians. I argued with him as hard and as long as I could and finally, after our long conversation, he popped out of the train at a stop and came back with a huge bunch of flowers. He thanked me for explaining things to him, for relieving him of the burden of ill-feeling that he had towards the Lithuanian people" (Lithuanian woman, 51).

The "play" was basically about displaying a certain etiquette "over the head" of national relations: forbearance, tact, understanding of "the other". Sometimes very strange, an ability to see the essential goodness of people behind different shells and to connect to it. Here is one of the answers to the question "how did the Russians perceive your people during that period?": "many came to us, they liked it. They met with friendliness here. We believed that they thought we were good people" (Lithuanian woman, 48), i.e., included them in the "friendship of the peoples" scenario.

The "Friendship of the Peoples": People and the State

The hunger for human warmth was incredible, probably as a reaction to the coldness of the totalitarian regime: "The multinational state had only pluses. It's like comparing a glove and a mitten, where do your fingers feel warmer?" (Ukrainian woman, 59). What is particularly important is that interethnic relations were often built up over the heads of administrative, security and other agencies: "Communication with ordinary people was easy. The communists were one thing but the common people, your colleagues were quite another" (German man, 59). "If there were shortcomings, they were at the leadership's level, we were common people and we were happy" (Finnish woman, 65). In the answers of non-Russian respondents "friendship of the peoples," with few exceptions, was not perceived as an ideological category. It hardly was considered to be a product of socialism: "While still at school I reflected on the Young Pioneers, on the Komsomol. And I could not make sense of them. But friendship of the peoples was real" (Georgian man, 47).

What is the underlying basis of the "friendship of the peoples" in the minds of people, apart from communication and mutual understanding of a multimillion mass of people and their mutual support? It lies in the events and hardship of the Second World War: "The friendship was real. Our fathers fought in the war" (Armenian man, 51). And in a "happy childhood." "I had a childhood and a youth and it may sound funny today, I had the Komsomol and the Young Pioneers. Life was interesting" (Ukrainian woman, 48). We had a normal childhood with the Young Pioneers" (Lithuanian woman, 45). The Young Pioneers and the Komsomol, unlike the Communist party, acquire a distinctly positive connotation in the context of the friendship of the peoples: "When I was a Komsomol member, I was assigned to meet the mother of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya when she came to Leningrad: I still remember the warmth and joy of that meeting. I put it down to the friendship of the peoples and the notion of 'the Soviet man'" (Finnish woman, 73).

Answers to the question about the friendship of the peoples are very detailed, including stories of their own lives and those of members of their families. They give an insight into what concrete meaning is read into this concept and what kind of relationships these were. What, to use the language of modern

anthropologists, is the scenario, i.e., the scheme of relations unfolding in time? How does cultural transmission take place, i.e., how is a young member of society included in this cultural scenario? "Our fathers had prejudices, but not we. I think if the Soviet Union had survived our children would have no misunderstandings" (Lithuanian woman, 55). It is clear what scenario people of various countries attach themselves to. It is a system of relations that does not require that one renounce one's innermost identity and become denationalized. Rather, a simulation of the denationalization was required. Ethnic identity could remain, but behavior was in many ways based on compromises, almost unconscious compromises.

It was a play of compromises that did not necessarily oust nationality, it ran above it, on the surface and filled certain lacunae in the models of communication that did not exist in national models. The "friendship of the peoples" scenario did not exclude the "national scenario," rather, it transformed it in certain ways. The peoples that were traditionally rivals and even enemies had to sublimate their hostility. It was required to adopt the system of compromises, for example, not parading one's nationality and not demonstrating historical disputes on national grounds to the public. As one interviewee said: "What we feared most of all was to bring in the authorities in our ethnic conflicts. The authorities would not have understood anything and would have done many silly things. Conflicts were resolved in a sublimated form: in the shape of sports competitions, 'Come on Girls,' the Club of the Merry and Resourceful *(KVN)*, at worst in scuffles at discotheques over day-to-day matters" (Armenian man, 52).

Since "friendship" was between peoples, a person thinks of himself as a representative of one of the peoples, but his ethnic consciousness is diluted, it is important for him to assert himself not as "a representative of the people" (that is taken for granted in the framework of the Soviet national project) but as a person who can understand the representatives of other peoples and can be understood by them, to embody harmonious coexistence between different cultures, values and customs. Think of the favorite Soviet dictum: "Happiness is when you are understood." Patriotism is based not on the statehood, but on relations among people: "Yes, I was a patriot of the Soviet Union, without any reservation. The Soviet Union is a country and the system is something else. The country is its people, culture and language. They are our kin, it is our native culture, without them we are not members of the people's community" (Armenian man, 52). Indeed it was a grassroots culture in which the authorities performed only ritual actions: "The Communist system did not understand a thing about national relations. It was remarkable." (Armenian man, 52). "The official nationalities policy ran in parallel to the life of the people and the two hardly intersected" (Tatar man, 58).

Interethnic unity is the ideal a society strives for. This is not an ideologem, this is a habit. The habit of behaving in a multinational and multicultural environment, the habit of combining diversity and unity, the habit of mutual understanding between people of different cultures, the habit of building interethnic and intercultural harmony.

The "Friendship of the Peoples" and "the Soviet Man"

While "friendship of the peoples" is a scenario, i.e., a model of interaction, "the Soviet man" is a function, the predicate and an ideologem that is invested with meaning at the same time. He who is involved in the "friendship of the peoples" scenario is "a Soviet man." This concept, like "friendship of the peoples," is outside ideology. Within that context it is proper to say that "a friendly man is a Soviet man," "a tactful man is a Soviet man," "a person who is ready to help is a Soviet man" and in general "a good man is a Soviet man." But a "Soviet man" did not mean a "proponent of the Soviet ideology." "The Soviet man is a man of integrity" (Ukrainian woman, 61). "The Soviet man is a man who is proud of his country" (Tatar woman, 40). "The Soviet man has all the ideal features and to date there is no system that could produce more than the concept of the 'Soviet man'" (Dagestani man, 45). "The concept 'Soviet man' was all about pride" (Georgian man, 65). "The Soviet man had freedom of choice. He could decide for himself what he needed to do and do it" (Dagestani man, 78). The Soviet man, in the overwhelming majority of the interviews, is not associated with the Communist system or with the totalitarian regime. On the contrary, he exists in spite of them as it were.

Thus, we see a collectively performed real life drama in which everybody plays the role of "the Soviet man." The image of "the Soviet man" is assimilated by the "friendship of the peoples" scenario conferring an inner meaning on the latter, and investing the whole "play" with ideal meaning that expresses itself in a multitude of scenarios. These scenarios are summed up in such dictums as "the Soviet man is ahead of the whole planet," "We will plant apple trees on Mars." "We have been born to make a fairy tale real." Thus, "the Soviet man is a cultural theme in its own right that is derived from the theme of "friendship of the peoples" and confers an ideal meaning on it. Learning the complicated art of compromise, sublimation, communication and "goodness" towards their own folk of whom there are millions upon millions, are all brought to the altar of that ideal.

"The Soviet man" is an ideologem that forms meaning. It is truly the "creativity of the masses," the masses that experience hardship and are deprived of any internal and external support, ill-done-by, humiliated people who wanted not only to survive but to be "ahead of the whole planet," to launch the first sputnik, and to be the strongest: "He was content with a loaf of bread and plateful of soup. People were like that everywhere, all over the Union" (Dagestani woman, 45). "The Soviet man" would make do with a plate of soup so that his rockets could go to outer space.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky suggested somewhere that people in a godless society would love each other very much. Friendship of the peoples is an echo of such love. In a sense, it is a surrogate. But that surrogate was increasingly acquiring real life features. There was so much humanity in these relations that it is etched on memory like a happy fairy tale. It is just that humanity had to find a place and an inner core. But it failed to do so, perhaps it did not have enough time.

The "Friendship of the Peoples" and the Russians

Undoubtedly, cultures were not equal. The whole building of the Soviet culture was sustained by a peculiar interpretation of Russian culture. All the respondents think of themselves as belonging to the "high Russian culture." For some peoples the high Russian culture compensated for the lack of or a very thin layer of their own high culture. For the peoples that had a high culture the Russian culture enriched it. The relative ease with which things Russian were accepted was due to the fact that the Russians (as Russian people, and not the authorities) did not infringe upon the day-to-day culture of other peoples and often themselves adopted the day-to-day habits of the local population: the food, lifestyle, elements of behavior and some customs.

But what is the role of the Russians in the "friendship of the peoples" scenario? The "friendship of the peoples" system can be seen as one form in which the Russian imperial complex manifested itself, including at its grassroots level. It is a superficial view that the Russians were less involved in this scenario than the others. Apart from and contrary to the official "friendship of the peoples" discourse a national projective discourse emerged at the grassroots level which is summed up in the famous phrase: "Being a good man is all that matters." For non-Russian members of Soviet society it meant being part of the mandatory "goodness" of Soviet people and it elevated the incredible internationalism of the Russians who demonstrate by their example that nationality does not matter. For the Russians that discourse often meant something very different: "A person is not to blame for having been born from a non-Russian mother, let us not mistreat him for that reason. It is not his fault, it is his bad fortune." Glimmerings of understanding of this motive can be seen in several interviews that speak about "Tactful attitude." "I don't recall any instances of tactlessness" (Tatar woman, 51). "They behaved tactfully towards me" (Georgian man, 56). But far more often non-Russian respondents did not detect anything suspicious.

Therefore the perception of the ethnic Russians was very interesting. It would seem that the "friendship of the peoples" ideologem need not necessarily have become a habit of behavior with Russians. Simply, their role in the "friendship of the peoples" scenario was somewhat different. "It was the role of a fairy-tale *Santa Claus*. Before him everybody dances and sings, and he smiles, strokes people's heads and distributes gifts. The principle is that other peoples do things for the Russians and receive praise and gifts from the Russians. If they (Russians) tackle things they should be helped" (Armenian man, 53). The task of the Russians in the "friendship of the peoples" cultural scenario is central and at the same time the most simple one (because it is their culture and their models and stereotypes that form the basis). But it is also the most complicated because they must support the whole edifice and direct the actions of others.

"What does it mean to be 'a Soviet man'? I imagine how you could explain 'the Soviet man' to a small child. Because it is a little bit of a fairy tale. The concept of goodness thrived in our country, we have a special perception of human goodness and duty. Number one. Number two, from childhood we were educat-

ed more in the concept of duties than rights. We have always thought that it is our duty to work, to be kind, to do something for your grandma, your grandpa, your mother, to do something for your child, to dedicate yourself to the state. But we never thought: I wish somebody would do something for me personally. For example, the child, the grandma or somebody else. This was inculcated in the subconscious, I have no doubt about it, and this is what foreigners cannot understand. We had a big Papa who had to do our thinking for us, and we had to work for the big Papa. And the big Papa was the huge state" (Armenian woman, 47). "Russian" took the back seat to the role of "Papa."

That is not how the Russians perceived their role. One respondent said: "The stereotype of behavior, the distinctive feature of this multinational country determined by the Russians was not perceived by them as belonging to their nationality in the first place. This despite the fact that the behavior of the USSR in the external world was perceived as Russian behavior. There was little sense among the Russians of being a nation, they did not perceive their behavior as ethnically original. And yet for the others they were a very original, 'special' people that set wonderful examples to be emulated in any field and generated an overall sympathy for the people. It is unlikely that an Uzbek could name ten Kazakhs whom he respects. But he knew so many remarkable Russians! This served as a wonderful foundation for interethnic relations in the country. Alas, it was hard to detect in the majority of my Russian friends a sense that the 'Russians' are also a people, a nationality. They objected that they had nothing of the kind, that they were 'normal,' 'ordinary,' 'simple' and even that 'it would never enter their minds to think of themselves as a nationality.' And this comes from representatives of the people that has a colorful and universally recognized identity, the people that had over centuries played a role in world history" (Armenian man, 57).

Until recently this was the case: the Russians as an imperial people did not want to have a nationality. But the latter too most probably had an element of play in it—only on the part of the Russians this time. They found it easier not to reflect on the fact that the system of relations set up in the country, the "friendship of the peoples," is a reflection of the Russian imperial policy. As one respondent explained, "nothing was required of the Russians except being themselves" (Dagestani man, 47). "The image of the Russians in the eyes of friendly peoples was one of a purely charismatic leader. They did not have to do anything special: the more the Russians behave themselves as an ethnic entity with their own interests the more that image will set an example for the neighbors. In a circle of the peoples of Russia the concept of 'nation' is a stereotype of being in the field of vision of the Russian people. Being looked over by the Russian people. International relations are shaped as they are because of the 'all-seeing eye' of the Russian people. Not to be confused with the 'eye of the supreme power.' The Russian people, culture and language provide a model in whose framework national behavior, and the form that even interethnic conflicts take must fit. Each party in any conflict wants to be heard in the Russian language—for good or bad—but not to be ignored by the Russian opinion" (Armenian man, 52).

Most importantly, it was the Russians who had to invest the scenario with meaning and to combine the two scenarios: "friendship of the peoples" and "we are ahead of the whole planet." We saw that the attributes of the "Soviet man" ideologem in the second scenario were geared entirely to the state as the main priority. They were geared to the state without any trace of religion, i.e., were sustained solely by the desire to be superior. Therefore, at a higher level the structure loses its meaning. And yet the sense of a strong state is very pronounced among Russians: "Apparently the question of statehood is really important for the Russians... Without discussing it—day and night—a ploughman cannot plough and an airman cannot fly... (Armenian man, 57).

While all the other peoples may perceive the "friendship of the peoples" scenario as part-play, with the Russians it gradually but inexorably leads to the crisis of state consciousness. Even as other peoples of the Soviet Union felt more and more comfortable under the superficially ideological and hardly oppressive Brezhnev regime the Russians had a growing sense of the crisis of their state consciousness, their imperial consciousness. The central principle of the empire has always been: "God is with us, know the languages and obey because God is with us." Imperial action cannot be strictly pragmatic. While the representatives of other peoples saw the war in Afghanistan as another opportunity to increase the might of the state (that is how most non-Russians saw it), for the Russians it was a meaningless war. Earlier Russian conquerors brought Orthodoxy to the conquered peoples, present-day ones bring nothing but ideological void.[5] The non-Russians, however, believed that the Russians did not feel enough support and did not understand that they were "loved as a nationality. They did not understand it and did not believe it. Perhaps they didn't love themselves enough" (Armenian man, 53). The Russians did not love themselves as proponents of the Soviet idea and, unlike non-Russians, could not dissociate themselves from it. The problem was that the Russians lived within a state and the non-Russians within a country, which was not the same thing. A country was a community of people where what counted most was human interrelations; the state is an idea of a world order for which one can sacrifice one's life. If a non-Russian lays down his life alongside with yours, he does so not for the sake of an idea, but in order to help the Russian and to preserve the human community that represents the highest value to him.

One can draw this conclusion: in any stable polyethnic society there are mythologems and scenarios of interethnic relations corresponding to them. They often take the form of sociopolitical projects pursued as a government program. But whether or not such a program exists these scenarios are formed "from below" in the process of relations between ethnic groups. A program handed down "from the top" is reinterpreted. In each case it is grassroots creativity.

The scenario of intercultural (interethnic) relations is a component of the generalized cultural scenario of any society. That applies to the entire polyethnic society which, for whatever reason, contains a shared cultural element and besides (in a more or less developed shape) a general cultural scenario connected with the cultural scenarios of the dominant people and the peoples that close-

ly interact with the latter. When such a scenario is violated the cultural system, which tolerates no lacunae, seeks to regenerate it. Thus the system of relations among the peoples in the Russian Empire is replaced with the Soviet-era scenario of "friendship of the peoples." It turned out to be acceptable for Soviet society because it correlated both with the system of cultural constants of the dominant people and with the system of cultural constants of a polyethnic society as a whole, even though they are reflected differently in various ethnic cultures.

In the process of cultural "sifting" of a large "mass of material" new "significant schemes" began to emerge[6] that provided material for new components of "intended worlds,"[7] new transfers and new cultural scenarios relevant to the generalized cultural scenario of society emerging from a state of crisis. In our case the scenario of interethnic relations expressed in "friendship of the peoples" had to be relevant to the generalized cultural scenario of the Russians while providing material convenient for reinterpretation by ethnic cultures living in close contact with the Russians, thus strengthening the general Soviet cultural scenario: any scenario is based on a kind of play of interpretations and reinterpretations. While the non-Russians in their interconnections had an idea of how the "friendship of the peoples" scenario was interpreted by each other (though only at a very superficial level, as the post-Soviet period demonstrated), the non-Russians had no inkling of how it was perceived by the Russians while the Russians had no inkling of being involved in a kind of play. Everything happened by itself, as it were, in accordance with the rhythm of a generalized cultural scenario.

