ИСТИНА

We consider a model of the tax audit and the problem of selecting candidates for the tax inspectorate taking into account their heterogeneous professional training. It is assumed that at the disposal of the inspection organizer there are trustees who always check correctly, but the costs of conducting inspections by them are very high. Also, the organizer may involve for inspections an unlimited number of rational inspectors who are ready to take bribes, if it is profitable for them. Each inspector is characterized by an inspection accuracy, which determines the average share of the income he reveals when checking the tax evader. Also, the inspector is characterized by an alternative salary, which can be received at another place of work upon dismissal from the tax inspectorate. The organizer of the inspection knows these characteristics of all candidates. The organizer's strategy includes probabilities of inspections and revisions depending on the tax declarations, the salaries of inspectors, and the rule for selecting candidates for inspection. The paper solves the problem of finding the optimal strategy that ensures the fair payment of tax by taxpayers at minimum costs for the inspection organization. The results allow generalization for other government agencies performing law enforcement functions.