ИСТИНА

At the TSC-2015 I presented an argument against constitutive panprotopsychism. The main idea of it is that nonphenomenal character of protophenomenal properties leads to the rejection of conceivability argument in a sense that there are no such specific phenomenal properties that couldn’t be reduced to physical properties (here it’s a new type of physical properties - “in a broad sense”); or it leads to the new version of conceivability argument - conceivability of panprotopsychist zombie. Now I’m going to discuss further questions that will deal with the basis of my argumentation. My argument is based on a suggestion that there is no a priori entailment from something nonphenomenal to phenomenal at least in the case of constitution. Look at the list of connected statements below: 1. Indeed the initial structure of conceivability argument doesn’t imply that phenomenal properties cannot be grounded in something nonphenomenal. And it’s good news for panprotopsychism; 2. But the idea of the identity of the first intension of consciousness with the second one implies that phenomenal properties cannot be grounded in something nonphenomenal. And it’s bad news for panprotopsychism; 3. The identity of the first intension of consciousness with the second one has primacy over the initial structure of conceivability argument; 4. Since basis of conceivability argument is an explanatory gap, from 3 we learn that it takes a form phenomenal nonphenomenal explanatory gap; 5. Hence, we are bringing bad news for panprotopsychism. But is that indeed bad news? It depends on the question whether a special combination of protophenomenal properties constitutes phenomenal properties. 1. The very idea of constitution is that difference between constituent properties and constituted properties is not in quality, but only in quantity; 2. If a special combination of protophenomenal properties constitutes phenomenal properties, then there should be the difference only in quantity; 3. Difference between nonphenomenal properties and phenomenal properties is in quality; 4. Protophenomenal properties are not phenomenal by the definition; 5. If a special combination of protophenomenal properties implies phenomenal properties, then it’s not a constitution; 6. Hence a special combination of protophenomenal properties doesn’t constitute phenomenal properties. The same works in the case when some combination of protophenomenal properties partly constitutes phenomenal properties. One might reject the definition of constitution above. It’s possible to change the meaning, but the initial idea of using constitution in the case of panprotopsychism is to explain mental causation. And it explains mental causation only if we take a term ‘constitution’ as it proposed above. And there would be inconsistency in using a term ‘constitution’ if we took it in one and another meaning at the same time. And even if panprotopsychism could succeed, it seems it goes beyond the explanation that could have a sense for us in a way of naturalistic explanation of consciousness. Probably taking these obstacles seriously we can handle them if we’ll see that naturalistic explanation is in some special relation connected with a phenomenalistic explanation. Other forms of panpsychism or panprotopsychism face these or another and more serious obstacles.