However, if the dominant ethnic entity withdraws from the "play" because it is not satisfied with its dominant values, the reality no longer fits into the generalized cultural scenario adopted by the polyethnic society and loses its capacity to adapt and begins to fall apart. More precisely, there begins to degrade the combination of the pictures of the world as held by ethnic groups, on the basis of which an interaction between these groups takes place. Functional interethnic interaction becomes bereft of meaning. For it is based on "playing" on the central cultural theme (in this case "we will plant apple trees on Mars").

It is only in the process of such "play" that the cultural theme is presented in its various interpretations. Dealing with living ethnographic and historical material we see and feel when functional interaction is disrupted because one or other form of existence of an ethnic entity, one or other mode of its functioning (which may be impeccable from the point of view of adaptation) turns out to be meaningless and devoid of its underlying idea. In spite of the beauty and harmony of the "friendship of the peoples" scenario the Russians resented playing their role in it because they lost its meaning, its supreme mission. For the course of functional intraethnic conflict to be restored another central cultural theme must be found. Society is structured in the process of interaction among its groups that have different value orientations. The world is not recreated in accordance with the new picture of the world, but is recognized as being adequate to it once it has already been restructured. The meaning and history of the formation of new institutions is explained *post factum* on the basis of the accepted value orientation and is included in the picture of the world as a component (mythologem of history).

NOTES

1 H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism,* New York, 1967.

2 K. Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania*, Berkeley—Los Angeles, 1991.

3 S. Lurye, "Nationalism, Ethnicity, Culture," *Obshchestvenniye nauki i sovremennost (ONS),* 1999, No. 4.

4 S. Lurye, "General Cultural Scenario and Functioning of Sociocultural Systems," *Sotsiologiya i sotsialnaya antropologiya,* 2010, No. 2

5 S. Lurye, *Historical Ethnology,* Moscow, 2005 (in Russian).

6 R. D'Andrade's terms, see: R. D'Andrade, "Cognitive Anthropology," *New Direction in Psychological Anthropology,* Cambridge, 1994, p. 91.

7 Richard Shweder's term, see: R. Shweder, *Thinking Through Cultures,* Cambridge, London, 1991, pp. 48-49.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Е. Преображенский. Архивные документы и материалы (2006), Новая экономика (2008), Деньги и мировой капитализм (2011). Составители М. Горинов, С. Цакунов. М., Издательство Главархива Москвы.

Ye. PREOBRAZHENSKY. *Archival Documents and Materials* (2006), *The New Economics* (2008), *Money and World Capitalism* (2011), Compiled by M. Gorinov, S. Tsakunov, Moscow, Main Archival Department of Moscow Publishers.

In the last twenty years the studies of Russian history, and the history of economic thought, in particular, have become more comprehensive and more objective. The names which remained deliberately suppressed under Soviet power are being gradually brought back; well-known names are presented in a new light. During *perestroika* and immediately after it the process was highly emotional: today, it has become more rational and, let us hope, more objective. In fact, the three volumes of works by Yevgeny Preobrazhensky and their analysis published in the last three years by the Main Archival Department of Moscow bear witness to this. Two more volumes are planned.

While Soviet historical science concentrated on the political side of Preobrazhensky's activities the West appreciated him as an original economist and theoretician of state regulation of the market economy.

In 2011 we marked 125th birth anniversary of Yevgeny Preobrazhensky. As a grammar school student he became interested in politics; in 1903 he joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party *(RSDRP)*. Until 1917 his political activities were limited to the Urals and Siberia; in 1905 he took part in an armed uprising in Moscow. Always an avid reader he made a special effort in self-education; for one year (1907-1908) he was a student at the Law Department of Moscow University when he majored in economics.

In May 1918 he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Urals Regional Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and gained promi-

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nence as one of the leaders of the Left-Wings Communists; for the rest of his life he remained on the left, radical-revolutionary flank of the Bolshevik Party. Unlike many of those who shared his opinions he was not a fanatic: his views rested on a solid theoretical basis even though one might disagree with some of his postulates. Since 1919 Preobrazhensky worked in Moscow. After the 10th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1921 there began Preobrazhensky's discrepancies with the party leadership. (The 10th Congress not only introduced the New Economic Policy *(NEP)*, but also banned factions inside the party.) His position on the "discussion on trade unions" made him unsuitable for the election to the CC RCP (b.); he got the post of the Chairman of the Financial Commission of the CC RCP (b.) and the Council of People's Commissars on monetary circulation, credits and finance—the issues brought to the fore by NEP. He filled executive posts, was engaged in theoretical studies and teaching. In 1922, together with Grigory Sokolnikov, he delivered a report at the 11th Congress of the RCP (b.) on financial issues. In the same year he wrote a work *From NEP to Socialism* in which he predicted that NEP would collapse in the late 1920s if there is no world revolution by that time.

The year 1923 marked a turning point in the life of the country and in his life as well: several groups with different ideas of further progress toward socialism began struggling for power in the party. Preobrazhensky joined Lev Trotsky as one of the leaders of the extreme left. In economics he spoke about stronger centralization, state control, a planned economy, faster industrialization, etc.

He was repeatedly expelled from the Communist Party (in 1927 and 1933); in 1934, in an effort to adjust to the changing circumstances he went as far as repenting at the 17th Congress; unable to become a cog in a huge mechanism created by Stalin he remained an independent and free-thinking person which sealed his fate: he was executed in 1937.

Much of what he wrote nearly 100 years ago retained its theoretical relevance. The three volumes prepared for publication and published by the Main Archival Department of Moscow contain the following materials. Volume 1 (*Archival Documents and Materials*) contains his earliest works, up to the year 1920: prerevolutionary articles; speeches in the years of the revolution and the Civil War and several larger works, the most interesting among them being *The ABC of Communism* written together with Nikolay Bukharin in 1919 and *Paper Money in the Epoch of Proletarian Dictatorship* written in 1920. Volume 2 (*The New Economics*) contains his publications of 1922-1928 as well as *The New Economics,* his *magnum opus*, in which he analyzed NEP and the prospects of industrialization of the USSR and substantiated his "law of the primary socialist accumulation." His work *From NEP to Socialism. Looking into the Future of Russia and Europe* is another gem. Volume 3 *Money and World Capitalism* consists of his works of 1921-1931 on monetary circulation in the capitalist and Soviet economies as well as on the economic problems of capitalism of those years.

His theoretical works are dominated by two main ideas: a possibility of accelerated industrialization of the Soviet economy and an economic role of paper money and inflation in particular. He brought them together in his "theory

of two regulators": he saw the law of value and the law of primary ("primitive" in English sources) socialist accumulation as two regulators of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. The former operates in the nonsocialist sector and presupposes equivalent economic ties; the latter, in the socialist sector where equivalency was not observed. The role of the nonequivalent ties is revealed in an interaction of the socialist and nonsocialist sectors. (Preobrazhensky described this as an "active balance" in favor of socialism.) This is done to move resources to the still weaker socialist sector to accelerate its development and achieve its final victory some time in the future. Non-equivalent interaction betrays itself in economic contacts with the capitalist world surrounding the USSR which are realized through state monopoly on foreign trade and "socialist protectionism" (Trotsky's term). The main source of primary socialist accumulation is found inside the country: the NEP bourgeoisie, small handicraftsmen and, mainly, the peasantry. Preobrazhensky suggested that an active balance should be established between the socialist (industry) and nonsocialist sector (agriculture) in the NEP context through unequal taxation of different social groups, "semi-compulsory" state loans, inflation, discrimination of the nonsocialist sector in crediting and, finally, by manipulation with industrial and agricultural (procurement) prices.

If separated from the Soviet economic realities of the 1920s, his theory was carefully studied in the West as one of the first works related to state regulation of the market economy. Some people treat it as pre-Keynesian because both regarded inflation as an economic factor. It seems, however, that in the theories of Yevgeny Preobrazhensky and John Keynes similarities are few and far between. Indeed, the Keynesian theory suggests that state regulation should be used to restore economic balance while the Soviet theoretician regarded it as an instrument used to upset economic balance to attain certain aims. It seems that Preobrazhensky's theory had many more common points with the theory of the "dominating economy" of François Perroux. This is for the reader to decide whether this is true or not. The works of Preobrazhensky have become available: in this way his name has been restored to the galaxy of famous Russian economists of the early 20th century.

M. Pokidchenko
Translated by Valentina Levina

В. МАЛЬКОВ. Россия и США в XX веке: очерки истории межгосударственных отношений и дипломатии в социокультурном контексте, М., зд-во «Наука», 2009, 495 с.

V. MALKOV. *Russia and the US in the 20th Century: Essays on the History of Interstate Relations and Diplomacy in the Sociocultural Context*, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 2009, 495 pp.

The relations between Russia and the USA have been an abiding topic of discussion in our society. There is a diversity of judgments and assessments, some of which are diametrically opposite in their purport and mood: from admiring America to its total rejection. A similar diversity of opinions exists among Americans: for some of them Russia is still "an evil empire," an eternal enemy of America, while for others it is a country of high culture, Lev Tolstoy and Anton Chekhov, with a kind but miserable people constantly suffering under a succession of tyrannical governments. But it is seldom that one can encounter among the multitude of speeches and publications on the topic original and well-grounded conclusions that rest on a solid foundation of facts and a profound insight into the nature of various phenomena that engage people's minds. The new serious work by Viktor Malkov, a well-known scholar specialized in American studies, is such an exception.

The title of the book accurately reflects its content, genre and its approach to the subject. It is devoted to the relations between the two most significant subjects of the historical process during the past century. It spans the whole century and if somebody objects that judging by the table of contents, the book deals only with the first half of the 20th century, they should be told: read attentively and you will see that in covering the events in the early or in the middle of the century the author skillfully projects the plot into the immediate and more distant future restoring the continuity of time. Although the times of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George Bush, Brezhnev and Gorbachev are treated in very general terms (while Yeltsin's "rule" is mentioned in just a few sentences), the breath of modern times permeates the whole book through direct

This review, titled *Russia and the USA in the 20th Century,* was first published in Russian in the journal *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya,* No. 3, 2011.

references or in context, inviting the reader to reflect on the consequences of the events described.

The book before us consists of essays, and not a head-on description of events, although the chronological principle in presenting the material certainly confers discipline on the author's thought. At the same time the historian ranges freely between historical eras finding in the past the sources of today's already accomplished events or peeping into the future waiting for it to happen.

The nucleus of the book consists of the problems of interstate relations and diplomacy, but the author presents them not in the traditional way, but as an intense dialogue between two civilizations which in the past century exerted the greatest influence on the development of the whole world. Dialogue, consisting not only of a body of diplomatic challenges and responses, but of a contest of ideas and assessments of individual events and global phenomena and processes by people belonging to different cultures and generations. A dialogue made more complex by the fact that it reflected the course of world history, bringing in a vast number of actors.

Russia and the USA are continent-states which have grown out of a common trunk of civilization, geographical and, in the 20th century, geopolitical antipodes, had in the past and still retain similarities of historical development alongside with signs of undoubted differences. In both countries, perhaps more than anywhere else, there are such apparently incompatible qualities as disunity and a quest for internal unity. With the Americans, it is to a large extent the consequence of the Calvinist teaching of personal communion with God and predetermination that permeated that country from the start and, on the other hand, the practice of jointly overcoming the resistance of nature and the aborigines developed by the Fathers-Pilgrims which gave the nation stable habits of creating diverse forms of civil society. With the Russians, the principles of communal life and *sobornost* have for centuries coexisted with profound divisions between social estates that were so deep that at times the aristocracy and the people literally spoke different languages. Both Russia and the USA had for centuries the system of forced labor which our two countries renounced almost simultaneously. Both lived through bloody civil wars that left a deep scar on national consciousness. Paradoxically, both the USA, where scientific-technical knowledge and pragmatism underlie the world outlook and shape the mentality of the educated part of the nation, and Russia, which has lived through decades of godlessness, today are the most religious countries with the prevalence of Christian denominations, differing in that respect from the Catholic and Protestant Europe where faith for the most part has been pushed to the periphery of national life. Finally, both nations in their long-term political experience espoused expansionism and an imperial view of their place in the world. In the 20th century both the USSR and the USA, proceeding from different motives, claimed to play a messianic role with regard to the rest of the world. Indeed America has carried these intentions into the new century.

At the same time there are limits to the apparent similarity between American and Russian civilizations and it would be folly to seek to bring them together as the basis in the search for a single cultural-historical matrix or to use the

historical experience of one country as a model for the development of the other. Different historical paths, different challenges and different magnitude of sacrifices brought to the altar of progress understood in different ways. The Americans have a cult of democracy while in Russia that concept today does not generate the former optimism, indeed for some time now it has been generating negative emotions among large sections of the population. In America a "successful man" is a model to emulate while in Russia he is referred to as "a new Russian" or an "oligarch" and is the target of society's criticism. We use very different methods of combining ethnic components to form a nation: in Russia, peoples—large and small—always preserved their historical identity within the framework of the common state, America is "the melting pot" which creates the "American way of life," the only possible way of life from their point of view.

All this makes the study of the problems of relations between the American and Russian civilizations, over a limited stretch of time, a difficult task even if one confines oneself to the above list of similarities and differences between them. And one has to bear in mind that these relations are greatly influenced by the rest of the contradictory and troubled world which has more than once changed its attitude to these countries. In the introduction to his book Viktor Malkov even uses the concept of a collective foreign policy in the period when its content was to a large extent determined not by the key protagonists but by their allies who prompted them to make decisions that are in their interests.

V. Malkov hit on an original way to resolve these problems: the study of interstate relations from the historical-cultural angle when political actions are dictated not only by pragmatic considerations and common sense, but by motives stemming from different national or social mentalities, the cultural-historical experience of the nations and the *clichés* of collective consciousness. At the same time this is not a cultural-anthropological outline of the history of USA and Russia, nor historiosophical forays into the distant and recent past of our peoples, nor impressionistic observations (it would be appropriate to recall the breathtakingly sharp and even provocative book about America by Georgy Gachev[1] in which much space is devoted to Russia). Malkov's new book is a history of international relations in the 20th century seen as the crossing of the historical paths of two great nations which he considers to be unique types of civilization.

In a brief polemical introduction the author explains the principles underlying his work and pays tribute to a whole cohort of America scholars and international historians in this country while at the same time dissociating himself from those historians who take a simplistic and time-serving approach to the problems of the modern history.

Then follow nine essays each of which is an independent and complete work, but is linked to the other essays by the general idea and constant reminiscences and reminders of what has been already said and directing the searchlight into the future, all of which lends the book certain coherence.

The first essay is to a large extent historical-theoretical or rather historical-culturological. In it Malkov departs from the positivist savoring of an event, an attitude that has always been typical of Russian historiography and has indeed

strengthened its positions in the last decades in spite of the attrition it suffered in the early 20th century on the part of Marxist and Neo-Kantian vision of the historical process. The ideas of the Slavophiles, Westernizers, Liberals, Conservatives, *Pochvenniki* (literally Native Soil advocates) and Nihilists—all this is within the historian's purview as he engages them in a covert and sometimes overt polemic. For all that his main concern is invariably the problem of how Americans and Russians view each other, the assessment of one's own and the other's historical path and the national character traits. The author displays prodigious erudition ranging freely over diverse figures in Russian social and political thought from Radishchev to Danilevsky, Pushkin and Katkov, Leontyev and Milyukov. The author shows the highest degree of attention and sympathy for Nikolay Berdyayev whose complicated and contradictory worldview invariably revolved around the problem of the "Russian idea." True, the author refuses to go along with the philosopher who, finding himself exiled in emigration, justified the Communist dictatorship as the only force that defended Russia while branding the statism of both tsarist and Soviet times which he saw as the main cause for the failure of the messianic idea of the Third Rome. The author's particular attention to Berdyayev nevertheless is a bit of a psychological riddle: V. Malkov, a consistent and inquisitive historian, has long had a special predilection for the study of the problems of state politics and the impact of science on society and power whereas Berdyayev categorically rejects both: "science, like the state, is archaic as the Old Testament and is devoid of creativity." The predominantly critical perception of American life by the majority of Russian thinkers from the conservative Konstantin Leontyev to the *Narodnik* (Populist) Vladimir Korolenko and the Marxist Georgy Plekhanov, suggests that the dialogue between Russia and the USA cannot be simple. On the whole the author succeeds in presenting a panorama of Russian social and political thought. The American intellectual milieu is depicted in a less differentiated way, its diversity receiving only a cursory mention; the author concentrates attention on the thoughts of George Kennan, an attentive observer of Russian life, an admirer of Lev Tolstoy and a relentless critic of Tsarim.

