

ACCL Lecture 4: Infinitary classical propositional logic: Axiomatization and Completeness

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Advanced Course in Classical Logic
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Other connectives ($\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow$) are introduced as abbreviations; in particular:

$$\bigvee \Phi := \neg \bigwedge \{\neg A \mid A \in \Phi\}.$$

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A set $\Gamma \subseteq \text{Fm}$ is **satisfiable** if $v \models \Gamma$ for some valuation v .

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A **derivation from a set of hypothesis** $\Gamma \vdash A$.
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Lemma (Deductive closure of a set of formulas)

For any set Γ , the set Γ_{ω_1} is closed under the rules (MP) and (R $\wedge$).

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We define “layers” indexed by ordinals (i.e. by transfinite recursion):

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Therefore, $f(\vec{a}) \in X_{\omega_1}$. So X_{ω_1} is closed under f . □

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(a) $\Rightarrow$ (b) by Deduction theorem (2). So we prove only (a).

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Therefore, A is not valid.

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Why $\text{Sub}(\Gamma)$ is again at most *countable*?

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Corollary. *If $|\Gamma| \leq \omega$, then $|\text{Sub}(\Gamma)| \leq \omega$.*

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(!) Such a formula B exists by the rule $(R\bigwedge)$.

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The remainder of the proof is in the lecture notes.

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- each countable subset of Γ is satisfiable,
- the whole set Γ is not satisfiable.

Then $\Gamma \models \perp$.

However, $\Gamma \not\vdash \perp$. Indeed, otherwise $\perp$ has a **countable** derivation from Γ .

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However, $\Gamma \not\models \perp$. Indeed, otherwise $\perp$ has a **countable** derivation from Γ . This derivation uses only countable subset $\Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma$. But we know that $\Gamma' \not\models \perp$.