ИСТИНА

Illusionism is a theory of mind that holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and explains why it seems to exist. One of the arguments against illusionism is the Moorean argument. (1) I perceive a red thing. (2) If I perceive a red thing, illusionism is false. (3) Illusionism is false. evident Key point: premise (1) should be true without presupposing that illusionism is false; I know (1) just by introspection without the claim that illusionism is false. Is it really a question-begging argument? I think that it is not, but I have another worry about it. The original Moore’s proof of the external world goes like that: (1*) Here is a hand. (2*) If here is a hand, skepticism is false. (3*) Skepticism is false. The core of the argument is the common-sense analysis of premise (1*). It’s very natural to think that (1*) follows from (1**): “I know that here is a hand “. We can analyze this as follows: (a) the phrase “here is a hand “ have a correct use; (b) if I really know p, then p, (c) the denial of the phrase “here is a hand “ is ambiguous. If the analysis is true, then it follows from (1**) that there is a hand. Why (2*) is true? To answer that question, we should add at the correct use of the phrase “here is a hand “ implies that a hand is an external entity in the sense that a hand is in space and time. And that seems right because we usually say that a hand is, for example, left to a teacup or it was stronger when I used to go in for sports. But in implying that the premise itself does not presuppose that skepticism is false. But (1) is disanalogous to (1*) and (1**). (1) simply does not claim that I know that I perceive red. If it did, then the illusionists would never agree with it. The illusionists claim that by introspection I believe falsely that I perceive red. It is true that it seems to me that p (I perceive a red), but the belief that p is false. And then (1) is false according to the illusionists: it says “I perceive a red thing “, not that “It seems to me that I perceive a red thing “. We may add to (1) the phrase “I know that “ and say that (1) really means that (a*) “there is a red thing “ has a correct use, (b*) it is true, (c*) it implies that something analogous to “a hand is an external entity in a sense that a hand is in space and time “. If it does not mean (a*)-(c*), that I cannot see how can we prove that (2*) is right. And the illusionists will say that at least (b*) in phenomenal sense and (c*) are false. I believe that the Moorean argument is a good piece of reasoning, but now I cannot see how it can refute illusionism.