Speaking about Tsarism. Malkov in this chapter paints a convincing picture of the social and political crisis that increasingly marked the reign of Nicholas II, but in my opinion he focuses too much on the personality of the Tsar (which puts Malkov in the same company with Woodrow Wilson who had a low opinion of the Russian monarch's ability to be a statesman). And yet Nicholas II had not created the situation but was rather a hostage to the dramatic developments in which his wishes and his will did not count for much. It is not his fault or his achievement that the final hour of Russian absolutism already struck on history's clock (it is not by chance that the same fate was in store for the monarchies in Germany and Austro-Hungary, typologically close to the Russian Empire). The accelerating economic modernization which was gaining momentum demanded the creation of a new political system incompatible not only with autocracy, but with its symbols, including the figure and personality of the Tsar. Having said that, one can glean all this from the author's text and my remark has to do merely with differences of nuance.

American politicians had a hand in weakening the Tsarist regime and helped the antimonarchy movement. Their arsenal of influencing the situation in the world, as Malkov shows, was very extensive even then and American diplomacy displayed consummate skill in using it. In addition to traditional diplomacy it used indirect methods where state and private interests are often difficult to tell apart. The author merely hints at the circumstance, but the message is very clear when it comes to the readiness of US political and business circles to help both Russian republicans in their struggle against the monarchy and the national groups that sought to destroy the empire. We are looking at the "possibility of mobilizing the financial and other resources of America to maintain direct and 'informal' contacts with nonconformist trends and groups in Russia which had typically an ethnic character" (p. 106). American politicians had perfected these methods using them throughout the 20th century (the technology has recently been explained in an impressive way in the books by American political journalist John M. Perkins about "economic assassinations" practiced by the American political and business elite all over the world). One cannot help thinking of the "velvet" and "orange" revolutions in Eastern Europe and Asia in the late 20th—early 21st centuries so vigorously supported by the United States.

The overthrow of Nicholas II, however, did not produce the results the American political circles had hoped for: neither the Constitutional Democrats (on whom they put the main stake) nor the moderate socialist parties could inspire the war-weary nation to perform its allied obligations. The allies were unhappy about the establishment of Soviet power, but the US displayed more diplomatic flexibility than the European leaders. Wilson's diplomacy chose not to "put all the eggs in one basket" and before openly siding with the anti-Bolshevik forces, tried to woo the Soviets. The American moves on the chessboard of international relations in those critical years are well depicted in the book's second chapter. The most interesting pages are devoted to the delicate relations between the American authorities and Admiral Kolchak. The author shows that the White movement could not count on unreserved support on the part of the US whose establishment and part of the intellectual elite saw Kolchak above all not as a fighter against "Red tyranny," but as a man who sought to restore the authoritarian rule in Russia, someone who had no use for Western liberal values. Breckinridge Long, Third Assistant Secretary of State, gave somewhat different reasons for questioning the rationale of helping Kolchak. During a conversation with Ambassador Boris Bakhmetyev, who represented Kolchak's interests, he noted that ordinary peasants would have nothing to do with the cruel military authorities. Behind it one could discern the American reluctance to become embroiled in a "shooting" war on the side of a conservative-minded admiral who had no popular support. The ideological approach to the "Russian question," as Malkov demonstrates, did not prevent Wilson and his entourage from pragmatically looking for support to secure American interests among various separatists who were prepared to dismember Siberia, following which it could fall under American control.

Some of the more interesting pages are devoted to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal (Chapter 3), of which the author of the book is recognized as a connoisseur

in the Russian community of historians. Analyzing the perception of the Soviet experience in America in the 1930s Viktor Malkov shows how actively the "Soviet" theme was used by the critics of Roosevelt's social and economic policies. The attacks on the New Deal, above all, by the conservative Republicans, was backed by a massive propaganda campaign designed to convince the Americans that Roosevelt's experiments, allegedly inspired by the practice of the Soviets, would destroy the economy and society. That factor of internal political life in the USA, though not to be exaggerated, did influence Roosevelt and his supporters who took a very guarded view of the idea of strengthening and developing relations with a state that, as many thought, embodied an authoritarian Soviet model, which was unacceptable to Americans either as a whole or in part. The author does not dwell on the activities of the friends of the USSR, left-wing and Communist leaders and organizations because much has been written about it by our historians. However, it would be interesting to assess the impact on American society of such impartial experts on Soviet problems as William Chamberlain, N. Thomas and others who are merely mentioned in the book.

Of the three paragraphs of Chapter 4 titled "The *Rendezvous* of Two Diplomacies: the Great Depression and the Prewar Crisis of the 1930s" which spans the history of the 1930s, the third paragraph, "The Return of Bainbridge Colby" is particularly interesting. It shows in microcosm the main features of the approach of one of our leading scholars in American studies, his ability to connect what seem to be disparate chunks of history. Colby himself is by no means an outstanding figure. He held the post of Secretary of State for less than a year and his name is usually ignored in dictionaries and encyclopedias. Nevertheless he turned out to be a significant figure in the history of Russian-American and Soviet-American relations. His name crops up on the pages of the book which were devoted to the elaboration of American policies with regard to Russia during the Civil War. Colby was one of those US diplomats who thought it was possible to pursue the course for weakening the positions of the Soviet government in the Eastern part of Russia, not stopping short of dismembering it and establishing a *de facto* US protectorate there. At the same time he proposed to leave the European part of the former Russian empire intact in a consolidated form as a counterweight to the most powerful state on the European continent, i.e., Germany, which was down on its knees, weakened, but had the potential to rebound. Germany then or in the future could dominate the Western parts of the former Russia should they decide to secede from it. In August 1920 he circulated a note to American ambassadors explaining why his government had refused to recognize the Baltic states (p. 147). True, nearly three years later another American administration recognized these states whereas Soviet Russia had not expected the US to do it until 1933. It would seem that the episode involving Colby's note is consigned to oblivion, but it is a remarkable feature of American diplomacy that it never renounces anything for good, as the author shows convincingly. As the international situation deteriorated in the late 1930s, Colby's legacy, albeit in a somewhat different format, came in useful. Rightly seeing Germany as the biggest threat to the US interests in Europe, the American diplomatic circles dis-

played impressive flexibility in assessing events around the limitrophe states between Germany and the USSR. Analyzing the extremely complicated intrigue connected with the changing vision by the State Department of the diplomatic and military strategic problems in Eastern and Central Europe, Viktor Malkov does some impressive digging of sources (in the first place the reports by America's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Latvia and Estonia John Cooper Wiley) to show how and why American policy in the region evolved in accordance with the national interests of the USA. Roosevelt accepted Wiley's clarifications and at the height of the Second World War was reassuring Stalin about the American position on the issue of reintegration of the Baltics into the USSR. Getting ahead of this review, let it be said that Colby's note again lost its relevance with the start of the Cold War and the issue of the status of the Baltic Republics was raised persistently by the American government. American diplomacy's thrifty attitude to its own accumulated experience has manifested itself of late more than once. Suffice it to recall the various occasions on which the American leadership invoked the Monroe Doctrine. Another example was recently presented convincingly by Fyodor Voitolovsky[2] in his book *The Unity and Disunity of the West* on the fate of "trilateralism," one of the pet ideas of the "Kissinger era" in the American foreign policy which was not consigned for good to the archives when the US embarked on the course of creating a unipolar world, and is resurrected each time the need for it arises.

The book's Chapter 5 is devoted to the problem of the start of the Cold War. The prerequisites for the Cold War had long been in place even before politicians and scholars invented the term. It stemmed not only from the fact of the coexistence of two mutually hostile social systems and ideologies, but also from the phobias that go back much earlier in time. This chapter highlights the author's commitment to the sociocultural view of the problem as witnessed by the key phrase: "Europeanization of Russia in the 19th—early 20th centuries did not remove fears and mistrust of its intentions in Europe among the members of the aristocracy or among the advocates of the proletarian revolution" (p. 250). The author goes on to show how new prejudices were superimposed on the prejudices and stereotypes of the representations of each other (Russian consciousness has also been long permeated with mistrust of the West).

Viktor Malkov was more than justified in not dealing with the problems connected with the Second World War in any detail. These matters have come in for thorough study in numerous works by Russian historians, including Malkov himself. Even so, his new book contains pages devoted to wartime diplomacy. One should note in particular Chapter 6 which sums up the essence of the negotiations between the Allies on the postwar disposition in the world. However, the picture created through historical-anthropological vision would have benefited from a more detailed discussion of that period, and not only because it was the time of the most intensive contacts between the diplomats of the two countries, but also because never before and never after the tragic and heroic years of the common cruel war against Nazism have Soviet-American relations been so warm-hearted. They were based not so much on the calculations of politicians and diplomats as

on the emotional impulses of a vast number of people who were remote from politics but were close to each other in their wish to stand side by side at a time of severe trials.

The second half of the book deals with the postwar history of international relations. Obviously, that marks a departure from the chronological structure of the study because the author looks at the problem from various angles bringing across the message that Soviet-American relations, and now Russian-American relations, are a complicated result of the interaction of various factors.

Chapter 8 describes the main events that undermined the atmosphere of cooperation between the recent allies. The atomic bomb obscured the vision of the present and future world in the minds of politicians in all countries, especially those of the USA and the USSR. The chapter provides a diversified and profound description of the sociopsychological context of the Soviet and American diplomatic activities. Still, it does seem to me that additional touches could be added to give a deeper insight into the psychological situation of the time. Both the USSR and the USA emerged from the war as victors. In the popular consciousness in each of these countries it was their armies that had dealt the final crushing blow at the enemy. The collapse of Germany and the use of the atomic bomb to punish Japan generated among the American establishment and ordinary Americans what Senator Fulbright described as "the arrogance of power." But a similar syndrome was characteristic of the mentality of the Soviet people and their leaders. Moreover, the state in which our countries emerged from the war went a long way to determine their assessment of each other and of themselves.

The two countries were in strikingly different condition at the end of the war: half of the European part of the USSR had been devastated whereas not a single bomb had fallen on the US territory. The war casualties and especially the civilian casualties cannot be compared (in the USA the population had even increased from 130.8 million in 1939 to 141.4 million in 1946). Of course the Americans were not entirely spared the hardship of the war years: after the second half of the 1930s, when inflation was very low and even negative, that indicator increased to 10.9% in 1942, but the Soviet Union had to introduce a rationing system for a long period, a system that guaranteed mere survival of the mass of the people. The Americans saw these differences as giving them an edge in the international disputes that were hotting up. Paradoxically, in the USSR the fact that victory had been won at such a price was seen as proof of strength and readiness to make even greater sacrifices and to meet any challenges.

The final ninth chapter provides a perceptive analysis of the evolution of the consciousness of an outstanding American foreign policy specialist George Frost Kennan (a distant relative of the Kennan mentioned above) for whom the author has an abiding interest. Studying the thoughts and actions of that diplomat Viktor Malkov identified and explained the most intricate trends in the development of international relations and, more broadly, the direction of the movement of history itself.

Kennan, who covered the path from total rejection of the world that prerevolutionary and Soviet Russia represented to a balanced "political realism" to

some extent shaped the author's conclusions, as Malkov himself admits. In the concluding chapter Malkov sums up the interim results of more than a century of Russian-American relations which saw both periods of profound antagonism and periods of joint actions against common threats. Russia experienced three colossal upheavals during the course of the 20th century. On one occasion America had to lend a hand to our country and thus strengthened the regime whose very existence it saw as a threat to itself, but at the same time it secured its own prosperity. Twice the USA exerted a certain influence on the course of Russian history. Early in the century, in the revolutionary years, the US helped the forces that were out to smash "the old order," but could not foresee all the consequences of that act. At the end of that century American policy made the most of the profound crisis of the Soviet state contributing to the loss of Russia's strong international positions and weakening its economy and defenses. Russia had no historical opportunities to exert a direct impact on American history: the USA has never experienced the kind of historical upheavals that our country experienced. Soviet-American confrontation has become history. Russian-American relations are evolving and probably will require another "reset."

Viktor Malkov has described how the relations between two civilizations with different genetic codes were shaping up, identified the limits of their compatibility or mutual rejection, revealed the role of traditions in culture and politics and very potently demonstrated the impact these traditions have exerted on Russia and the USA and the surrounding world. One of the main conclusions of the book is the awareness of the need to overcome the "distortions or difficulties in the recreation of respectively the Russian and American 'other' in the system of ideas of the world and themselves in this world, and in the perception of various international actions of both countries" (p. 473). V. Malkov's book makes a tangible contribution to solving this task. Replete with facts, and still more with ideas, even if it does not answer all the questions it asks, the book certainly awakens the reader's consciousness making him look for his own solutions to the tricky questions of history and the modern times.

NOTES

1 G. Gachev, *National Images of the World. America,* Moscow, 1997 (in Russian).

2 F. Voytolovsky, *Unity and Disunity of the West: Ideological Reflection in the Consciousness of the US and Western European Elites of the Transformations of the Political World Order. 1940s—2000s,* Moscow, 2007 (in Russian).

N. Kalmykov
Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

В. КЕЛДЫШ. О «Серебряном веке» русской литературы: Общие закономерности. Проблемы прозы, М., ИМЛИ РАН, 2010, 512 с.

V. KELDYSH. *On the "Silver Age" of Russian Literature: General Features*. Prose, Moscow, The RAS Institute of World Literature (IMLI RAN), 2010, 512 pp.

The summary of the book notes the common semantic features and the conceptual integrity of the parts of the works that came out in different years and have been included in this book. The author, who has never written "for the moment," did not even have to rewrite the articles written a long time ago, he only made some abridgements and additions, mainly connected with the latest publications on the same topics (most notably recent monographs on neorealism).

Vsevolod Keldysh is no lover of extremes and he invariably takes into account all the essential nuances of the object of study. The idea that runs through most of the book is that the opinion of the Silver Age as the time dominated by poetry is one-sided. It is now universally recognized that the era is ushered in Anton Chekhov and the later Leo Tolstoy, both of whom, until 1972 (when the RAS Institute of World Literature brought out a three-volume *Russian Literature in the Late 19th—Early 20th Centuries,* (1968-1972) were regarded as belonging entirely to the 19th century literary process. The introduction clarifies the literary systems that were interacting at the time: in poetry "modernism held sway," with only Ivan Bunin singled out among the realist poets—"whereas in prose the rivalry was largely between equals" (p. 6). One might speak about an approximate *balance* between prose and poetry at the turn of the century: in poetry modernism prevailed not in quantitative terms,[1] but in terms of quality, while in prose only Andrey Bely's *Petersburg* perhaps holds its own against the works of Tolstoy, Chekhov and Bunin, although Vsevolod Keldysh gives due to the considerable merits of modernist and "semimodernist" prose.

One of the extremes of our literary studies is that the history of literature is concerned mainly with trends and personalities. The other extreme is a negation

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of any "-isms" in favor of purely empirical study of texts. Vsevolod Keldysh does not deny that major writers do not fit into the frameworks of currents, schools and groups, but neither does he ignore the theory of literature: "There are few writers who are totally unconnected with literary schools and trends of their time. As for the schools and trends, the processes within them are indeed complex. Let us not forget that it is primarily the "first-rate" writers who are heralds of the new trends, authors of their platforms, declarations and programmatic statements" (p. 11). The author shifts the emphasis from the juxtaposition of trends and schools to their interaction. To him the epoch of modernism was remarkable due to the "*direct* impact of lyricism on traditionally more objectivized structures." Another notable thesis is that interest in Romanticism was revived in literature in a renewed quality: "...The new art—in narrative genres above all and especially on the Russian soil—acquired the Romantic legacy through realism" (p. 161). The final chapter devoted to the legacy of the author's predecessor, Yevgeny Tager, rejects the prejudices with regard to naturalism. Initially Vsevolod Keldysh even writes that "Tager is among the scholars who had been restoring the truth. "He believed naturalism to be a variety of realism, only one focusing not on a "colorful individual, but on a human community, <...> on the 'milieu' and not on 'personality.'" But almost in the same breath that "truth" is moderated and Tager's definition is recognized as being too broad: "In our opinion naturalism is a more self-centered (and more vulnerable) commonness of principles. But for all the controversial things, one has to agree that at its best that movement was a sign of the life of literature and not its waning" (p. 502). Vsevolod Keldysh's basically "conciliatory" position is most apparent in the chapter which, predictably, opens the book and is entitled "the Silver Age literature as a complex entity." It describes the mutual attraction and repulsion of the literary trends of the time. It moderates the previously powerful impact of positivism with its uncompromising determinism and recognizes a greater role of the individual. "The reception of Friedrich Nietzsche is undoubtedly a common feature of the Russian literary process at the turn of the century. It helped the acceptance of one of his key ideas, namely, the assertion of the value of the personality in its own right, in its varying and often opposite interpretations". It was not straightforward borrowing. "A humanized 'Russian Nietzsche' was imbued with the spirit of Russian *sobornost*. On the other hand, the sources of individualism in his philosophy were also sought in Russian thought" (p. 37). Thus, Vladimir Solovyov traced them to Lermontov. Tolstoy, who did not recognize that he was influenced by anyone, in the 1900s also exhibited a keen interest in the "fate of an individual (*Hadji-Murat, After the Ball, What For?*). The way it is portrayed—the 'dropping out' of the personality from the surrounding social world—confirms that Tolstoy was no stranger to the new literary trends" (p. 41). Only, one should have distinguished the social *order* and life in the midst of people and for the sake of people. Lev Tolstoy, the author of *Father Sergius,* does not of course renounce the ideal of "secular" life.

The publishing activities changed. In the early years of the 20th century there is a proliferation of literary almanacs and collections that have no political

or science-fiction sections. They came to "rival as equals the literary, scientific and political 'thick' journal" (p. 50). The boundaries between literary types (especially in modernism) and genres were becoming blurred. As regards artistic form, subjectivity and at the same time generalization and expressiveness were increasing. "The accent was being shifted from 'portrayal' to 'expressiveness'. Characteristically, along with the 'new art' there was 'traditional' art" (p. 58), writes Vsevolod Keldysh. The author attributes that to the impact of modernist poetry on the literary process.

It should be stressed that it was the Silver Age and the 1920s that witnessed an upsurge of the sensual perception not only of what is visible, but also of what can be touched and smelled, including in spheres that used to be taboo in classical literature (in the realm of extreme cruelty, raw eroticism and general antiaestheticism). The opposite "trend connected with 'objectivization' of the expressive word with the element of *portrayal* originated from realist prose and its traditions" (p. 65). In the chapter "Yevgeny Zamyatin" the author of the book quotes these words of the writer: "Neorealists do not narrate, but show, so their works would more appropriately be described not as stories but as demonstrations,"[2] and concludes: "Everything is in the image and through the image, the inward features only through observable features—this is the inherent quality of Zamyatin's style" (p. 309). However, innovation is not necessarily a prerogative of modernism or its symbiosis with realism. Thus "Vyacheslav Ivanov, the Grand Old Man of Symbolism, was probably the most diligent custodian of behests," while the realist Chekhov, the heir and successor to 19th century classics, "in his quest of novelty constantly turned his attention to what had exhausted itself in this literature" (p. 63). In general, the Silver Age, for all its innovative character, does not by any means "drop out" of the process of national literary development, "on the contrary: in terms of the vastness and diverse character of the links of continuity that period is unique in the history of our literature. Characteristically, one of its distinctive features is the acceptance of the expressive idioms of various epochs and widespread stylization" (p. 63).

Three chapters are devoted to Lev Tolstoy. In the early 1900s he "is ashamed not only of bad art that worships beauty, but of any "artistry." At that period Tolstoy writes his main fiction works 'secretly', not publishing them; instead he publishes a lot of moralistic articles" (p. 81-82). Even in his fiction works there is a growing social and political engagement as the author's position is clearly revealed. The type of hero, the genre and composition structures and style change. "In *The Living Corpse* the main message is close to that of *Resurrection* as a personal drama is elevated to the social level. <...> It is significant that in the play's family conflict Protasov's antagonists are generally worthy people. Still more significant is the fact that this circumstance is ultimately unimportant because while being decent and honest in their personal lives they are tarnished by the very fact that they are in a 'bad' social milieu" (p. 87).

In *Resurrection* descriptive and characteristic portrayal is at least as important as the situational elements underlying the plot, which underplays the distinction between the main and episodic elements, although in principle action in

Tolstoy's later prose predominates to the detriment of "intensive portrayal of inner life" while at the same time modifying it, "bringing it closer to 'external' action" (p. 89). Vsevolod Keldysh finds it in *The Forged Coupon* where emotions are deep but fleeting and tend to translate themselves into deeds and acts. The lack of psychological motivation is not an oversight, it is deliberate. "The metamorphoses of the soul recreated in the story are far less connected with the previous history of the characters, are far more unexpected for the characters themselves and for the reader: they come out of the blue" (p. 99). Now catastrophes and great turning points are invariable accompaniments of spiritual enlightenment in Tolstoy's work. The moral transformation of his characters sets them apart both from society's elite and from the revolutionaries: Tolstoy sees violence in both, but usually stops short of putting them on the same footing (the author had no doubt that the motives of the revolutionaries were initially noble).

Unlike some modern Gogol scholars who see no difference between the ideas of *The Dead Souls* and the religious preachings of the later Gogol, Vsevolod Keldysh does not equate different hypostases of Tolstoy. "The preacher in Tolstoy of course is not identical to the artist in him. In his philosophical treatises and public journalism the utopian aspects of his teaching were typically proclaimed with much greater intolerance" (p. 93). Some of his essays are almost indistinguishable from diaries. He does it in order to "renounce artistic imagination and assert a special authenticity of the fact being described. <...> The form of 'hybrid' artistic-publicistic essay is particularly eloquent. But there are signs of similar trends in the writer's fiction of the time" (pp. 104-105). He was not ashamed of his last works, "like he was ashamed of *Hadji-Murat,* and printed many of them" (p. 108).

The idea that runs through the separate chapter devoted to Tolstoy's later story about the Caucasus is that the epic quality of Tolstoy's prose is still there, but it takes a different form. Tolstoy and Chekhov both followed the path of maximum concentration of figurative thought. In *Hadji-Murat* one notes in particular Tolstoy's growing interest in the events and actions in a human life. He thinks above all in categories accepted in the socium. While he is still attentive to the individual, individuality is always placed in the social milieu. Nevertheless previously Tolstoy did not have a protagonist with such a significant function, including a function of composition. The writer, like all Silver Age literature, is vastly more interested in the factor of the personality; this factor is not yet projected on the development of mass consciousness, but neither does it oppose it. The same applies to the author's own personality. In the classical 19th-century prose one finds an "equilibrium" of thought and material, a broad thought is embodied in vast material. A tilt in favor of thought is one of the consequences of "the processes of artistic concentration that took place in Russian literature at the turn of the 19th—20th centuries" (p. 121).

Moving consistently from the general to the particular, Vsevolod Keldysh, in a short chapter on Tolstoy and Fyodor Sologub, compares two positions in the description of the catastrophe on Khodynskoye Pole—one of a humanist realist classic and teacher ("having saved two people, Yemelyan finally brightens in his

thoughts," p. 145), and the rather unfeeling attitude to the human mass, as described by one of the early Russian decadent writers. However, the next chapter is titled "On the Prose of Fyodor Sologub in the Light of the Russian Classical Tradition." In it the author of the present book recognizes that the "duality of narrative in *The Petty Demon* is due largely to the signs of the historical-determinist concept <...> peculiar to realism. <...> As a result the concrete living aspect of the narrative sometimes acquires an inherent value in itself, a certain independence from the author's intent, or rather, semidependence" (p. 150-151). This is a conclusion characteristic of Vsevolod Keldysh as the author of a monograph on the realism of the turn of the century[3] and as a scholar who avoids extremes and final judgments as a matter of principle.

Maxim Gorky is a kind of "intermediate" figure in the book. The chapter devoted to Tolstoy's *Hadji-Murat* reads in part: "His works in the 1890s—early 1900s reveal inchoate and erratic thought which is exploring various paths and approaches to the issues of life that engaged his mind" (p. 126). This was not of course how Soviet literary scholars interpreted the work of the "stormy petrel of the revolution." The chapter on Sologub cites Franz Kafka, who was struck not by tendentiousness but, on the contrary, the objectivity of Gorky's manner: "It is amazing, he said, how Gorky reproduces the traits of human character without passing the slightest judgment."[4]

The chapter "On Value Benchmarks in the Work of Maxim Gorky" identifies the key juxtaposition that distinguished his work: "It's normative and anormative character. Thus the "normative" Gorky took up arms against Dostoyevsky but "his gut" accepted him in its own way and followed him in many ways. "Gorky's supreme value was for a long time thought to be the so-called 'positive hero.' and yet his main artistic accomplishment was the image of a person with a 'patchy' soul" (p. 168). In the preface to Tager's *Selected Works on Literature* (1988) the compiler admitted the flaw of Gorky studies: "While stressing the typologically common elements of his legacy we are less concerned with revealing intimately personal, 'inalienable' features of his talent. <...> In Tager's best interpretations Gorky is genuinely interesting, because he is original and sometimes unpredictable" (p. 497). Like Chekhov, he "ever and again seeks to directly portray historical events and persons, demonstrating more readily the underlying impact of history on the private life of 'nonhistorical' people. He observes the root processes of life in a person that is often far removed from the social 'norm,' an outcast, 'an oddball,' with a whimsical and unpredictable psyche" (p. 498). One would have liked to see a reference here not only to Tager, but to Aleksandr Voronsky, who wrote in his article on Gorky (1926) about the exceptional role of the images of mischievous oddball characters in his work.[5]

A major chapter is devoted to neorealism, although the author notes that none of its representatives, except Bunin, had achieved the pinnacles of modernism. The general works on neorealism, including the monographs by T. Davydova and U. Abisheva, ignore Bunin's work as a whole and the pioneering artistic innovations of Chekhov, the seminal precursor of that phenomenon. The prerequisites are discernible as early as the 1890s. In the literature of the late 1890s and early

1900s the opposition of the personality to the environment (Tolstoy, Gorky) is particularly noticeable and during the "First Revolution the main subject of activity is the collective action on the historical stage which has pushed aside the lone protester"—an image of the reigning "mass" (p. 172) Aleksandr Blok wrote about (in his article "On Realists"). For all that, many members of the Znaniye Publishing House resolutely departed from determinism, lost their trust in history and turned to the day-to-day natural human manifestations. As a result, the new realism did not cancel out history, but neither did it put itself at its mercy, it renounced the extremes of both the euphoric and negative attitude to history. "A sense of the drama of the surrounding reality is abiding and constant, but <..> it is brightened by neorealism's persistent idea that the inherent elements of existence are not amenable to empirical circumstances <...> Goodness at the level of everyday life opposes social evil" (p. 191). The 1905 revolution shifted the focus of ideological struggle to other social spheres and released literature and art from its constant tutelage. Neorealists "more often than not are engaged in the course of ordinary life and discover—and this undoubtedly reveals the Chekhov tradition—the spiritual richness of an ordinary human being" (p. 190). Short stories expanded their reach in terms of genre to encompass synthetic and unusually vast content; everybody was speaking about new forms. The epic element is preserved, the writers even reflect on the destinies of the world, but they do so in a more concentrated generalized form. In the 1890s artistic objectivism did not escape the impact of naturalism; at the same time a more expressive style appeared, especially in Gorky's works, which even set the trend during the revolution. The physical descriptive element of neorealism also develops. "*The use of 'portrayal' and 'expressiveness' becomes <...> a kind of stylistic analogue to the 'being and everyday life' synthesis in the new realism" (p. 197),* Vladislav Keldysh concludes before embarking on the specific personal variants of such synthesis.

Ivan Bunin is the first great realist "with whom the category of Beauty becomes essentially the key concept of creative work that trumps ethics although *it is not seen as its opposite.* That is why his aestheticism is not an affectation." (p. 208).

Fyodor Stepun noted very penetratingly that Bunin links "the existential and substantial with the physical, visible, audible and corporeal" (p. 209); similarly, with Ivan Shmelyov, the images of life or nature are often enlarged to encompass content that draws "both on the substantial foundations of popular life and eternal 'natural' foundations of being." This is an example of "seeing Being through the prism of everyday and private life" (p. 262). After publishing his harrowing story *The Village* Bunin, to forestall charges of a negative attitude to the people, wrote the story *Zakhar Vorobyov* in 1912 (one should recall, however, that though his hero thinks of himself as the last Russian *bogatyr* (hero) he drinks himself to death). Vsevolod Keldysh believes that not only *Zakhar Vorobyov,* but also the stories *Sickly Grass, The Spring Evening* and others blame the concatenation of circumstances. The theme of a "miserable" (rather than "culpable" people) becomes more prominent in Bunin's works than even before (p. 227).

Early Sergey Sergeyev-Tsensky is wedded to the thought of the omnipotent fate and man's fatal solitude. While replete with "material" impressions his works are marked by an abstract expressiveness, with the visible world perceived as a mirage. The author is still on a journey of self-discovery. "The idea that confers integrity on the work of art is in conflict with the spontaneous assertion of life that is discernible in certain stylistic features. Its quirks, extremes and sharp angles bespeak a kind of revolt of form and simultaneously presage further artistic quests" (p. 267). The subchapter "Other Paths" focuses on Boris Zaytsev and Osip Dymov because "both writers belong to the 'intermediate' literary type, which accounts for a strangely abstract character of their artistic vision and prevents them from being members of the neorealist trend" (p. 278).

A separate chapter is devoted to Yevgeny Zamyatin, including his fiction and critical writings. Zamyatin transcends the limits of neorealism and indeed of the Silver Age. The chapter comprises two introductory articles to the collections of his works and stands apart from the rest of the book because it is less academic.

Some tend to refer Zamyatin's work entirely to modernism, but although he shared some modernist features, he remained a neorealist. With him, the private and the social is elevated to the level of the national. Even his topical journalism gravitates towards sweeping generalizations. In an article titled "I Am Afraid" (1920) "the idea of the universal servility of much of the literature of the time was an exaggeration. But his vision of an emerging trend was truly prophetic" (p. 307). Even so, while Zamyatin had many disagreements with the new reality "there is no trace of counterrevolutionary sentiments" in Zamyatin's articles (p. 308). Even in the 1930s, having emigrated from Russia, he wrote copiously about Soviet writers Aleksey Tolstoy, Mikhail Prishvin, Mikhail Sholokhov, Nikolay Ostrovsky, Aleksey Novikov-Priboy, etc. The writer's own work since the late 1920s evolved from complexity to simplicity (just like the entire literature in the USSR).

The interest Vsevolod Keldysh exhibits in "intermediate" literary phenomena is most clearly manifested in a special chapter that appears to be of a general character, in the chapters on Leonid Andreyev at the turn of the 1890s—1900s and on Aleksey Remizov. However, even the first of these articles is devoted almost entirely to Andreyev. The author draws parallels between his drama and the theater of Bertholt Brecht, August Strindberg and Luigi Pirandello. In the play *Towards the Stars* he notes a timid attempt to reconcile the substantial and the historical. Later the writer separates them again. "The problem of history being the slave of metaphysical evil (despite the heroic impulses of some individuals) becomes predominant" (p. 358). However, beginning from 1913 (the play *Thought)* "there takes place a kind of 'justification' of being as such *in its ultimate substance* <...>. The pessimistic universality of *A Man's Life, Tsar-Famine* and *Yeleazar* is left behind. But also left behind is the writer's trust (during the years of the first revolution) in historical reason" (p. 358) which was manifested in his novel *Sashka Zhegulev* (1911). Towards the end of his life—in the play *Dog's Waltz,* the novel *The Diary of Satan*, a kind of "fantastic realism" phenomenon, Andreyev again reappraised the values he had

acquired not long before. In the play *Requiem* and his last novel (which provides "an impressive picture of the contemporary bourgeois world and a feeling of deep crisis") "one finds again a growing metaphysical pessimism. Human nature is not 'divine'" (like in the play *He Who Gets Slapped in the Face*) but spiritually bereft" (p. 363). The chapter on the early Andreyev makes the point that while for Friedrich Nietzsche the development of the egocentric element is only attainable by the chosen few of his time, with Andreyev (the story of Sergey Petrovich) the contemporary ordinary person is aware of the significance of his individuality. The author refuses to give a totally negative or positive assessment of the hero of the novella *The Life of Vasily Fiveysky.* The priest is engaged in a "process" with those whom he serves. "Even at the moment of fanatical and ecstatic faith he essentially accepts God only on condition that God recognizes the inherent value of his personality" (p. 395).

Remizov, according to Vsevolod Keldysh, came closest to modernism. "In Remizov's world there is a blend of profound sympathy for the 'miserable and the downtrodden' with fear of the revolutionary movement; the 'pagan' life-loving folklore motive (the collection *Posolon*, 1907, etc.) with the religious Christian idea; the morbid and mournful, though authentic, idea of the negative aspects of Russian social reality, a penetrating perception of the crisis of its foundations goes hand in hand with the searingly decadent negation of being; surrealistic 'overcoming' of reality with artistic material anchored in day-to-day life and realistic manner of writing" (p. 401). Even holy souls are impotent in Remizov's prose. Both they and ruthless types "are much more 'typical' and ordinary than with Dostoyevsky, but their very ordinariness is interpreted mystically. That is why the 'Dostoyevskian' element in Remizov's work paradoxically combines two extremes: it is simultaneously more down-to-earth and more irrational" (pp. 407-408). The mundane in a phantasmagoric context turns out to be the most eloquent sign of the abnormality and irrationality of being.

The author of the present book also notes an important feature of Remizov's humor. With the classics, the humorous manner corresponds to the object, although it is not identified with the object, with Remizov that manner is in constant contrast with the content. This could be one more thing for theorists to reflect on.

The chapter "V. Rozanov and the Silver Age Literature" shows that with Rozanov the common opposition of the lofty and the mundane is less categorical because according to Vasily Rozanov the metaphysical meaning of human life is contained precisely in the day-to-day life which only seems mundane. The synthesis of the metaphysical and the real is seen as universal. This appealed to diverse literary trends. Growing interest in artistic portrayal of reality is characteristic of the evolution of symbolism. Acmeism, contrary to some claims, does not renounce the metaphysical substratum while attaching greater significance to the empirical view of life. The Russian futuristic avant-garde also asserted the world of things in its own way. "The gravitation from what one might call "being" to "everyday life" (in the broad sense, as the totality of the earthly forms of life while considering Being as the "highest instance") that increased towards

the end of the 1900s—early 1910s, modernism comes in contact with realism, above all the neorealist trend that took shape in those years <...>" (pp. 418-419).

The chapter "Dostoyevsky's Legacy and Russian Thought at the Turn of the Century" leads seamlessly into two other chapters that explore important "particularities" of the theme: "D. Merezhkovsky's Critique of F. Dostoyevsky" and "Vyacheslav Ivanov and F. Dostoyevsky." The author notes that during Dostoyevsky's lifetime critics discussed not the global and philosophical, but topical issues in his work. In the essays at the turn of the century the authors discover its metaphysical depth. Although Vladimir Solovyov or Dmitry Merezhkovsky drew their conclusions about Dostoyevsky in line with their own philosophy the content of these works was not reduced to ultimate speculative conclusions. What counted for Merezhkovsky was Dostoyevsky's insight not only into the inner man but in the human predicament generally. This is gnoseology that opens the gate to ontology. As interpreted by the founder of Russian symbolism, Dostoyevsky is characterized by universalism and personal engagement with the entire, even negative, spiritual life of the characters and the world in which they live, as well as catastrophic premonitions. Conventionality of an artistic experiment becomes with the great writer (whose aesthetics was "justified" in the Silver Age) a prerequisite for the discovery of the supreme reality. "This conclusion of Merezhkovsky's is shared by Nikolay Berdyayev, Akim Volynsky and Andrey Bely thus presaging the view of Dostoyevsky as the precursor of the *artistic* trends in the 20th century in which classical poetic traditions were combined with those of Modern Times, the poetics of shifts and deformations, the poetics of the experiment" (p. 478). V. Rozanov wrote about the antithetic character of Dostoyevsky's work, but he saw these not as zigzags of a morbid mind but, on the contrary, as evidence of the universal genius capable of embracing the life of the spirit, including its extremes.

The book also analyzes the views of Sergey Bulgakov and Lev Shestov. It stresses that Lev Shestov's idea of the "underground" Dostoyevsky is incompatible with Vyacheslav Ivanov's "luminous" Dostoyevsky. The age of revolt gravitated towards the "explosive" Dostoyevsky, and so did Vyacheslav Ivanov, but the author of the "tragedy novel" saw catharsis as the core of his concept, an Osanna that crowns the catastrophe, "not a rebellion but eventual rise above it, assertion of the immutability ("time seems to have stopped there") of creative forces of being, possession of the 'single synthetic idea of the world' <...>" (p. 484).

Vsevolod Keldysh does not side with any viewpoint concluding that to date "a synthetic vision of Dostoyevsky sought after, in the beginning of the century, has not yet taken shape either in this country or in literary studies abroad." The latter lack social and national-historical analysis of the writer's world, but express the hope that a new and integral vision of Dostoyevsky will emerge in his home country.

The concluding article of the book argues that one should not, as often happens, counterpose the theories of Silver Age writers, which are allegedly all bad, and their artistic work "in which only what does not resemble their theories is valuable <...>. They had a positive Inner core which future studies hopefully will

bring out" (p. 505). Vsevolod Keldysh in general is not inclined to "close" scholarly themes.

Attached to the book is a bibliography of the author's main works. One can see that a very thorough selection preceded the new edition of the work. The book has practically no serious oversights. However, the author for some reason does not pay due attention to the works of serious students of the Silver Age who work at the Moscow State University: Lidiya Kolobayeva, Nikolay Bogomolov and Oleg Lekmanov. True, the latter two are more into poetry than prose.

In general the publication of a book by such a major specialist as Keldysh is a very positive event.

NOTES

1 M. Gasparov, "Poetics of the Silver Age," *Russian Poetry of the Silver Age. 1890-1917. An Anthology,* Moscow, 1993, p. 7 (in Russian).

2 Ye. Zamyatin, "Contemporary Russian Literature. Opening Lecture," *Literaturnaya uchyoba,* 1988, No. 5, p. 135.

3 V. Keldysh, *Russian Realism of the Early 20th Century*, Moscow, 1975 (in Russian).

4 G. Janouch, *Gespräche mit Kafka,* Frankfurt am Main, 1968, p. 134.

5 A. Voronsky, *The Art of Seeing the World. Profiles, Articles,* Moscow, 1987, pp. 38-39, 45-46, (in Russian).

S. Kormilov
Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

Ежегодник по феноменологической философии, 2008 (т. 1), М., Российский государственный гуманитарный университет, 2008, 512 с.; 2009-2010 (т. 2), 2010, 434 с. (на англ. яз.)

Phenomenological Philosophy Yearbook, 2008 [vol. 1], Moscow, Russian State Humanitarian University, 2008, 512 pp.; 2009-2010 [vol. 2], 2010, p. 434 pp. (both in English).

In front of us are two hefty volumes devoted to phenomenological philosophy published in Moscow in English. The scale of areas covered, interpretations and the relevance of the themes and problems addressed—all this bespeaks a laudable intention of the current generation of philosophers to sort out "what things are really like" in phenomenology. It is an understandable and laudable task. The fact that the task is impossible to fulfill, however, does not detract from the value of scholarly inquiry or from the originality of this philosophical work because only impossible tasks are worth setting.

The publication of the *Yearbook* is called upon above all to restore the continuity of the phenomenological tradition in Russia. The on-again off-again nature of phenomenological studies first in the USSR and then in Russia more than once generated various publishing projects aimed at developing phenomenological studies, creating a common field for phenomenological discussions in line with Edmund Husserl's behest that phenomenology is a field of work and not a doctrine.

The Phenomenological Philosophy Yearbook aims, as Viktor Molchanov writes in the preface to the first volume, at intensifying phenomenological communication, supporting the phenomenological studies pursued by young scientists, expanding their scholarly contacts and ultimately creating a problem field "whose outlines have been indicated by various versions of phenomenology and in which discussions on the topical philosophical and historical-philosophical problems in a critical and analytical mode will be possible" (vol. I, p. 15). These are the goals shared by all the genres represented in the two volumes: translations (both of Husserl himself and of prominent foreign phenomenologists such as Klaus Held, Thomas Nenon, Tetsuya Sakakibara, Alessandro Salice, James

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Mensch, James Hart, Eugen Fink, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Hans-Georg Gadamer and others), original articles by Russian scholars, reviews of some interesting and significant foreign publications,[1] interviews with the "giants" of phenomenology, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Gunter Figal, as well as a "propedeutic" part that contains a full list of the main publications on phenomenology, and a historical part: reminiscences of the founder and director of the Husserl Archive at Leuven, Herman Leo van Breda, on how the archive was saved from the Nazis in 1938-1940.

The *Yearbook's* first volume thematically is focused on Martin Heidegger's recension of phenomenology; the second contains the materials of an international conference to mark the 150th anniversary of Edmund Husserl's birth. The conference was organized by the Phenomenological Philosophy Center of the Russian State Humanitarian University in 2009. The speakers concentrated on little-studied aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, above all the problems of ethics and religion in the overall context of phenomenology. Usually these topics are pushed to the margins of research not only in Russia but abroad as well, which gives us grounds for asserting that the second volume of the *Yearbook* fills a certain conceptual gap in phenomenological studies. At the end of the volume one finds translations of two of Husserl's lesser known texts ("Die Kopernikanische Wende der Kopernikanischen Wende. Die Ur-Arche Erde" (The Copernican Turn) and three Husserl's lectures on "Fichte's Ideal of Humanity" made by Viktor Molchanov. Both disconnect the practical dimension of phenomenology in which explanation takes the back seat and phenomenology becomes a guide to action. This practical motive of Husserl's phenomenology is taken up and elaborated by many contributors to the second volume.

Many articles in the *Yearbook* are devoted to the genesis of phenomenology and its various versions. These include the works by Roman Gromov, who resurrects the "shadowy" figure of the phenomenological movement, Carl Stumpf, and explores the substantive links between Stumpf and Husserl (vol. 1). The article argues that Stumpf's psychology was an important prerequisite for Husserl's position at the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* stage. The author believes that Stumpf's concept of phenomenology is original and independent of Husserl, developing as it does the idea of descriptive psychological study put forward by Franz Brentano. In the second volume Roman Gromov continues to explore the sources of phenomenology dwelling on the popular association of Husserl's doctrine with scholasticism. The author turns above all to the figure of Wilhelm Wundt, who played the key role in spreading the abovementioned view, and his thesis on phenomenology as a form of scholastic thinking. Analyzing *The Logical Investigation,* Gromov insists on interpreting Husserl in the framework of his own concerns with the set of problems around the "morphology of consciousness" turning to the historical polemic and the historical background as a means of identifying the sources of phenomenology. The skillfully played out "duel" between Wundt and Husserl lends a certain polemical edge to the study which prevents the reader's attention from flagging and motivates him to weave his way through the multitude of names and opinions following the author.

Ilija Inishev turns to the practical motive of phenomenology by looking at the figure of Martin Heidegger. Tracing the genesis of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, Inishev focuses on the concept of philosophy in each period of the genesis whose common conceptual denominator is the "*leap" motive* which, the author believes, combines the universal-theoretical and individual-practical aspects of Heidegger's philosophical thought. The author believes that Heidegger's definition of philosophy derived from the historical and existential perspective is the result of Heidegger's concept of philosophy as a whole: "Philosophy is a juncture in the most essential: the disposal of its truth that is subordinate to Being" (vol. 1, p. 76). The final chord of the article has an upbeat tone: "Phenomenology becomes experience and an adventure fraught with risks of various magnitudes" (Ibid., p. 77).

In spite of the fact that much has been said and written about Heidegger has it been possible, at the end of the day, to really trace the philosopher's *train of thought?* This is the question F.-W. von Herrmann asks in an interview (vol. 1). For the Russian Heidegger studies addressing the problem of the genesis of Heidegger's own philosophical position is not irrelevant considering that Heidegger was the thinker who proposed a radical revision of the subject matter, the method and procedure of philosophical work.

Svetlana Konacheva (vol. 2) explores the theological overtones of Heidegger's thought filling certain "conceptual gaps" in the substantive interpretations of his philosophy. Following the general principles of intellectual neatness and thoroughness, Svetlana Konacheva takes us back to the early Heidegger in connection with the issue of religious motivation of *Dasein* existential analysis and in order to clarify Heidegger's reiteratively changeable concept of the relationship between God and Being. The author refers to the lectures *Die Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* delivered during the winter semester of 1920-1921 in which Heidegger, in search of a genuine subject of philosophical thought, explores "the phenomenon of factual life experience" as the foundation of philosophy. Svetlana Konacheva notes the controversial role of Husserl's phenomenology: on the one hand, it brought Heidegger to the question of Being, and a more consistent study of phenomenology combined with the study of the mystical tradition causes Heidegger to break with the system of Catholicism; on the other hand, Heidegger tries to transform Husserl's phenomenological method, but in doing so he turns not to the givenness of consciousness, but to the experience of daily life proceeding from the slogan "No theory!" For Heidegger, philosophy ceases to be a science of lofty matters and no longer leaves outside the brackets man himself and everything that is important for him.

Turning to the problem of the *relationship* between Heidegger's philosophical initiative and the preceding history of philosophy is both relevant and insufficiently precise for present-day Heidegger studies. The methodological significance of Heidegger's plan of destruction of the history of ontology that brought irreversible changes to the historical-philosophical landscape remains a moot point for the history of philosophy as a discipline. Each of the authors (not only those already named) looks at the potential of phenomenology in their own way, with due

account of the trends in modern philosophical thought and fashionable theoretical ideas proposing sometimes arbitrary and sometimes risky interpretations.

This applies to Anna Yampolskaya's study of the "new" French phenomenology which to date has been marginal to Russian studies. Anna Yampolskaya reveals one "motive" in the French phenomenology, i.e., the critique of the so-called intuitivism that we find in Jacques Derrida and Michel Henri. As it turns out her aim is not to reveal the specific features of the French phenomenology as one of the "national" phenomenological schools distinct from other schools, but to discover sore spots in Husserl's own thought. The main theme of French phenomenology is the trend to depart from the soil of phenomenology and attain "a phenomenology of the nonphenomenal" (vol. 2, p. 285). The author seeks to answer the question: what is behind the attempt of the "new" French phenomenology to reinterpret the concept of phenomenon? Tension is created by the reminder that French phenomenologists are heirs not only to Husserl but even to a larger degree to Heidegger: Michel Henri derives "life" (which is not a phenomenon among other phenomena) from that part of Being that is given to contemplation *in toto*. This repeats, it would seem, the well-known reproach Heidegger addressed to Husserl: of reducing phenomenology solely to the theory of cognition. We again return (this time through French phenomenology) to the problem of ultimate source of phenomenology "as it actually is."

Turning to the difficulties of phenomenology proceeding from phenomenology itself Viktor Molchanov demonstrates that to do so one does not necessarily invoke as the judge the historical context or highlight the historical background which like a litmus paper would reveal the substance of "things." Philosophy returns to the beginning, the ultimate foundation. In asking about the foundation we undergo a "return": we ask the question about the foundation but we are at the same time prompted by that foundation. Viktor Molchanov builds up a kind of *genealogy of the beginning* seen as the primary space of experience, the primary "room" for discriminations. The starting point of phenomenology in its main variants are discriminations, be the Franz Brentano's discrimination, the original discriminations of Husserl or the ontological discrimination of Heidegger. However, the analysis of the discriminations as the basic structures of experience has never been attempted in phenomenology, nor has there been an attempt at formulating the phenomenological discrimination between analysis and interpretation. The experience of discriminations is a fundamental prerequisite for understanding (to understand means to discriminate). Ultimately, we see understanding *itself* as a problem. It is easy—after Heidegger—to reflect on truth that is not hidden, on Being, on the structures of mundanity and temporality. It is far more difficult to discover and competently describe and explain the fine semantic differences *of the same words,* of one and the same phrase. If it is possible at all to speak about method, the true method consists in understanding. Meanwhile understanding begins with understanding, and not with some kind of method (even if it is a phenomenological method, which does not exist prior to understanding), even a scientific-philosophical method, which also exists only as a product of understanding. Viktor Molchanov attentively traces all the twists

and turns of Heidegger's reasoning, consistently undermining trust in "commonplaces."

Andrei Laurukhin continues the trend of his phenomenologist colleagues focusing attention on the turning points in phenomenology describing Husserl and his reflections on the crisis postwar events. As a result of these reflections Husserl's project of phenomenological philosophy experiences a *practical turnaround*—ethical and political—in the early 1920s. Andrei Laurukhin insists on the practice that is *de rigueur* for modern phenomenologists, the practice of discerning original phenomenological knowledge in the *practical* experience of the present. We must derive a lesson from Husserl's project of interpreting the renewal of culture in order, in the context of actual crisis configurations of our time, to become parties to "genuine renewal of the cultural humanity and not an imitation thereof" (vol. 2, p. 113).

The articles by Evgenij Borisov, Ilija Inishev, Vitalij Lehtcier, Tetsuya Sakakibara and others branch out from phenomenology into related areas and work on the boundaries of phenomenology. Of course following that path certain distortions may occur due to a degree of risk involved in "forays" into little studied areas, "opaque zones" both of themselves and philosophical practice in the broad sense of that word.

For example, *I. Inishev* (vol. 2) argues that the problem of the relationship between the world and language forms the main thematic spectrum both of analytical and phenomenological philosophy; however, their cooperation is based on the differing directions of their thematic development. Thus the task is set for cooperative "phenomenological-analytical" study.

Evgenij Borisov (vol. 2) takes a critical look at the concept of meaning with Husserl and Donald Davidson as two opposing semantic positions, demonstrating the contrast between Husserl's perceptive strategy and Davidson's interpretative strategy in the theory of meaning.

Anna Shiyan (vol. 1) examines Gustav Shpet's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology reviving in a sense a theme that is optional for modern phenomenology.

Vitalij Lehtcier turns to the "sad and pervasive theme of our time" (vol. 1, p. 104), the theme of disappearance, which is treated as the effect of the process of simulating reality. The need to treat disappearance as a philosophical problem is prompted, according to the author, by the "immanent phenomenological tradition" (Ibid.), is provoked by current social theories, is manifested in various modes of the experience of disappearance whose descriptions the author offers as grounds for the possibility of building a certain *phenomenology of disappearance.*

Tetsuya Sakakibara (Japan) (vol. 2) analyzes the phenomenological study of medical care of patients presented in the work of Patricia Benner and Judith Wruble *The Primacy of Care* and based on the phenomenological view of personality. The author focuses on explaining the experience of illness from the phenomenological point of view and on the project of *the phenomenology of patient care* that calls for particular attention to the ethical dimension of phenomenology.

K. Held (Germany), (vol. 2) takes up a little studied theme, the understanding of God and religion in the framework of the so-called theological turn of phenomenology. The concept of "God" crops up in Husserl's discourse in various contexts, from ontology to ethics, but only one context in the approach to the problem of God is decisive and marks a turning point in the development of phenomenology, the context for which "teleology" is the key concept. K. Held scrutinizes the 1930s manuscripts with an archive signature "E" that are practically unknown and have come in for little comment. Held builds his study around the central question: what should be the meaning of teleology that produces the concept of God and why does Husserl's concept of teleology confer relevance on that concept? Thus the question is raised of the place of philosophical theology in Husserl's analysis.

It should be noted for fairness sake that the problem of the relationship between theology and phenomenology has been attracting recently more and more interest. One can mention the book *Phenomenology and Theology* edited by Held and Thomas Söding.[2]

Thomas Nenon (USA, vol. 2) turns to Husserl's lectures on ethics of 1920 and 1924 suggesting the possibility of building a *phenomenological ethics* proceeding from Husserl's theory of ethics and morality which he describes as "metaethics." Examining Husserl's critical commentary on the doctrines of key figures in the history of philosophical ethics, Nenon shows that Husserl, through that analysis, tries to overcome the false dualism of reason and feelings and the contradiction between the ethics of duty and the ethics of virtue.

Nicolas Monseu (Belgium, vol. 2) picks up the ethical problems and looks at the phenomenological analysis of nature which, the author claims, can be helpful in describing the foundations of ethics. Proceeding from the same lectures on ethics (1920 and 1924) Monseu demonstrates that they define phenomenology as a practical project: ethics is neither a purely scientific discipline nor a direct analogue of pure logic: it unfolds in the practical dimension. For Monseu the key ethical thesis of Husserl is the one that claims that the foundations of ethics lie in the sphere of the interaction between reason and nature.

Viktor Molchanov (vol. 2) reinterprets and critically deconstructs the centuries-old tradition of the "supremacy" of time over space. History offers a Kantian precedent: the granting of ontological primacy to the temporality of the inner feeling, which Heidegger and Husserl followed. Heidegger starts with *Dasein* and not with transcendental subjectivity, but in the process he does not resolve the problems connected with temporality (which Husserl was faced with as well). Viktor Molchanov goes back to the old questions: how is time introduced in philosophic discourse and what is its place in the structure of our experience? Turning, in the historical context, to the precedence of time as a form of experience to Husserl's phenomenology, the author proceeds from the analysis of Husserl's discriminations between perception and sensation as well as the very language of Husserl's descriptions of experience and temporal definitions to arrive at some ground-breaking conclusions. Husserl's concept of the consciousness of time and the time of consciousness is presented as a concept expressed

in *spatial* language and based on experience that is *spatial* in character. The inner space of experience on whose basis inner time is introduced is space *par excellence,* namely the space of discriminations, the deepest layer of experience. Time is assigned the role of a "medium" or "coordinator" of the multitude of spaces of the living world. Such an approach to the well-known set of problems of time opens up new perspectives for its study on the basis of the same historical-philosophical subjects represented through deconstruction.

The issues on the essence of phenomenology as the science of phenomena and its basic principle—the lack of premises—, the significance of the phenomenological method and phenomenology's claim to be the "first philosophy" and its turn towards practice—all these questions have dogged the path of phenomenology attesting to this day to the fact that phenomenology is alive and has not turned into a dogma. But essentially all these issues arise from the question of the very existence of philosophy as a mode of thought and life in the present time. The stakes are extremely high. The first two issues of the *Yearbook* prove convincingly that Russian phenomenology is not only able to stay afloat, but can discover new phenomenological perspectives, explore distant horizons following Husserl's maxim: phenomenology is a field of work and not a doctrine.

NOTES

1 M. Heidegger, *Zu Ernst Jünger. Gesamtausgabe,* Bd. 90, Frankfurt am Main, 2004; C. Möckel, *Phänomenologie: Probleme, Bezugnahmen und Interpretation,* Berlin, 2003.

2 *Phänomenologie und Theologie,* Hrsg. Von K. Held und T. Söding, Herder, Freiburg, 2009.

N. Artyomenko
Translated by Yevgeny Filippov

А. Железняков. Монгольский полюс политического устройства мира, ред. З.Т. Голенкова, М., Институт социологии РАН, 2009, 272 с.

A. ZHELEZNYAKOV. *The Mongolian Pole of the Political Order of the World*, ed. by Z. Golenkova, Moscow, Institute of Sociology, RAS, 2009, 272 pp.

The vast monograph by Aleksandr Zheleznyakov, prominent political scientist and Orientalist, who has to his name several trailblazing works on the past and present of Mongolia, is an excellent example of the Russian school of Mongolian studies. His scholarly interests and numerous personal contacts which made Mongolia his second homeland are behind his unrivalled knowledge of that country.

His monograph covers the widest possible range of problems ranging from the variants of contemporary world order and basic approaches in the framework of civilizational studies to very specific questions of Mongolian history. The scope is determined by the subject range of the book under review—civilizational politology—the branch of knowledge which has not yet become fully conventional but the future of which looks assured. The vast scope has allowed the author to look at the historical, economic, political and cultural aspects of the Mongolian socium as an intricate intertwining which adds a systemic nature to his pioneering effort. On the other hand, there is a risk that the theoretical models might lose their instrumentality while his conclusions might become uncertain.

The author has set himself the task of answering three "major questions": What is Mongolian civilization and its content (if such a notion does exist)? What are Mongolia's prospects in the present system of international relations? What can Mongolia offer as potential answers to the challenges it is facing today?

The book consists of four chapters. Chapter One outlines the theoretical and methodological frameworks within which the author intends to build up his own conception. He answers the first question in the context of two patterns—polar and civilizational—of the arrangement of the world order.

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To analyze the world order the author looks at its three possible future variants—unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity—to dismiss unipolarity as hardly viable. (His conclusion is based on a careful analysis of weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the unipolar world created by the American leadership at the turn of the 21st century).

He believes that the bipolar world "looks much more viable and sustainable than the unipolar structure" yet, he argues, in the final analysis it is "not viable since it cannot respond to the entire range of varied geopolitical challenges of the contemporary world... it is a theoretical and practical instrument to be applied *ad hoc* in an effort to substantiate and justify global leadership" (p. 40). Aleksandr Zheleznyakov believes that multipolarity is the most adequate answer to the realities of the contemporary world which cannot be reduced to a single universal development model: "The instinct of self-preservation will force the world community to think about taking into account the need to secure the coexistence of various models of social, political and cultural order and ensuring it" (p. 45).

The author has obviously embraced the thesis of multipolarity, represented by the cultural variety of the world political landscape as his starting ideological and methodological point: "The multipolar world is divided along the line of cultural isolation rather than along the line of class revolutions" (p. 186). The second part of Chapter One "Emergence of the System of Contemporary Civilizations" substantiates the above. A large part of it offers an analysis of what the classics of civilizational approach (Nikolay Danilevsky, Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, Pitirim Sorokin, Samuel Huntington, etc.) had to say on the issue. No wonder, the author supports the thesis of civilizational variety of the contemporary world which suggests itself with his own weighty conclusion: "Mongolia and Inner Asia which surrounds it has not been entered into any of the known lists of world civilizations" and has been studied so far "either as a passive object invaded by civilizational flows from without (outside) or was merely excluded from the civilizational process as a 'negative factor'" (p. 73).

The third part of the same chapter deals with the concept of Mongolian civilization; the author has enumerated, among the diversity of facts describing the Mongolian historical and cultural commonness, the most important ones that allow to recognize the existence of a Mongolian civilization as such: a consistent reappearance on the specified territory of powerful empires based on nomadic cattle breeding; distinctive ecological culture which maintained the balance between human activities and nature and indissoluble ties between the secular and the spiritual in everyday life (which took the form of Tengriism) of the states and empires of Inner Asia with the traditional center in Mongolia.

The historical material presented in Chapter Two adds specificity to the author's deliberations about the concept of Mongolian civilization. The author relies on his arguments expounded in Chapter One to criticize the conceptions of nomadism based on the logic geared at the settled way of life to the exclusion of all others. His arguments suggest that the historical process was unfolding in parallel and independently at one and the same time on the territories populated by nomadic and settled peoples; the author points out that in certain respects and

during certain periods the nomadic communities were more progressive than settled communities (for example, they knew no slavery as a mass phenomenon).

A. Zheleznyakov has identified several basic features which put Mongolia, as the civilizational core of Inner Asia, on a par with cores of the other five world civilizations. First, throughout several millennia Mongolia remained a cultural core at the meeting point of several civilizations. Second, the Mongolian core was very different from all other cores (the neighboring—Orthodox, Confucian and Islamic—civilizations, in the first place). Third, Mongolia was absolutely sovereign and was not either part or zone of predominant influence of any of the world civilizations. Fourth, it was directly involved in the events that changed the course of world history. The author has in mind the still preserved "living intertwining of the nomadic and settled worlds with their advantages lost in the process of blending into a single settled whole" (p. 104). Fifth, the universally realized need to preserve the unique culture "which can be used as a rostrum... of a philosophical dialogue of civilizations" (p. 105).

The author further develops his own conception based on the thesis that there were civilizational breakdowns (Toynbee's term) in the history of Inner Asia and Mongolia (as its cultural and historical core). He described them as "revolutions protracted in time and occurring in the scope of the entire civilization" (p. 107), which served the watersheds between the phases of civilizational development of Inner Asia; he has identified twelve phases. The first began together with the emergence of the Empire of Hunnu, the earliest nomadic empire of Inner Asia; the latest began in the 20th century. This means that the history of the Mongolian civilization was developing in cycles. The Third and Fourth Chapters deal with Mongolia's historical and political aspects of the past and the present. The Chapter Three describes the economic, social, political (external and internal), spiritual and cultural factors behind the (so far) latest civilizational breakdown of Mongolia. The author describes the Qing Administration as the most important external (in relation to the Mongolian socium) factor behind the civilizational breakdown. At the turn of the 20th century the Manchu Qing Dynasty changed its policies in Mongolia: it deprived the local people of their privileges and initiated massive Chinese migration to Mongolia accompanied by penetration of Chinese capital. A. Zheleznyakov sums up: "In Mongolia development of capitalism without national borders and in unhampered integration with China was fraught with a national catastrophe" (p. 133). It seems that the materials presented in Chapter Three and the author's conclusions based on them prepare the reader for a detailed analysis of the main problems of the political development of Mongolian society of the 20th and early 21st centuries and for a conclusion of signal importance based on this analysis.

In Chapter Four the author continued the polemics which has been unfolding among the experts in Mongolia for over two decades now about the nature of sociopolitical processes under socialism. His material destroys the myth about Mongolia as a "Soviet puppet and satellite" in which the American and European historiography had been indulging in the Cold War period and which survived to be actively reproduced by Russian, Mongolian and Western authors. He has the

following to say on this score: "So far the idea about Mongolia the victim of the monstrous communist experiment staged by the puppeteers from the Communist International and the All-Union Communist Party (b.) is still very much alive" (p. 192). He argues that "Mongolian communism," the country's theory and practice for nearly 70 years, was not exported from Soviet Russia but was a "stage at which old society was destroyed to be replaced with a new one which served as a watershed and which survived for a long time" (p. 188). In fact, the Mongolian elites consciously relied on "Mongolian communism," which they "interpreted in a very special way, assimilated and adjusted to the country's history" (p. 187) and which was an attempt to halt the developing civilizational breakdown.

The author, who relies on the earlier inaccessible archival materials of the socialist period, has convincingly demonstrated that the Mongolian leaders were independent in their relations with the Soviet Union and never limited the role of their country and people to that of a buffer state between the USSR and China. He believes that "the image of a buffer state was created by those academics who failed to discern in Mongolia an active inner element and were prepared to describe it as open to any external impacts or as a mould to be filled with no matter what content" (p. 235). He cites numerous examples to prove that the Soviet-Mongolian bloc was never free from contradictions and that the relations inside it had nothing to do with the puppet-puppeteer relations.

In the last part of Chapter Four the author discusses the contemporary situation in Mongolia and around it and the future of the Mongolian civilization. He described the potential of "China's unlimited global economic, cultural and political expansion which can, within the shortest time, radically change the cultural and ethnic makeup of the vast and sparsely populated region" (p. 251) as the main threat and the most dangerous challenge to Mongolian society if it switches from nomadic cattle breeding (an important economic and everyday sphere of life) to the settled way of life.

On the whole, the author looks at Mongolia as a sparsely populated country squeezed in between Russia and China, with few chances to enter into an equal dialogue with them and to preserve its sovereignty in the broad sense of the word. As a civilizational center of Inner Asia, Mongolia has much more chances to listen to others and to be heard in the world. As a civilization, it forms one of the numerous poles of the contemporary world order which can, under certain conditions, become an equal partner of the powers-poles of world order—Russia, China, the US, India, etc.

Some things, however, breed doubt. Such is, for example, his thesis that "intensified contacts between Mongolia and the United States should not cause Russia's concerns because Mongolia is a nuclear-free state and pursues an open policy" (p. 235). The last two decades, however, demonstrated that intensified relations between Ulan Bator and Washington and greater American influence in Mongolia have already infringed on the interests of Russia.

I would like to conclude by saying that the author who has concentrated on Mongolia and its place in the system of world political order indirectly pointed

to the need to reassess our ideas about peoples, cultures and civilizations; its topicality is not limited to theoretical civilizational studies but is directly related to the present and the future of international relations. This means that A. Zheleznaykov's conception of Mongolian civilization can be described as another attempt at a new approach to the dialogue of civilizations.

More than that: the book reveals the intricacies of international politics in which small countries and peoples are living; this information will be undoubtedly appreciated by students of international processes and cultures as well as by historians and philosophers.

V. Rodionov
Translated by Valentina Levina

В. Петренко. Многомерное сознание: психосемантическая парадигма, М., Новый Хронограф, 2010, 440 с.

V. PETRENKO. *Multidimensional Consciousness: the Psychosemantic Paradigm*, Moscow, Novy Khronograf, 2010, 440 pp.

Viktor Petrenko has not merely offered his ideas about the problems of psychology, politics, religion and art; he has expounded his integral view of the world; this is not the only attraction of his book: the volume contains an Introduction by Aleksandr Asmolov and a Conclusion by Aleksey Ulanovsky.

Here I shall dwell on the chapters related to those aspects of psychology in which the different worlds created by Viktor Petrenko and myself become closely interconnected; I want to provide a subjective and partial "reflection of subjective reflection" of the author of the present book riveted to the points of my greatest interest and leave the Introduction and Conclusion, which deserve special attention, outside the scope of this review, although they may represent an intrigue for the reader, thus arousing an additional interest for researchers.

Viktor Petrenko devotes one section of his book to the analysis of the correlation (based on the methods of psychosemantics, very interesting *per se*) between the Leontiev School and other psychological schools, beginning with a contraposition of the theory of activity and behaviorism along the "activity (related to the idea of evolutionism)—reactivity" line. This is a very precise approach of fundamental importance. Indeed, different location of the system of ideas on this line is what determines the scientific picture of the world created by psychologists together with physiologists, evolutionists, molecular biologists, sociologists, culturologists, etc.

I cannot but be highly satisfied with the fact that systemic psychophysiologydeveloped in our laboratory of psychophysiology named after Vycheslav Shvyrkov (Institute of Psychology, RAS)together with the theory of functional systems from which it stems (and Pyotr Anokhin, its author, quoted by Petrenko in connection with the contraposition mentioned above) have found themselves on the same side of the barricade with the school to which the author of the book under review belongs. I have in mind the pole of activity. Consistent application

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of the activity-related approach in systemic psychophysiology allows to create a *systemic-evolutionary alternative* to the idea of reactivity not only at the level of an individual or socium but also at the cellular level. The idea of reactivity is replaced with the ideas of activity and purposefulness which, in turn, leads to substantial changes in the methodology, tasks and methods (including methods of natural sciences) of objective research of the subjective world, culture, social ideas and language.

The author has called "outstripping reflection," one of the best known conceptions of Anokhin's, an oxymoron which "paid tribute to stagnating ideology" (p. 108). It should be said, first, that forty years ago ideology was not "very stagnating" and was better described by Thomas Kuhn as "normal science." Second, it is precisely an oxymoron, if we mean T. Kuhn's definition, cited by V. Petrenko on page 404: a combination of contradictory concepts which creates a *new meaningful quality.* Reflection *trails behind* because it is a reflex, a mechanism which reflects the environment by responding by way of reflective reaction to the past event-stimulus. According to Pyotr Anokhin, the living being does not reflect the past event (a stimulus) but is ready for the future changes of the environment; in fact, he builds it (the result.) It seems to me that the new meaningful quality thus produced stresses what the "oxymoronic" name of the conception suggests: the living (when it emerges) changes, in the most fundamental way, the correlation with the environment. Before the appearance of the living—a retarding reflection (stimulus-reaction) for the physical world; after the appearance of the living—an outstripping activity (purposeful behavior) for the living world. The oxymoronic nature leads to disaccordance which is an inevitable (initial) stage of learning, of acquiring new knowledge.

In this context V. Petrenko's formula which describes human behavior from the point of view of constructivist psychology: "Not as a reaction to the objective environment or a social situation but, rather, as a question with which the subject turns to the world" (pp. 61, 114) looks logical. This perfectly correlates with what Karl Popper had in mind when criticizing the "bucket" theory of cognition: according to it information ("raw material") coded by the organs of senses flows to the "bucket" (human brain) to be processed by comparing it with the materials stored in memory, under the impact of emotions and motivations, controlled by attention, etc. As a result, our knowledge of real environment (object) is synthesized, its image, reflection and perception are taking shape. A fairly large number of those who write about physiology and psychology proceed from this idea supported by common sense and the paradigm of reactivity.

Karl Popper insists that the individual does not receive knowledge from outside. Cognition begins "inside him": the individual formulates a hypothesis and addresses his question to the world. *The answer he receives uses the language of this hypothesis.* This is not all: the answer is *interpreted* by the individual (in terms of the hypothesis). I should add that the latest interpretation must remain in line with previous interpretations: it should not only adjust itself to them but also change them. This dynamic structure of interconnected interpretations created in the process of individual development is what we call "knowledge of the world."

About 40 years ago my teacher Vyacheslav Shvyrkov arrived at the ideas which totally corresponded to the ideas about hypotheses and their verification through an analysis of the systemic positions of the earliest phases of activity of the neurons of the sensory areas of the brain. Before him they had been commonly regarded as reflecting the physical properties of specific (in relation to these areas) stimuli. He asserted that earliest activations of the neurons did not code physical properties of the stimuli but, in fact, provided a "yes/no" answer to the question the individual asked before receiving the stimulus. At no time and at no point (starting with the first millisecond and at the level of receptors) do we deal with an impartial reflection of the physical properties of the environment (the result of which, as many people believe, is later compared with what is stored in our memory). In this case we should interpret the so-called "objectively existing (physical) properties of objects" not as a "beginning," an elementary "raw material" to be used for perception but as fairly complicated cultural conceptions created by science, art, etc. These conceptions are the language which the individual uses to ask his questions. Aleksandr Luriya clearly demonstrated in his famous experiments that this language depends on culture. The physical properties (and not elementary at all) appear at the end of perception (if we continue using this term). These ideas are related to those developed by the school of Arshak Mirakyan.

Viktor Petrenko's idea about scientific (and *any other,* for that matter) activity being dependent on culture perfectly fits his idea about cognition as a highly individual construction of worlds. "Cognition outside reflection on motives and a system of values shared by a scientist as a representative of a certain culture... in an effort to 'find out how things stand in reality'... is an ephemeral task" (p. 99). He has written that "it is possible to talk about a psychological theory of relativity of categorization and world perception" (p. 115). This contradicts the habitual idea (and accepted by the majority of the academic community!) that there is "a single world science" and that we can hardly talk about national specifics of science. V. Petrenko's idea corresponds to the latest developments in the science of sciences and with what experts in individual disciplines think about obvious specifics of Russian, European (insular and continental), American, etc. psychology, mathematics, physics, neurosciences, etc. conditioned by culture.

Viktor Petrenko offers experimental and theoretical arguments to prove that the dimensionality of semantic expanses *is influenced by* affect. He has pointed that emotions trim this dimensionality and the "subject moves over to deeper levels of categorization—from relying on the denotative to more connotative qualities" (p. 73). This is extremely important for the further development of numerous problems which are not confined to the scope of psychosemantics: they can be found also in psychology (and biology) of development (both individual and philogenetic), in cognitive psychology (and cognitive neuroscience), in psychology (and biology) of emotions, etc.

The data we have been accumulating for several years while studying the brain activity of animals and man and our linguo-psychological analysis confirm the above. To my mind, however, emotions cannot be described as a single fac-

tor which can influence, affect, reduce, etc. They are not an independent process but *descriptions* of the comparatively old systems (which emerge at the early development stages) which correlate the individual with his environment at a relatively low level of differentiation. In some situations (for example, when alcohol selectively suppresses the activeness of the systems of high differentiation; impact on visual perception by using high frequency filters to remove the details of image) the "weight" of the low differentiated systems increases. The individual returns to the early development stages, that is, a retrogression is taking place. From the first person perspective these situations are described as the emergence of emotions: negative ones in the situations of withdrawal and positive in the situations of approach to the something desired. This suggests that emotions are present in all creatures with an ability to develop; it is realized as a transition from the low to (relatively) highly differentiated correlation with the environment, that is, in all living creatures. We should agree with the author who has written that "if a *primitive creature* encounters a certain object then the most primitive feelings, or *emotions,* which orient it in the world are reduced to: whether the object caused pain or pleasure" (p. 79; italics mine.—*Yu. A.*)

On p. 152 Petrenko relates to the data José Delgado obtained through brain stimulation as an argument in favor of what Aleksandr Luriya wrote in his time: "Human memory retains... practically all events which happened to man during his life." This is a very important point because today (as well as what Lev Vygotsky wrote about human memory as "geological stratification," Yakov Ponamaryov's opinion about the development stages as fixed organizational levels, etc.) there is a wealth (we have also contributed to this wealth) of convincing data on constant, probably lifelong, specialization of neurons as related to newly formed memory.

We have already obtained numerous arguments in favor of the highly important idea substantiated by Petrenko that the "subject may have a high cognitive complexity in one meaningful area and a low one, in another" (p. 186). We have found, for example (at the neuron, psychological, linguistic levels of analysis) that the domain of experience, which includes the withdrawal acts, is much more complicated, more differentiated and contains more systems than the domain of approach.

I should say in conclusion that the book under review supplies detailed arguments in favor of the statement that "the semantic expanses are a powerful multidimensional instrument of analysis of the picture of man's world" (p. 81). Having familiarized himself with the entire set of arguments the reader will undoubtedly acquire valuable, and first-hand, information about the way this instrument can be applied in various spheres of psychology.

Yu. Aleksandrov
Translated by Valentina Levina

Ю. Растов, Д. Щербинин. Сибирский сепаратизм: социологическая экспертиза современных проявлений, Барнаул, издательство Алтайского университета, 2010, 168 с.

Yu. RASTOV, D. SHCHERBININ. *Siberian Separatism: Sociological Studies of Its Contemporary Manifestations,* Barnaul, the Altay University Press, 2010, 168 pp.

The joint fundamental work by Yury Rastov and Denis Shcherbinin deserves close attention not only because the style, logic and clear presentation set it apart from many other works: original theoretical ideas and thought-provoking empirical material cannot but fascinate.

The book will not remain shelved for too long: its subject—specifics of Siberia within the all-Russia sociocultural and political expanse and its future—is too topical to be ignored. The authors have registered the real, and far from favorable, state of affairs: while fully aware of the natural riches of their land, its territorial, ethnocultural specifics, those who live in Siberia remain frustrated by social and political neglect and indifference on the part of the federal center. These sociopsychological moods are nutrient, a "culture medium" which might develop into separatist sentiments and breed dangerous illusions that economic freedom and political independence from the "colonial diktat" of European Russia and Moscow will bring material well-being and social flourishing of Siberia. The authors have pointed out, with a great degree of bitterness, that today this centuries-old contradiction between European and Asian Russia has not been resolved. In fact, the processes underway in Russia aggravate the situation merely increasing the number of those who look forward to separation of Siberia from Russia (the authors quote their share as about 9.8% of Siberia's total population). "Today, a dangerous situation is taking shape in which Russia's economy is losing its unidirectional nature of development: the European subjects of the Russia Federation have embarked on the road of innovation while Siberia, so far, remains a source of raw materials not only (and not so much) for Russia but also

The review appeared in Russian in *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya (SOTSIS)* journal, No. 8, 2011.

for China and other APR states. The already wide social gap between Siberia and European Russia is being widened still more by economic bifurcation which also fuels Siberian separatism" (p. 133). One feels that the main conclusion made by the authors is absolutely correct: to uproot the destructive Siberian separatism and achieve organic (rather than formal, voluntarist and etatist) unity of the Russian Federation the federal authorities should recognize Siberia's deeply rooted specificity and the need for its priority development. It seems that the logic of the book under review and concrete sociological data confirm once more the key idea put in a nutshell by Lomonosov: "With Siberia Russia will grow stronger," but only if the federal center "extends privileges and gives more freedoms" to Siberia.

The authors are very clear about their values and ideas and are prepared to defend them which cannot but attract the reader. They stated in so many words that the book is not a result of purely intellectual abstract studies but has an existentialist value of its own. They have deemed it necessary to point out: "Russians who are also patriots of Russia, Siberia and Altay" are very much concerned with and do not hesitate to attract attention to the problem of mounting Chinese expansion to Russia which the authorities deliberately ignore and which is fraught with numerous threats. The authors have rightly pointed out that the separatist sentiments will inevitably speed up Sinoization of Siberia and its separation from Russia. They do not mince words about the prospect of a direct gas pipeline from Siberia to China which is expected to cross the relict plateau Ukok in the Altay. If realized the project will provoke separatist and extremist sentiments among the local people; it will also serve as a direct channel of Chinese expansion to Siberia.

An obvious merit of the book under review is the authors' devotion to the theory of social conflict. Indeed, they do not merely carefully examine their theoretical and methodological conflictologic attitudes but also consistently apply them when planning, realizing and interpreting the results of their sociological studies.

A detailed historical digression delving into separatist ideas and sentiments in Siberia is another attractive feature of the book. The authors have revealed continuity of separatism of the past and the present and their common roots. They were quite right when they wrote that the founders of Siberian regionalism *(oblastnichestvo)* Grigory Potanin and Nikolay Yadrintsev had never called for separation from Russia (of which they were often accused and are still accused without any reason): they wanted wider autonomy and respect for Siberian specifics, its ethnic variety and way of life. The authors should have probably paid more attention to the still valid ideological potential of the classics of regionalism: their demand to take the ethnic and cultural variety of the Siberian peoples into account and to preserve it; their thesis stressing the role of social self-organization, political self-administration and economic cooperation for the territories and ethnic communities of Siberia. This is not the pivotal issue for the authors yet without its practical implementation it would hardly be possible to quench radicalism and separatism.

The specific sociological results and generalizations which bare the roots and reveal the varieties of Siberian separatism can be described as the authors' most significant achievement. Certain conclusions suggest themselves: separatist sentiments are most pronounced among urban dwellers and the *intelligentsia*; separatism and the standard of living are interconnected; people who express different forms of regional ideology do not plan to leave Siberia. Some of the facts and conclusions are fairly unexpected. For example, the share of those who support separatism among people of the middle age and older groups (from 26 to 60) is practically the same; women are less inclined to separatism than men. It has been empirically proved that the ideas of territorial autonomy and independence of Siberia directly oppose the ideology of ethnic separatism. Separatist sentiments among those who live in small settlements along railways come as a surprise. The authors hasten to clarify: "Here is an explanation of separatist sentiments among a large share of the population of small settlements. A trackwalker who lives in one of the halts along the Transsiberian Mainline said, in particular: 'Every day I see empty freight trains arriving in Siberia to return to Moscow fully loaded. They carry everything out of Siberia: timber, coal, grain, oil and all sorts of metal things. Siberia is rich in everything but very soon all this will end. When will they start carrying good things to us? Why do empty trains arrive to Siberia?" (p. 78).

This suggests a polemic question: should this trackwalker who refuses to accept Siberia's colonial status of a raw-material source be regarded as a separatist? Can we apply the term "separatist" to people who want Siberia's specificity acknowledged at the national level, who demand "privileges and freedoms" of which Lomonosov wrote in his time and who insist on certain forms of political autonomy within a single Russian political expanse? The authors give a positive answer to this question by identifying two forms of separatism: *a secessionist separatism* (separation from European Russia) and *an autonomist separatism* (greater political, cultural and economic independence within Russia). While the former threatens Russia with disintegration, the latter, the authors argue, is ambivalent—its risks are more or less balanced by certain positive elements. The authors describe both types as a social conflict of sorts "of part of the Siberian population with the federal authorities over the state and legal status of Siberia" (p. 139).

To my mind, "demand for autonomy" and "regionalism" can hardly be described as separatism for the simple reason that by insisting on a special legal status for parts of the country within the single state they consolidate the country and add to its integrity and organic unity by opposing formal unificationism, no less destructive than secessionism. In this context autonomy and account for sociocultural specifics of regions (Siberia, in the first place) look like the shortest route to preserve state unity in the form of regional variety and the best method of overcoming real separatism. Indeed, the federative structure of Germany is one of the factors of its unity; on the other hand, the Soviet Union collapsed because, among other things, its federalism was a mere declaration. The authors are quite right: autonomy and regionalization are fraught with separatism

yet, one might argue, hypertrophied state centralism likewise breeds separatism. We can see it today. Viewed in the context of the theory of social conflict (which the authors support) Siberian "autonomizm" is, first and foremost, a rational and effective instrument of *settling* the conflict between federal unificationism and centralism in state administration and Russia's objective need for constructive regionalization. In principle, the authors write about "the positive potential of Siberian separatism" (p. 137) in the form of an autonomy. In this context the term "separatism" loses its primary meaning as a "separation of part from the whole." Unlike separatism, "autonomizm" implies freedom of parts within the whole and in the interests of the whole. This issue is related to the methodological instruments the authors used rather than to their conclusions.

The authors hope, with good reason, that Russia will arrive at a national-state ideology which will take "Siberian identity" into account and within which consistent "state Siberian policy" will be realized (p. 129). It looks strange that the authors have not dwelt on the Eurasian national-state ideology within which Nikolay Alekseyev, who followed in Dmitry Mendeleyev's and Pyotr Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky's footsteps, stressed: "The great body of Russia should consist of parts with conscious interest in natural mutual attraction and with an awareness that without this mutual gravitation the whole and the parts will be threatened with death. Russia should become... a genuine economic and geographic organism."[1] The ideologists of Eurasianism are fully aware of Siberia's importance and its key role in transforming Russia into a leading world power between the West and the East (an idea of Pyotr Savitsky about migrations of the cultural centers of mankind). It seems that the theoretical tenets of Eurasianism, together with conflictology, may become a highly heuristic paradigm for analyzing and overcoming Siberian separatism and its nationalistic hypostasis, in particular.

These polemic considerations do not belittle the book's merits—they stress them. Indeed, a book with which the reader agrees and has no urge to enter into creative debate is a bad book. Having said this I want to congratulate the authors with a highly professional and interesting book which will attract not only those interested in the problems of Siberian separatism but also those who seek scientific truth and who adhere to active civic positions.

NOTE

1 N. Alekseyev, *Russian People and the State,* Moscow, 1998, p. 369 (in Russian).

A. Ivanov
Translated by Valentina Levina

ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

VESTNIK ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK

(Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences)

No. 7, 2011

V. Fortov et al. Scientific and Technical Problems of Water-Power Engineering after Failure on the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydroelectric Power Station.
A. Varshavsky et al. On Adequate Evaluation of the Productivity of Scientific Activity.
V. Ivanter, V. Panfilov. The End of the Economy of Growth or the Change of a Paradigm of Development?
Taking Lessons from the Crisis. *Discussion of a Paper.*
V. Bolshakov, A. Kapitsa. Development Lessons of the Orbital Theory of Paleoclimate.
A. Yurevich. Estimating the Contribution of Russian Sociohumanitarian Science in World Science.
O. Mikhaylov. Criteria and Parameters for an Objective Assessment of the Scientific Activities Quality.
R. Dzarasov. Capitalist World System and the Russian Economy in the Epoch of Crisis Upheavals.
M. Krylov. Common Features of Evolutionary Processes.
R. Shcherbakov. Founder of the Quantitative Experiment. *The 275th Birth Anniversary of Charles-Augustin Coulomb.*

No. 8, 2011

Yu. Granin. The Official Nationalism Is Necessary to Russia.
A. Tatarkin. Intellectual Resources of Society.
A. Vasilyev. Russia and Africa in the Global Struggle for Mineral Resources.
It Is Necessary to Expand the Russian-African Cooperation. *Discussion of a Paper*.

A. Golovnyov. Anthropology of Movement: A Historical Methodology and Humanitarian Technology.
The Frameworks of Modern Humanitarian Problems Are Moved Apart. *Discussion of a Paper.*
G. Malinetsky et al. Cognitive Challenge and Information Technologies.
A. Khavkin. The Copyright on Scientific Result.
A. Dresvyannikov, O. Mikhaylov. The Element (Ruthenium)
Named in Honor of the Great Country. *K. Klaus and His Discovery.*
V. Fortov. The Joint Institute of High Temperatures Is 50 Years.

No. 9, 2011

Cosmonautics in the 21st Century. *Report by the President RSC "Energy" n.a. S. Korolev. the Corresponding Member of the RAS* **V. Lopota.**
Presentations of the Meeting Sitters: Academicians **L. Zeleny, B. Chertok, B. Katorgin, A. Grigoryev, V. Fortov, Ye. Galimov.**
Closing Address by RAS President Academician **Yu. Osipov.**
G. Kleyner. A New Theory of Economic Systems and Its Applications.
On the Way to Creating an Integrated Economic Theory. *Discussion of a Scientific Report.*
V. Lakhno. Mathematical Biology and Bioinformatics.
V. Rumyantsev et al. Nanoscale Elements of Limnology.
O. Mikhaylov. A Word in Defense of the Chemistry.
A. Chibilyov, S. Bogdanov. Euro-Asian Border in the Geographical and Cultural-Historical Aspects.
A. Demidov et al. Director of the Main Botanical Garden of the Country.
The 80th Anniversary of Academician L. Andreyev.

No. 10, 2011

General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Diary of a General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Scientific Culture Is an Invaluable Gift of Russia. *Opening Remarks by RAS President Academician Yu. Osipov.*
Report on the Activities of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2010. *Report of Chief Scientific Secretary of the Presidium of the RAS Academician V. Kostyuk*
Speeches by the Participants of the General Meeting of the RAS: Academicians *S. Aldoshin, A. Aseyev, V. Charushin, V. Fortov, M. Kuzmin, V. Kozlov, A. Kokoshin, V. Sergiyenko, N. Kuznetsov*, Chairman of the Board of Trade Union of the RAS *V. Vdovin*, Academicians *S. Grigoryan, V. Panchenko.*
What Stimulates the Development of Theoretical Physics. *Report by Lomonosov Grand Gold Medal Laureate in 2010 Academician S. Belyaev.*
On the Postulate of Free Will in Quantum Mechanics. *Report by Lomonosov Grand Gold Medal Laureate in 2010 G. 't Hooft.*

Closing Remarks by RAS President Academician Yu. Osipov.
On Approval of the Report of the Presidium of Russian Academy of Sciences of the Scientific Achievements of the Academy and the Scientific and Organizational Work of the Presidium of Russian Academy of Sciences in 2010. *Resolution of the RAS General Meeting.*
V. Ivanov, A. Markov. Conceptual Aspects of Formation of Common Scientific and Technological Space of Belarus and Russia.
R. Shcherbakov. The Founder of Russian Science. 300 Years since the Birth of M. Lomonosov.
V. Kotlyakov, A. Tishkov. The Origin of the National Academic Geography.
M. Sverdlov. M. Lomonosov and Russian History.
A. Nozdrachyov, Ye. Polyakov. The State Awards Named After Prominent Russian Scientists.

VOPROSY ISTORII
(Problems of History)

No. 9, 2011

On the Threshold of the Complete Split. Contradictions and Conflicts in Russian Social Democracy, 1908-1912.
A. Iskenderov. History and Myths.
O. Morozova. Nikolay Fyodorovich Gikalo.
V. Molotov's Letter to the CC of the CPSU, 1964.
Ye. Frolova. Political Red Cross Organization and the Soviet Russia.

No. 10, 2011

On the Threshold of the Complete Split. Contradictions and Conflicts in Russian Social Democracy. 1908-1912.
R. Makarenko. Along the Path of Rapallo: The USSR and Germany, 1922-1927.
M.Chinyakov. Francois-Joseph Lefebvre.
V. Molotov's Letter to the CC of the CPSU, 1964.

No. 11, 2011

On the Threshold of the Complete Split. Contradictions and Conflicts in Russian Social Democracy. 1908-1912.
P. Iskenderov. The Origins of the Japanese People.
N. Khaylova. Andrey Mikhaylovich Rykachev.
V. Molotov's Letter to the CC of the CPSU, 1964.

NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA
(Modern and Contemporary History)

No. 5, 2011

Humanitarians in Search of Forms of Dialogue with a Society. On the Results of the General Meeting of the Branch of Historical-Philological Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
R. Simonyan. Socioeconomic Policy in Modern Russia: Its Sources and Some Results.
K. Khvostova. Truth and Objectivity in the History.
I. Gayduk. The United Nations Organization and the Iranian Crisis of 1946.
A. Ayvazyan. The Egyptian Question in the French Foreign Policy in the 1880s.
I. Voronkova, V. Kuzmenko (Belarus). Hitlerite Occupation and the Beginning of Antifascist Struggle in Belarus in 1941.
Academician **V. Myasnikov.** Russia and Japan: Knots of Contradictions (Reflection in Connection with Appearance of the Book of A. Koshkin).
S. Shevchenko. (Kirovograd). From the Historiographic Heritage of Academician Yu. Pisarev. The Ukrainian Lands in East-South Slavic Interconnections of the Beginning of the 20th Century.
From the History of Activities of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Interview with its Former Employee, Doctor of Historical Sciences **A. Galkin.**
N. Kapitonova. "Travelling" with Tony Blair over Pages of His Memoirs.
P. Cherkasov. Comte Charles de Morny—Ambassador of Napoleon III in St. Petersburg (1856-1857).

ROSSIYSKAYA ARKHEOLOGIYA
(Russian Archaeology)

No. 3, 2011

M. Hamakawa, O. Aleksandrova. A Functional and Planigraphic Analysis of Microdebitage (Based on the Materials from Kamennaya Balka II Upper Paleolithic Site).
N. Krenke et al. New Data on the Stratigraphy of the Ushki Sites in the Valley of the River Kamchatka.
Viskalin A. About Ethnocultural Processes in the Mid-Volga and Kama Regions in the Mesolithic and the Neolithic.
Yu. Kuzmina. On the Criteria for Identifying Classical Sanctuaries.
O. Kurinskikh. Arrowheads from the Early Nomads of the Ilek Left Bank, 6th—1st Centuries BC (Based on the Materials from the Burial Grounds Near Prokhorovka).
I. Demicheva. Specific Features of Mayan Men's and Women's Costume from the Classic Period (Based on the Study of Terracotta Figurines).

L. Belyaev. Byzantine Jericho Project-2010: Recent Excavations and New Perspectives.
O. Rumyantseva. The Glass-Making Industry in Roman Times and in the Early Middle Ages: Sources, Facts and Hypotheses.
V. Sedov. Early Byzantine Temple in Apameya Kibotos (Dinar): a Preliminary Report on the 2009-2010 Investigations.
G. Afanasyev. Who Has Actually Built the Levoberezhnoye Tsimlyanskoye Site of Ancient Settlement?
Ye. Arkhipova, A. Tolochko. The "New Date" for the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev: A Critique of the Hypothesis.
A. Medyntseva. Inscriptions and Drawings on the Walls of the Stair Turret in the Church of the Nativity of the Mother of God of the St. Anthony's Monastery in Novgorod.
A. Engovatova, A. Yaganov. New Data on the Assumption Cathedral in the 13th—16th Centuries in Rublyony City of Yaroslavl.
R. Smolyaninov, A. Surkov. Stone Shuttles (the Neolithic of the Don Forest-Steppe).
Yu. Morgunov. House Building in the Ancient Town of Sneporod.

No. 4, 2011

T. Mishina. Pottery Ornaments As Chronological Markers for the Early Bronze Age (Based on Material from Tell Yunatsite, Bulgaria).
A. Bobrinsky et al. Certain Data on the Techniques and Technologies Used by Kura-Araxes Potters (Based on Material from Novo-Gaptsakh Settlement in Dagestan).
A. Khavansky. On the Cultural Identity of Certain Late Bronze Age Sites Near the Town of Orsk.
N. Makarov et al. Radiocarbon Dates for Sites in Suzdal Opolye (Early Iron Age to the Middle Ages).
N. Spasskaya et al. Early Medieval Horses from the Second Half of the 9th—Early 10th Century at Rurik's Hillfort.
A. Gomzin. Fragmentation of Kufic Coins (Based on Materials from the Middle and Lower Oka Regions).
M. Gaydukov. The Stone Towers of the 14th Century of the Okolny Gorod in Veliky Novgorod: Unpublished Materials and New Researches.
V. Yenukov. On Oblique Palisades in the River Seim Region.
Yu. Serikov. Votive Arrowheads from the Cave Sanctuary at Kamen' Dyrovaty (Middle Urals).
S. Andreyev, N. Terekhova. Cruciform Pendants and Their Modifications in Mordovian Culture on the Middle Tsna.
S. Valiulina. Artifacts of Non-Ferrous Metal Found at Toretskoye Settlement, 15th Century.

ETNOGRAFICHESKOYE OBOZRENIE
(Ethnographic Review)

No. 4, 2011

Special Section of the Issue: **Traditional Holidays and Feasts of Peoples of Russia (Guest Editors – L. Tultseva).**
L. Tultseva. Traditional Holidays of Peoples of Russia at the Turn of the Centuries: Introduction to a Discussion.
O. Ulyashev. The "Midsummer Day": The Tradition in Life and Life in the Tradition of the North Khanty.
Ye. Popova. Agricultural Holidays of the Spring-Summer Cycle in the Present-Day Culture and Sociopolitical Life of the Besermyane (an Udmurt Ethnic Group).
G. Kornishina. Calendar Rites of the Mordva As a Factor of Strengthening their Ethnic Identity.
Ye. Romanova, V. Ignatyeva. The Yakut National Festival of Ysyakh in Transition: Historical Myth, Ethnocultural Image and Modern Celebratory Narrative.
T. Molotova. The Holiday of Semyk in the Ethnic Culture of Contemporary Mari.
T. Dronova. Ust-Tsilma Hill: From a Rite to a Republican Holiday.
V. Vlasova, V. Sharapov. The Church, Image, and Holiday of St. Paraskeva-Friday among the Present-Day Udor Komi.
L. Tultseva. Russian Holiday and Demography in the 20th and Early 21st Centuries.
Ye. Filippova. History and Memory in the Epoch of Dominating Identities: An Interview with Pierre Nora, Historian and Member of the French Academy.
M. Butovskaya. Reproductive Success and Economic Status among the Datoga—Semi-Sedentary Pastoralists of Northern Tanzania.
Z. Makhmudova. Silver and Gold in Women's Jewelry in the Caucasus in the Second Half of the 20th Century: A Problem of Sociocultural Replacement.
T. Chudova. Fish in the Food System of the Komi (Zyryan).
I. Zinkovskaya. On New Approaches to Interpretation of the Northern Peoples List in Jordanes's "Getica."
T. Zhdanko. The Amu Darya Organizational Commission of 1875-1876 (Toward the History of the Karakalpak in the Second Half of the 19th Century).

No. 5, 2011

S. Arutyunov. From a Quite One Materiality to a Fleeting: On the Issues in Ethnographic Study of Material Culture (Interview to N. Bogatyr).
P. Vannini. Studies of Material Culture and the Sociology/Anthropology of Technology.
N. Bogatyr. Contemporary Technoculture through the Prism of Relations between Users and Technologies.
D.J. Hess. Ethnography and the Development of Science and Technology Studies.
N. Bogatyr. Recovery Ritual in the Modern Sociotechnological Drama.

A. Novik. Self-Consciousness of Albanians Living in the Ukraine and Their Adaptation: Historical and Linguistic and Extralinguistic Contexts.
L. Ostapenko, I. Subbotina. The Russians of Moldova: Ethnodemographic Transformations.
O. Merenkova. The "British Bangladeshi" in Search of Identity.
T. Yemelyanenko. Paranja in the Traditional Dress of the Bukhara Jews.
V. Tishin. Kazaklyk As a Social Phenomenon.

VOPROSY FILOSOFII
(Problems of Philosophy)

No. 8, 2011

Knowledge of the Past in Present-Day Culture (A Roundtable Discussion). The Participants: V. Lektorsky, B. Pruzhinin, A. Nikiforov, V. Finn, A. Medushevsky, K. Khvostova, D. Lakhuti, G. Malinetsky, M. Kukartseva, N. Sadomskaya, O. Kapelko.
V. Yemelyanov. Historical Progress and Cultural Memory (On Paradoxes of the Idea of Progress).
P. Olkhov. Dialogue As a Way to History (On the Book of V. Makhlin *The Second Consciousness: Approaches to Humanitarian Epistemology).*
A. Brudny. Will, the Ego and Evidence.
Ye. Gruzdeva, V. Kalmykova. *The Lord of the Rings* As a Myth of Postindustrial, Network and Information Society.
V. Zinchenko. Values in the Structure of Consciousness.
Ye. Pribytkova. Vladimir Sergeyevich Solovyov on Moral Imperative of Law.
V. Kantor. "Positively God Person" Helping to Survive (Russian Emigration and Its Keeper).
F. Stepun. The Letters to Maria and Gustave Kullmann. Publication and Commentaries by V. Kantor.
A. Khamidov. The Unusual Work of G. Batishchev.
M. Solopova. Greek Atomism: Hypothesis of Its Origin and Notes on Doctrinal Typology.
I. Izotova. "The Laboratory of Death" of Miguel de Unamuno.

No. 9, 2011

The Unity of the World and Diversity of Cultures (A Roundtable of the Ukrainian and Russian Philosophers Participants from the Ukraine: M. Popovich, A. Onishchenko, A. Konversky, S. Proleyev, O. Bily, V. Malakhov. Participants from Russia: A. Guseynov, V. Lektorsky, B. Pruzhinin, M. Stepanyants, M. Gromov.
M. Kultayeva. The Local in the Labyrinths of the World Society: Methodological Aspect.
V. Fedotova. The Unity and Diversity of Cultures in the Context of Globalization.
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